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I. Introduction
In Part A of this essay, "The Killing Fields"', I developed a critique of the
disciplinary impulses that underlie modern law and legal theory.
Invoking a number of perspectives and a plurality of analyses, I proposed
that male-stream legal theory and contemporary law both assume as
inevitable, and legitimize as appropriate, the funnelling of violence
through law. The problem with a funnel, however, is that it does not
curtail or reduce that which is channelled through it. On the contrary, to
funnel is to condense and to intensify. Viewed from this perspective,
interpreted from the bottom up, law and legal theory are not the
antithesis of violence but rather its apotheosis.
Critique, however, can only take us so far, and alternative
consciousness is not changed reality. In this second part of the essay, I
attempt to cautiously outline a reconstructive sequel that suggests the
possibility of making law and jurisprudence "otherwise". Specifically, I
filter my reflections and tentative proposals through the critical prism of
feminist theory and practice. Moreover, paralleling the pattern of
argument in the first part of the essay, I will draw on "knowledges" that
have, traditionally, either been alien to, or marginalized by, conventional
jurisprudential inquiry. In this way, I hope to provide some critical
distance on the theory and practice of modern law (and its hegemonic
propensities) thereby enabling us to envision, even if only for a moment,
the possible nature of a postmodern, postpatriarchal juridical regime.
In section II of this part of the essay, through an analysis of feminist
literary criticism and feminist psychoanalysis, I outline two of the
predominant themes that have, historically, pervaded feminist analysis:
equalitarianism and gynocentrism. However, rather than seeing these
approaches as being in conflict or antithetical, I will argue that, though in
tension, they are potentially compatible and even mutually reinforcing. I
will concretize this discussion through an affirmative interpretation of the
analyses of Carol Gilligan and Catharine MacKinnon.la
In section III, I relate these more thematic discussions to an overview
of feminist responses to pornography, while in section IV, I suggest that
the feminist turn to law, as it is currently constituted, while being part of
the solution, tends to reinforce part of the thanatical problem. The
conclusion attempts, briefly, to identify some of the strengths and
1. (1989), 12 Dalhousie L. J. 298. For acknowledgements and caveats see Part A, footnotes
1 and 12. In particular, I am grateful for the critical commentary of Alexandra Z.
Dobrowolsky.
la. This essay was completed prior to the publication of Carol Gilligan et al., Mapping The
Moral Domain (1989) and Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(1989).
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weaknesses of the various theses presented in "Nomos and Thanatos,
Parts A and B."
II.

Feminism

1) The Significance ofFeminism
"The principal objective of feminist criticism has always been political: it
seeks to expose, not to perpetuate, patriarchal practices."
Toril Moi2
Feminism, I think, is at the cutting edge of progressive social movements
within post-industrial society. Feminism, by its very existence,
demonstrates the poverty of liberalism's commitment to equality. It seeks
to realize what for liberalism has been, at best, pious platitudes, 3 at worst,
ideological obfuscation, chicanery and apologetics.4 Feminism is
progressive in the sense that it recognizes and acts upon the needs of
women in contemporary society in order to help them achieve
substantive equality. It aspires to a full recognition of women's humanity.
Feminism helps.
Feminism can be distinguished from other progressive movements in
that it is radically effective. It grows out of, and is underpinned by, the
lived experiences of women and continually strives to improve the social,
economic and political conditions within which women live. Whereas
Marxism has been effectively relegated to the peripheral of the academy
(at least in the rich western countries), feminism is a constitutive element
of modem political practice. Moreover, social democracy, a stunted
hybrid of socialism and liberalism, has proved itself incapable of doing
more than making minor modifications to the basic structure of society,
even when it can work out what it wants to do.
Critical theory, while perhaps the most progressive social theory, has
remained just that, theory. In both its social-philosophical and legal
manifestations it is very much the product of celebrated male professors
at prestigious universities. For most, it is unintelligible and inaccessible, a
sophisticated and convoluted critique with almost no direct or immediate
political relevance. Although visionary, it has not yet made its way into
the interstices of everyday human interaction. Critical theory, at this time,
lacks both the means to communicate and a productive/receptive
constituency.

2. Sexual/Textual Politics(1986) xiv.
3. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (197 1).
4. Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism" in Public and Private Morality 113 (S. Hampshire ed.
1978); Taking Rights Seriously (1978); A Matter of Principle (1984); Law's Empire (1986).
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Feminism has advantages over all the foregoing. First and foremost, it
is existentially located and radically contextual. It never forgets its
experiential roots, its raison d'etre and its ultimate purpose: the
achievement of self determination, "home-rule", 5 and substantive
equality for women. Second, although it is reflective and theoretical, it is
also driven by political necessity and pragmatism. Feminism strives, not
without success, to maintain the link between theory and practice. Third,
it is in the political ascendency. From being an outlandish and illegitimate
quirk in the nineteenth century, it has gradually infiltrated the ranks of
both liberalism and socialism, discovered their limitations, and
transcended them, to espouse its own worldview.
That worldview is large. Feminism does not aspire to being just
another pluralist constituency. It does not limit its agenda to incremental
reformism, although that is one strategy available to feminism. Rather,
feminism seeks to be transgressive and transformative. It is transgressive
in the sense that its ambition is to go beyond the realm of what has
hitherto been considered as the limits of the possible.6 Feminism unmasks
the repressive tolerance of rationalism - the "man on the Clapham
omnibus" - to adumbrate the deep structured inequality, indeed
misogyny, of contemporary society.
Significantly, many feminists argue that for this transgressive dynamic
to be effective there must also be radical transformation. However,
transformation is not to be confused with revolution, with women
replacing the proletariat as the vanguard leading us into the millenium.
Rather, transformation demands a complete restructuring and
dehierarchicalization of human interaction in order to eradicate the
massive imbalance in gender relations. Only in this way can substantive
equality be achieved. In turn, this egalitarian dynamic simultaneously
invokes and motivates a reconstitution of contemporary value structures
so as to de-centre the excessively individualistic ethic which is
characteristic of contemporary society and to emphasize a more intersubjective one. Feminism's long term goal is therefore large: a complete
reworking of our interpersonal relations, a reconstruction of the basic
structures of society, and an alternative understanding of what we have
7
historically known as "human nature".
5. Christine Boyle, "Home Rule for Women: Power Sharing Between Men and Women"
(1983), 7 Dalhousie U. 790.
6. In this sense feminism shares with modernism the disbelief that conventional wisdom is as
constraining as it is facilitative of our human potential. However, as we shall see below,
feminism goes beyond modernism by providing tentative suggestions as to what "otherwise"
might mean.
7. Marilyn French, Beyond Power(1985)ch. 6, "Feminism".
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2) Themes of Feminism
Feminism is, and always has been, a heterogeneous and polyvocal

"movement", one which has undergone numerous metamorphoses over
the period of its existence. 8 Although this lack of fixity may mean that
there is no "one true essential feminism" thereby rendering feminism

undefinable, it is a veritable strength in that it allows for diversity,
historical contingency, openness, ongoing dialogue and self-criticism. It
renders feminism a dynamic and progressive movement.
However, despite this heterogeneity, on my understanding, it is
possible to discern, in particular, two pervasive themes 9 or traditions

which have manifested themselves, with various intensities, in the works
and programmes of different participants at different times. 10 As I shall
suggest, these two themes co-exist in a mutually reinforcing tension"
8. There are many different feminist voices, including, for example,
radical feminism: Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (1981), Liz
Stanley and Sue Wise, Breaking Out FeministConsciousness and FeministResearch (1983);
marxist feminism: Charnie Guettel, Marxism and Feminism (1974), Lydia Sargent (ed.)
Women andRevolution (1981);
socialist feminism: Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction(1981);
critical legal feminism: Fran Olsen, "The Family and the Market" (1983), 96 Harvard L.Rev.
1497, "The Sex of Law" (unpublished manuscript 1984);
psychoanalytic feminism: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982). [Hereinafter cited
as Voice"];
lesbian feminism: Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence"
(1980), 5 Signs 631;
black feminism: Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre(1984);
existentialist feminism: Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1957);
liberal feminism: Elizabeth Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women (1980), Ann Scales,
"Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1980-81), 56 Indiana L.J. 375, Wendy Williams, "The
Equality Crisis" (1982), 7 Womens' Rights Law Reporter 175, Susan Okin, Women in
Western PoliticalThought (1979), "Justice and Gender", 16 Philosophy and Public Affairs 42
(1987), Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (1981), Janet Radcliffe Richards, The
SkepticalFeminist(1980).
For a useful overview of various feminist perspectives see A. Jagger, "Political Philosphies
of Women's Liberation" in Feminism and Philosophy 7 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F Elliston, J.
English, eds. 1977).
9. See also Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, "Introduction: Feminism as Critique"
(1986), 5 Praxis International 365; K. Lahey, "Feminism, Theory and Method" (April 1984),
(Unpublished Paper, presented at special conference on Feminist Legal Theory, Osgoode Hall
Law School); "Equality and Specificity" (unpublished manuscript).
10. It is important that I point out that my claim is not that these two themes, either
conjunctively or in opposition, capture the essence of feminism; they are not necessarily its
determining features. There are many other vitally important cross-currents in the matrix of
feminism which contribute immensely to the richness and novelty of both its theory and
practice. I concentrate on these aspects because they have a direct and immediate impact upon
the nature and direction of feminist jurisprudence. See further, Julia Kristeva, "Women's
Time" (1981), 7 Signs 13.
11. I use the term "tension" in preference to the more vogueish "contradiction" because,
politically, a tension can be more creative than a potentially polarizing and stultifying
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which contributes greatly to the reconstructive nature of feminism. I shall
characterize 2 these as the "equality approach" and the "gynocentric
approach."

a)

The EqualityApproach

Historically, equalitarianism has been the dominant organizing principle
or concept for feminism. The basic claim of the equality approach is that
men and women share a common humanity, that they are fundamentally
equal and that there is no justifiable reason to treat one group as different
from the other.' 3 Consequently, women are entitled to participate in all
aspects of contemporary society. The equalitarian feminist demand is for:
"the full extension of political, civic and juridical equality to women; the
rights to public political participation; the realization of social justice in the
workplace and other institutions and the legal abolition of sex
as to allow women to become full economic, civic and
discrimination such
4
political agents."'
contradiction which may assume a non-transcendable dichotomy. See also Fran Olsen, "The
Family and the Market," supranote 8.
12. James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (1985) draws an important distinction
between characterize and caricature. I propose to do the former.
13. For classic statements of this position see Mary Wollenstonecroft, A Vindication of the
Rights of Women (1792); John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill "The Subjection of
Women" in Essays on Sex Equality 125 (A. Rossi ed. 1970); As framed by Elizabeth Cady
Stanton et al. in the celebrated Seneca Fulls Declaration, feminism considers
these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by
their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.
For a brief review of aspects of the history of women's shifting attitudes on difference and
equality, see Ellen Dubois in "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A
Conversation" (1985), 34 Buffalo L.Rev. 11 [hereinafter cited as "Discourse"]; Janet Radcliffe
Richards, The Skeptical Feminist (1980). E. Lanz and B. Myerhoff even suggest that equality
is a reality in many aspects of contemporary American life, The Feminization of America
(1985). For a useful brief compilation of French women's claims for equality over the last three
centuries, see, New French Feminisms 6-7,28-29 (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1980).
14. See Benhabib and Cornell, supra; note 9. See also: Yolande Cohen "Thoughts on Women
and Power" in G. Finn and A. Miles Feminism in Canada(1983), 229, 235. Equalitarianism
was basic tenet of both the E.R.A. movement and the supporters of entrenching the equality
provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the gender
neutralization of the Criminal Code to reclassify "rape" as "sexual assault". It is also the basic
position adopted by the suffragettes, National Organization for Women, and "La Ligue" now "le Droit des Femmes" in France.
It is important to point out that the quotation in the text is not suggesting what is the essence
of "equality". Rather it is an attempt to capture what, historically, has been the nature,
aspirations and significance of most feminist claims to equality. For a useful discussion of
competing interpretations/visions of equality see Colleen Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and
Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in Charterwatch195
(C. Boyle, A.W MacKay, E. McBride, J.A. Yogis eds. 1986). Sheppard discusses the important
differences between conservative, liberal and post-liberal conceptions of equality.
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Equalitarian feminists also suggest that to accept a distinction based on

gender or reproductive ability is to either risk 5 or tolerate a hierarchical
dualism in which men dominate and women are subordinate.
Equalitarians argue that in the male constructed world in which we live,
difference equals domination. 16 It risks confining women to he "moral
neatness of the female tended hearth". 17 Consequently, some equalitarian
feminists reject what might be called "feminine values" as relics of
8
oppression.1
b)

The GynocentricApproach

"Feminine values are the means of our oppression, the only place we are
allowed to be; but they are also potentially subversive because they are so
contradictory to the established order outside ourselves."
Yolande Cohen 9
The articulation of the gynocentric perspective is of more recent vintage2
in feminism and is still in embryonic form. The basic claim of the

gynocentric approach 2' is that there are important distinctions between

15. See, for example, Wendy Williams' call for an absolute sex neutrality:
If we can't have it both ways, we need to think very carefully which way we chose.
"The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Courts, Culture and Feminism" (1982), 7
Women's Rights L.R. 175, 196.
16. Catharine MacKinnon, "On Difference and Dominance" Feminism Unmodified (1987)
[hereinafter cited as Feminism Unmodified]. It is important to point out that I am not
necessarily identifying equalitarianism with liberal feminism. Although both John Stuart Mill
and Catharine MacKinnon may favour equality over difference it can hardly be said that the
latter is a liberal. By the same token, those who favour gynocentrism may also have very
different politico-economic visions. Feminism throws a spanner in the works of traditional
political pigeon-holing.
17. I.M. Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public" (1986), 56 Praxis International 381, 389.
18. Angela Miles posits that such a rejection can be identified in the works of, inter alia,
Simone de Beauvoir, Second Sex, 23-25 (1953); Shulamith Firestone, Dialecticof Sex (1970);
Juliet Mitchell, "Women: the longest revolution" (1966), 40 New Left Rev. 11, and "Women:
the longest revolution" (1967), 41 New Left Rev. 81; Betty Friedan, Feminine Mystique 55; TiGrace Atkinson, Amazon Odyssey (1974); Jeffner Allen, "Motherhood: The Annihilation of
Women" in Mothering315 (J. Trebilcock ed. 1984).
19. Cohen, supra note 14, at 245.
20. Gynocentrism is not a completely new phenomenon in that, historically, there have been
several feminist activists and theorists who generally fit this perspective. For discussion see:
Michele Riot-Sarcey and Elani Varikas, "Feminist Consciousness in the 19th Century" (1986),
5 Praxis International 443; Sklar, "Hull House in the 1890's: A Community of Women
Reformers" (1985), 10 Signs 658.
21. For the classic collection of articles which incorporate this viewpoint which has influenced
my own thoughts significantly see Feminism in Canada,supra, note 14. Angela Miles describes
this project as "Integrative Feminism", ibid at 12. See also her "The Integrative Feminine
Principle in North American Feminist Radicalism: Value Basis of a New Feminism" (1981),
4 Women's Studies International Quarterly 481 [hereinafter cited as I.F.P.]; "Integrative
Feminism" (1984), Fireweed [hereinafter cited as I.E]. Conspicuous by its absence in this
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men and women, that although this awareness has historically operated
to the disadvantage of women, there is something valuable within this
feminine culture that should be identified, preserved, extended and

shifted from "margin to centre" 22 rather than be surrounded or
abandoned in the quest for equality. This approach seeks to affirm and
(re)valorize characteristics, activities and values such as contextualism
and holism; compassion and responsibility; nurturing and sharing;
cooperation and interdependence; relationalism and empathy; intuition

and emotion. 23Its challenge and re-vision is therefore ambitious: it rejects
the contemporary traditions of moral, political and legal life and aspires
to reconstruct the whole of human interaction on the basis of pro-social,
pro-creative, anti-destructive 24 and (re)productive 2l values. Gynocentrism
interdisciplinary collection is any discussion of law. See, however, K. Lahey, supra note 9 and
Colleen Sheppard, supra note 14, at 216-223.
The sources of gynocentrism and the documentation of women's difference are varied, and
often appear as subtexts rather than explicit, fully recognized themes. Mary O'Brien, Politics of
Reproduction (1981), relates gynocentrism to the birthing process, as does A. Rich, Of Women
Born (1976). Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976), Nancy
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(1978) and Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid andthe Minotaur: SexualArrangements of the
Human Malaise (1976) relate it to psychosocial analysis of human development. Carol
Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982) outlines an alternative moral structure for women, which
differs from the abstract sense of justice which predominates today. Several political
perspectives also incorporate this view: A. Dworkin, Our Blood 63-64 (1976); Capitalist
Patriarchyand the Case for Socialist Feminism (Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979); L. Fritz, Thinking
Like a Woman (1975); N. Harstock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism" in Discovering Reality, 283 (S.Harding and M.
Hintikka eds. 1983).
See also, Barbara Burris, "The Fourth World Manifesto" in A. Koedt et al. Radical
Feminism (1973); B. Ehrenreich and D. English, ForHer Own Good-150 Years of the Experts
Advice to Women (1978), at 342; Roxanne Dunbar, "Female Revolution as the Basis for
Social Revolution" in R. Morgan, Sisterhood Is Powerfu 677 (1970); Sheila Rowbotham,
Woman's Consciousness,Man's World (1973); Dorothy, "Position Paper of a Feminist on the
Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada and the National Ad Hoc
Committee on the Status of Women" (1971), 2 New Feminist 3; Iris Marion Young,
"Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications and Feminist Critiques of Moral and
Political Theory" (1986), 5 Praxis International 381; Judy Chicago, Through the Flower
(1975). For a brief overview of the literature and practice s6e Miles "I.EP." and Fireweed
"I.F.",
ibid
22. Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (1984).
23. These values frequently are contrasted with "malist" or androcentric values such as
individualism and separation, competitiveness and domination, abstraction and rationalism,
and egocentrism.
24. Jeri Dawn Wine even goes so far as to suggest that there isa commitment to non-violence.
"Gynocentric Values and Feminist Psychology" in Feminism In Canada,supra note 14, at 67;
see also Marilyn French, Beyond Power,445 (1985); and S. Ruddick, "Preservative Love and
Military Destruction" in Mothering supra note 18, at 231. see generally, Cynthia E. Enloe,
"Feminists Thinking about War, Militarism and Peace" in Analyzing Gender526 (B. Hess and
M. Ferre eds. 1987).
25. O'Brien, "Feminism and Revolution" in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14, at 252. As
sometimes articulated, gynocentrism privileges reproduction over production, a position that is
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seeks to change the very nature and terms 26 of power relations, "of what
it means to be a woman and what it means to be a man". 27 By drawing
on its reservoir of transformative values, it promises to take us beyond
equality as it has been traditionally conceived, "towards a new departure
for humanity as a whole". 2 It calls for a feminization of humanity and

the negation of the negation imposed by the imperialism of "malestream" conventional wisdom.
Gynocentrism acknowledges that the achievements of equalitarianism

have been significant. 29 However, it suggests that equalitarianism, on its
own, lacks an emancipatory vision, that it constructs feminism as merely
another constituency in the pluralist regime.30 Equalitarianism does not
make the fundamental challenge to man's definition and structuring of

the "prototype human being". Ultimately, its central weakness is that it
comes dangerously close to being premised on an "essentially male model
of humanity". Moreover, it runs the very real dangers of being yet
another patriarchal cul de sac,3' or assimilation.
The equalitarians are similarly perturbed by the gynocentric turn in

feminist discourse. They are seriously concerned that such an approach is
both strategically dangerous and conceptually misconceived. Gynocentrism is perceived as dangerous in that, by seemingly accepting a moral
division of labour, it reconfirms traditional stereotypes of the feminine
woman, thereby restricting women's horizons and confining them to the
as critical of traditional Marxism as it is of liberalism. See for example Linda Nicholson,
"Feminism and Marx: Integrating Kinship with the Economic" (1986), 5 Praxis International
368; Mary O'Brien, "Reproducing Marxist Man", In The Sexism of Social and Political
Theory 107 (L. Clarke & L. Lange eds. 1979); Dorothy Smith, "The Problem of the Main
Business" (Address, Dalhousie University, 9th March 1988).
26. Betty Friedan asks "Can women, will women, even try to change the terms?" The Second
Stage 33 (1981).
27. Geraldine Finn in Feminism in Canada; supra note 14 at 303.
28. A. Miles, in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, at 214. Marcuse, "Marxism and
Feminism" (1974), 2 Women's Studies 279, 281. But see A. Rich for a more cautious feminist
approach:
The urge to leap across feminism to "human liberation" is a tragic and dangerous
mistake.
"Toward a Woman Centred University", Lies, Secrets andSilence (1979) at 134, 11.
The concern of this paper is not to "leap across" feminism, but to inquire into the potential
of feminist reconstruction, and to raise concerns about the pervasiyeness of patriarchal
hegemony, both substantively and methodologically.
29. For a review of the success of equalitarianism in an area of sex discrimination see Herma
Hill Kay, Tex4 cases and materials on Sex-Based Discrimination(2d) (1981). See also W.
Chafe, Women andEquality (1977).
30. Angela Miles, "Ideological Hegemony in Political Discourse: Women's Specificity and
Equality" in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14, 213 at 214. Yolande Cohen, "Thoughts on
Women and Power" in Feminism in Canada, ibid 229 at 230. See also Miles, "I.E.", supra
note 21.
31. Marilyn French, Beyond Power, supranote 6.
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disempowered and deprived 32 private sphere. Difference reinforces and
colludes in the continued marginalization, subordination and oppression
of women.3 3 Egalitarian feminists fear that gynocentrism is conceptually
misconceived in that it simply assumes that these are women's values, an
assumption that smacks of biological reductionism. It is argued, instead,
that gender is socially constructed, that these values are not necessarily
women's but are rather those which the powerholders in society-menhave allowed or imposed upon women. We cannot know what women's
values are because they have been coerced, constrained and inhibited
from developing an autonomous culture. Gynocentrism unmasked, is
perhaps masculinist ventriloquism, or simply an inversion of an always
and already androcentric construction.
The tension between these two themes is deep and pervasive, resulting
in very different theories, analyses and recommendations for practice.
While the concept of equalitarianism is fairly well known and
understood (particularly by lawyers), the concept of gynocentrism will
undoubtedly appear foreign to many readers, and probably utopian. To
make the concept more accessible, I wish to adumbrate two relatively
recent developments which incorporate this perspective. The first will
almost certainly be alien to the vast majority of the legal community: the
New French Feminism, while the second has circulated more widely:
Carol Gilligan's espousal of a "different voice". The purpose of the
following discussion will be to suggest that gynocentrism can have an
existence relatively autonomous from patriarchal hegemony; that
gynocentrism does indicate the possibility of a society and legal system
different from that which currently prevails, and that that difference is
substantive.
i) Difference andLiterary Criticism
a)

34
Trespasserson the Lawns of Patriarchy:
The FeministHermeneutics of Suspicion

32. Hannah Arendt has drawn this politico-etymological connection, The Human Condition
(1958).
33. Miles, "Feminism, Equality and Liberation" in (1985), 1 C.J.W.L. 42, 55. But neither are
the gynocentrists unaware of the danger. Thus Kristeva posits... "What an unbelievable force
for subversion in the modem world! And at the same time what playing with fire!", "Women's
Time" in Feminist Theory: A. Critique of Ideology, 48 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi
eds. 1982). See also I.M. Young, "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics" (1985), 8
Women's Studies International Forum 173, and Sheppard on the dangers and promise of
gynocentrism, supra note 14 at 220.
34. Carolyn G. Heibrun, Forward to Poeticsof Gender at viii (Nancy K. Miller ed. 1986).
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"It is obvious that the values of women differ very often from the values
which have been made by the other sex. Yet it is the masculine values that
prevail."

Virginia WoolP 5

"... it is not difference in itself that has been dangerous to women and
other oppressed groups, but the political uses to which the idea of
difference has been put."
36
Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine

In the last fifteen years or so, various feminist scholars and activists in a
variety of disciplines and fora have begun to recognize the importance
and transformative potential of "difference". These inquiries have taken
place in intellectually
diverse "disciplines" such as "psychoanalysis" and
"psychology"; 3 7 "literature" 38 and "linguistics", 39 "history", 40
"anthropology", 41 and "sociology", 42 "politics '43 and "philosophy"" and,
35. A Room of Ones Own, 76 (1929).
36. Introduction, The Futureof Difference xxiii (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980).
37. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysisand the Sociology of
Gender (1978); Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysisand Feminism (1974); Dorothey Dinnerstein,
The Mermaidand the Minotaur Sexual Arrangements of the Human Malaise (1976); Nancy
Chodorow, "Gender, Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective" in The Futureof
Difference, supra note 36; Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976); S.
Orbach and L.Eichenbaum, Understanding Women: A Feminist PsychoanalyticApproach
(1983).
38. Writing and Sexual Difference (E. Abel ed. 1982); The New FeministCriticim:Essays on
Women, Literature and Theory (E. Showalter ed. 1985); Gynocritics/Gynocrituques:Feminist
Approaches to Canadianand Quebec Women Writers (Barbara Godard ed. 1987).
39. Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place (1975); Cheris Kramarae, Women andMen
Speaking (1981); C. Kramer et al. "Perspectives on Language and Communication" (1978),
3 Signs 638; Sally McConnell Ginet, "Difference and Language: A Linguists Perspective" in
The Futureof Difference 157, supra note 36; S. McConnell Ginet et al. Women and Language
in Literature and Society (R. Borber & N. Furman eds. 1980); Language and Sex: Difference
and Dominance(B. Thome & Nancy Henley eds. 1975); Symposium (1978), 3 Signs.
40. Bernice A. Carroll, Liberating Womens History (1976); Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre
English, For Her Own Good (1978); Gerda Lerner, The Majority Finds Its Past Placing
Women in History (1979); Joan Kelly, Women, History and Theory (1984);'Alison Prentice et
al. CanadianWomen: A History (1988).
41. Toward an Anthropology of Women (Rayna Rapp Reiter ed. 1975); Woman, Culture and
Society (M. Rosaldo and L.Lamphere eds. 1974).
42. Another Voice FeministPerspectiveson Social Life and SocialScience (1975).
43. Elizabeth Janeway, The Powers of the Weak (1980); Elizabeth Janeway, "Women and
the Uses of Power" in The Future of Difference supra note 36 at 327; Ruth Messinger,
"Women in Power and Politics" in The Future of Difference supra note 36 at 318; Alison
Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983); N. Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power:
Toward a Feminist HistoricalMaterialism (1983); Marilyn French, Beyond Power (1985);
Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (1984); Alison McPhail et al
Women OrganizingFor Change (1988).
44. Elizabeth Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women (1980); Women and Values:
Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy (M. Pearsall ed. 1986); Mothering (Joyce Trebilcot
ed. 1984); Alice Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Women and Modernity (1985); M.
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the masculinist bastion par excellence, "science". 45 North American legal
communities, however, have been somewhat slower to take up these
initiatives," and efforts to discuss legal recognition and espousal of
difference immediately conjure up legitimate concerns about the racist,
hierarchicalized dichotomy of "separate but equal" as immortalized by
47
Plessy v. Ferguson.
Still, I think it is important for lawyers, and particularly crucial for
(pro) feminist lawyers, to discuss "difference" as a useful, desirable and
possibly even essential politico-legal strategy, in achieving the ultimate
goal: real equality and choice for women. To introduce this discussion of
law and difference, it may be helpful if we trace the development of
similar discourses in another discipline where there has already been
substantial progress on such issues.
One of the most prolific and potentially fruitful developments in the
last ten years in thinking about law has been the transdisciplinary impulse
to relate law and literature. This "interpretative turn"48 is of crucial
Belenky, B. Clinchey et al., Women's Way of Knowing (1986); Women andMoral Theory (E.
Kittay, D. Meyers eds. 1987); N. Noddings, Caring:A FeminineApproach to Ethics andMoral
Education (1984); B. Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics
(1985); Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers (1986); Caroline Whitbeck, "A Different
Reality: Feminist Ontology" in Beyond Domination (Carol Gould ed. 1984); Gloria Steinham,
"If Moral Decay is the Question, is a Feminist Ethic the Answer", Ms. Magazine, Sept. 1987,

57. For a particularly powerful French critique of the imbricated patriarchy of philosophy see
Michele Le Doenf, "Women and Philosophy" (1977), 17 Radical Philosophy 2.
45. S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); E. Keller, Reflections on Gender
and Science (1985); "Special Issue I: Feminism, and Science" (1987), 2 Hypatia; "Special
Issue II Feminism and Science" (1988), 3 Hypatia.
46. But see Colleen Sheppard, supra note 14.
47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For classic examples of the sexism of the separate spheres ideology
at work see, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 16 Wall. 141 (1873); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S., 28 S.Ct. 324 (1908); Geduldig v. Aiello, 471 U.S. 484 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981); Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

For Canadian equivalents see, In re Mabel P French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359 (S.C.); Edwards
v. A.G. for Canada, [1928] S.C.R. 276; [1930] A.C. 124, [1929] 3 W.W.R. 479, (1930] 1
D.L.R. 98 (P.C.). [The Persons Case]. For further discussion of this case see M.J. Mossman,
"Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes" (Unpublished manuscript, Sept.
1986); Bliss v. A.G. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 711, 92 D.L.R. (3d)
417.
48. See Brest, "Interpretation and Interest" (1982), 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765; Fish, "Fish v. Fiss"
(1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325; Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982), 34 Stan. L. Rev.
739; "Interpretation Symposium" (1985), 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1; "Symposium: Law and
Literature" (1982), 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373; Weisberg, "A Response to Fish and White" (1984),
5 Miss. C.L. Rev. 57; White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life" (1985), 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684; see also McIntosh, "Legal Hermeneutics: A
Philosophical Critique" (1982), 35 Okla. L. Rev. 1; Patterson, "Interpretation in Law Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate" (1984), 29 Vill. L. Rev. 671; Phelps & Pitts,
"Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal
Interpretation" (1985), 29 St. Louis U.L.J. 353. Levinson, "On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely:
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significance for an understanding of law, in that one of its central
achievements has been to reject the "received hierarchy of text and
reader", 49 thereby highlighting the relationalnature of author-text-reader,
and inducing the correlative awareness of the unavoidability of the
plurality of legal meanings. The interpretative turn therefore challenges,
in a fundamental way, the traditional jurisprudential dichotomization of
law as either a transcendental subject or reified object. It recognizes law
as relational, interpretable, and non-essential.
Unfortunately, as is common with jurisprudential discourse, the
openness of this interpretative turn is more apparent than real. Not only
are the law and literature debates very much the progeny of an elite and
perhaps politically irrelevant academy, they are predominantly a malecentred and male-determined debate. Put differently, despite a vibrant
and vital dynamic of feminist literary criticism and theory, gender
conscious interpretations have been muted in the legal academy.50
In this part of the article I hope to trace a pattern. I wish to briefly
discuss aspects of the more traditional feminist analyses of literature
which focus most of their efforts on demonstrating the gender bias of
most traditionally valued literature. I hope to make explicit the homology
between this enterprise and equalitarianism. On this foundation, I wish to
proceed to a more recent impulse in feminist literary theory, one which
can be usefully identified as a countertradition of "a different voice". In
order to partake of the flavour of this impulse it will be helpful if we
abandon the parochialism of North American inquiry, to encourage
inter-cultural exchange by outlining the work of one particularly vocal
grouping of feminist voices, what has become known as the New French
Feminisms. This critical discussion will help identify potential sources for
that different voice. The final section will attempt to articulate the
substance of that voice, thereby leading us towards an "ethic of care",
which, I suggest, tentatively leads towards a legal theory and practice that
can point towards the transcendence of our current, thanatically
determined legal system.

Decoding the Legal Past" (1984), 51 Partisan Rev. 248, 262; See Fried, "Sonnet LXV and the
"Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention" (1987), 100 Harv. L Rev. 751; Posner, "Law and
Literature" (1986), 72 Va. L. Rev. 1351; Christopher Norris, "Law, Reconstruction and the
Resistance to Theory" (1988), 15 Journal of Law and Society 166.
49. Toril Moi, Sexual/TextualPolitics 25 (1986).
50. An obvious and urgent question is "Why?". Clearly such a question goes beyond the
narrow confines of this paper but I would suggest that the reason is not because feminists do
not wish to participate in the interpretative turn, rather it is because the academy - be it
literary, legal or even left - views feminism with a seige mentality, as a threat to the cosy
comfort of the intellectual old boys club.
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The FeministEqualitarianCritiqueof Literary Criticism
In 1981, Elaine Showalter posited that it was possible to identify two
modes of feminist criticism. The first she identified as "the feminist
critique" claiming that,
it is concerned with feminist as reader, and it offers feminist readings of
texts which consider the images and stereotypes of women in literature,
the omissions and misconceptions
about women in criticism, and women
as signs in semiotic systems. 51
Showalter identified the second mode as "gynocriticism" which
emphasizes
the study of women as writers, and its subjects are the history, styles,
themes, genres and structures of writing by women; the psychodynamics
of female creativity, the trajectory of the individual or collective
female
52
career and the evolution ard laws of a female literary tradition.
My suggestion is that "the feminist critique" homologizes with
equalitarianism, while "gynocriticism" parallels "difference".
It will be helpful if we articulate the basic project of "the feminist
critique" in a little more detail. On a general level, feminist critics have
identified language as "a", perhaps "the", central cultural phenomenon
which constructs our understanding of the world and our mutual
interaction. Words are neither essential nor transcendental, they are
socially constructed. 53 Recognizing its inherently socialized and
socializing potential, feminists have posited that language is a major
component in the continued existence of sexism and patriarchy.5 More
specifically, by connecting text with context, feminist critics claim that
gender and literature are inextricably intertwined, that gender-related
factors are systemic and pervasive in the creation, dissemination and
consumption of any literary work. Feminist criticism identifies the sexism
of textual politics. Having identified these concerns, feminist critics claim
that the impact of this gender encoding upon the reader is large, that it
contributes in a significant way to the structuring of a reader's
understanding and acceptance of social relations. Language imposes
men's meaning upon women.

51. "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry 179, 182.
52. bid at 184-185. Invoking the empowering dynamic of naming, Showalter continues, "no
English term exists for such a specialized critical discourse and so I have invented the term
"gynocritics".
53. For similar arguments from a neo-Marxist perspective see Culture, Media, Language
(Stuart-Han et al. eds. 1980).
54. Sheila Rowbotham, Women's Consciousness,Man's World 32-33 (1973); Dale Spender,
Man MadeLanguage (1980).
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The oppositional activities mobilised by such a critique range from the
"obvious" - which had not been so obvious until the critique was made
- to the subtle. Feminist critics draw attention to the unjustifiable
preponderance of male authors in academic syllabi. They relate this bias
to a patriarchal educational system which systematically undervalues and
ignores women's literary contributions because of its deeply entrenched
premise that "artistic creativity is a fundamentally male quality". 5 By
interpreting through a "hermeneutics of suspicion"5 6 feminists unmask
and criticize the sexism and misogyny of cultural texts from Petrarch to
Shakespeare, from classical mythology to the Bible - both the Old
Testament and the New, - from Chaucer to Milton, from fairy tales to
pornography, from D.H. Lawrence to Norman Mailer.5 7 They argue that
the use of the generic "he" universalizes maleness, reinforces
androcentricity as the benchmark of existence, and erradicates women's
undeniable contribution to society. They object strongly to female
stereotyping inculcated via "images of women" which are constructed in
literature, thereby providing a severely constrained panorama of role
models for women. 8 One aspect of the critical project is consciousness
raising, to help the reader become a "resisting reader",5 9 to be aware of
the ideological fallout of uncritically absorbing such texts. 6° In brief,
feminist critics unpack the sexual politics of the aesthetic.
The parallels with equalitarianism in other fields are obvious. The
6
basic criticism is that women have been excluded, perhaps intentionally, '
and that the enforced silence has been an important aspect in the
continuing subordination and inequality of women in society. The
critique is levelled against the exclusion with its correlative detrimental
impact upon women, but as call for action it articulates little more than
a demand for access and inclusion, 62 a fair kick at the literary-linguistic
can. "Feminist theorists seek equality and bolster their demands with

55. S. Gilbert and S. Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic (1979).
56. E. Showalter, "Towards a Feminist Poetics" in Women Writing and Writing About
Women, 22 (M. Jacobus ed. 1979). Showalter adopts this phrase from Paul Ricouer, Freud
and Philosophy, 32-36 (1970).
57. See for example, Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (1970); Katherine M. Rogers, The
Troublesome Helpmate (1986); Elizabeth Meese, Crossing TheDouble Cross 9 (1987).
58. Mary Ellman, "Feminine Stereotypes" in Thinking About Women (1968); Susan
Kippelman Cornillon, Images of Women in Fiction (1972).
59. Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader (1978).
60. Annette Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Minefield..." (1980), 6 Feminist Studies 1.
61. "Women writers were not haphazardly 'forgotten' but deliberately buried", Annis Pratt,
"The New Feminist Criticism" (1970-71), 32 College English 872.
62. Annette Kolodny, "Some notes on defining a feminist literary criticism" (1975-76), 2
Critical Inquiry 75.
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claims of similarity. '63 This type of feminist criticism and revision is
important in that it explodes the liberal myths of cultural pluralism and
openness to reveal that our literary-linguistic geneology has been truly
history thereby excluding women's heritage. 64
However, it soon becomes apparent that this negative critique, the
unearthing of the archaeology of women's silence, although necessary
and certainly beneficial, is by no means a sufficient foundation for fully
articulating women's contributions - past and present - to literature.
The feminist effort to revise the male bias inherent in the evolution of
literary merit leaves too much of the methodological, if not the
substantive, androcentric structure intact. As Showalter pithily posits:
the feminist obsession with correcting, modifying supplementing, revising,
humanizing or even attacking male critical theory keeps us dependent
upon it and
retards our progress in resolving our own theoretical
65
problems.
Feminist criticism continues to work within the masculinist paradigm,
it does not challenge the paradigm itself in any fundamental way. It is
partial rather than total criticism of the "economy of sameness",66 The
most obvious example of its limitations is that its analyses are primarily
concerned with male texts.
In the light of these limitations, Showalter calls for a "feminist criticism
that is genuinely women centred, independent and intellectually
coherent. It must find its own subject, its own system, its own theory, its
own voice ...we must choose to have the argument out at last on our
own premises. '67 This she names "gynocriticism" and emphasizes that its
68
fundamental question is "what is the difference of women's writing"?
The most important shift envisioned by this proposal is that the data
base be primarily women's texts, not those of men. 69 The potentially
63. Elizabeth Abel, Introduction (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry 173.
64. For a less than sympathetic male response which seeks to accommodate feminist criticism
by reducing it to just another constituency in the cacophany of literary critical voices, see K.K.
Ruthven, FeministLiteraryStudies (1984).
65. Showalter, supra, note 51, at 183.
66. Meese, supra note 57, at 17.
67. Showalter, supra note 51, at 184.
68. ]bid, at 185.
69. Not surprisingly, the primary emphases have been on the texts of white women, first world
women, heterosexual women. Little was said at the time about lesbian or black women's
literature or criticism. In recent years intragender differences have begun to be articulated, and
not always without pain and mutual criticism. See, e.g., A. Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence" (1980), 5 Signs 631, On Lies, Secrets and Silences (1979); B.
Zimmerman, "What has never been: an overview of lesbian feminist literary criticism" (1981),
7 Feminist Studies 451; Barbara Smith, Towards a Black Feminist Criticism (1980). For more
general discussions of the occlusion of different women see: Marilyn Frye, The Politics of
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radical correlative of this "search for a muted female culture" 70 is that it
provides the opportunity for an autonomous and distinctive feminist
critical theory and practice of writing. Moreover, it opens up space for
something more than negative critique, in so far as it reveals a sustained
and ingenious feminist resiliance to what had, at first blush, appeared to
be a totalizing masculinist hegemony. The necessary critique clears the
way for the reconstruction and affirmation of a tradition "of expressivity
outside the dominant discourse" that not only can be recognized and
redeemed, but also expanded.
Showalter's call was less an exhortation to commence a new
endeavour than an articulation of what had already been intersticially
underway in the anglophone feminist literary circles for the preceding
several years. Several North American books and articles had been
published which, despite important differences, had sought to identify
both the existence of an extensive women's literature and the ways in
which women's writing had been different. 71 They also began to inquire
72
as to whether gender had been a determining factor in that difference.
However, in general, these anglophone efforts did not identify as their
central concern the pivotal question of why women's writing was, and
continues to be, different. Their discussions were diverse rather than
central, in part because their tradition of North American empiricism left
little space for more sustained reflection.
In the last five years or so, it may be possible to detect yet another shift
in emphasis, or at least direction, in anglophone feminist literary thought.

Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (1983); Bell Hooks, Ain't I a Woman Too: Black Women
andFeminism (1981), Feminist Theory: from Margin to Center (1984); Gloria Joseph, "The
Incompatible Menage a Trois: Marxism, Feminism and Racism", in Women and Revolution;

91-107 (L. Sargent ed. 1981); Audre Lorde, "An Open Letter to Mary Daly", in This Bridge
Called My Back- Writings by Radical Women of Color, 94-97 (Cherri Moraga and Gloria
Anzaldua eds. 1981); Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V Spelman, "Ha'e We Got a Theory

for Youl Feminist Theory, CulturalImperialism and the Demand for the Woman's Voice"
(1983), 6 Hypatia Women's Studies International Forum 6, at 578-81; Elizabeth Spelman,
"Theories of Race and Gender: The Erasure of Black Women" (1980-82), 5 Quest 4, 36-62.
70. Moi supranote 2 at 76.
71. See for example, The (M)other Tongue: Essays in Feminist PsychoanalyticInterpretation
22-23 (Shirley Nelson Gardiner et al. eds. 1985).
72. See for example, Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Female Imagination (1975); Ellen Moers,
Literary Women (1976); Elaine Showalter, A Literature of their Own (1977); Nina Baym,
Woman's Fiction (1978); Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic
(1979), Margaret Homans, Women Writers and Poetic Indentity (1980); Annette Kolodny,
"Some Notes on Defining a 'feminist literary criticism"' (1975-76), 2 Critical Inquiry 75;
Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place (1975). For a useful review of some of these
important texts see Toril Moi, supra; note 2, Ch. 3 and 4. Indeed, as early as 1923 Virginia
Woolf had suggested the possibility of such a distinctive mode of writing in her references to
"a woman's sentence" in"Romance and the Heart", Contemporary Writers 124 (1965).
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There now appear to be several serious North American attempts to
suggest explanations as to why women might speak and write differently
from men, in The (M)other Tongue.73 This relocation of emphasis is
inspired by the desire to challenge the androcentric literary paradigm, to
critique its unidimensionalism and exclusivity, and to give original value
to that which has been traditionally devalued by the masculinist
74
gatekeepers of the literary establishment.
However, the main impulse underlying this differential enterprise has
not been indigeneously anglophone. Rather, it has been inspired by a
group of women scholars working, for the most part in France, to
articulate, justify and valorize the importance of "difference". Their
contribution is both intriguing and politically crucial so it may be useful
if we partake of a "French detour" in order to develop a critical
awareness of the origins, development and impact of difference.
b)

The Cartographiesof Silence:75
i) New French Feminisms:76 Difference Developed- The Sources of the
Different Voice
The limits of my language means the limits of my world.7877
To imagine a language, means to imagine a form of life.
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Like their Anglo-American counterparts, the primary concern of the
New French Feminists (N.EF) is to inquire into the nature and relations
of language, power and gender. They also identify and critique the
historical exclusion of women from culturally valued discourse and
writing as a central component in the oppression and repression of
women by phallocratic 79 societies. Where the N.F.F come into their own,
73. The (M)otherTongue supra note 71. See, also, Writing andSexual Difference (Elizabeth
Abel ed. 1982); The Poetics of Gender(Nancy K. Miller ed. 1986).
74. See for example Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language,
Power and Meaning" (1981-82), 7 Signs 603.
75. A. Rich, The Dream of a Common Language(1978).
76. For useful introductions to the New French Feminists, See Elaine Showalter, "Feminist
Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry 179; Ann Rosalind Jones, "Writing the
Body: Toward an Understanding of L'criture Frminine" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 247;
Elaine Marks, "Women and Literature in France" (1978), 3 Signs 832; Carolyn Greenstein
Burke, "A Report from Paris: Women's Writing and the Women's Movement" (1977-78), 3
Signs 843.
77. Cited in K.K. Ruthven, FeministLiteraryStudies 59 (1984).
78. PhilosophicalInvestigations para. 19, 53 (1958).
79. French feminists frequently refer to the prefix "phal" in order to identify the inherent
maleness of so much of contemporary knowledge, social structures, and social activities. This
term has also begun to infiltrate jurisprudential discourse, see e-g. Christine Littleton,
"Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987), 75 Cal. L.Rev. 1279.
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however, is their adamant insistence that the reason for this systemic
silencing and enforced absence has been the masculinist refusal to
recognize women's specificity, women's difference. They advocate that
the effective vocalization and inscription of such difference would
seriously threaten the monologic, phallus-identity fundamental to
mankind's domination of others, including women and nature. The
N.EE's attempt to challenge this androcentric colonialism by being
positive, by tentatively creating, locating, and valorizing alternative,
specifically feminist, languages and literature - what they call parole
fiminine, l'criturefiminine.80 Thus, the central concern for the N.F. is
not feminism and equality, but feminism and difference and their
mutually constitutive relationship.
The historical origins of the N.EE can, roughly, be traced back to the
psuedo-revolutionary days of May 1968, and the subsequent realization
that the radical men of the New Left were just as patriarchal, sexist and
intolerant of gender issues as their bourgeois forefathers and brothers. In
response, the Mouvement de Libdration des Femmes (M.L.E)8 1 sought to
develop its own distinct agendas, agendas that were responsive to the
concerns and needs of women. Their activities have ranged from
consciousness raising groups to intentionally polemical political action,
from the creation of alternative discursive fora to the establishment of
non-co-optable journals and even an independent publishing house.
Their underlying motivation has been to identify and challenge the deep
structural sexism of contemporary French culture, what they called
"everyday sexism".8 2
The intellectual geneologies of the N.F.F. are extremely diverse,
including biology, linguistics, neo-Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis,
social contructionism, structuralism, Derridean deconstruction, and neoMarxism. Predictably, but unfortunately, because of this genealogical
prehistory much of the N.EE is, at best, unfamiliar and demanding and,
at worst, inaccessible to the uninitiated.8 3 But difficulty, as Colin McCabe
80. It should go without saying that not all French feminists agree with the N.EE analysis,
assessment, critique and program. Others, including de Beauvior, have voiced serious concerns
about the dangers in espousing difference. See also Monique Wittig, The Guerillas (1973)
trans. David LeVay. For useful North American introductions to this opposition to N.FE See
H.V. Wenzal "The Text as Body Politics" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 264; Ann R. Jones,
"Writing the Body" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 247.
81. The M.L.F was not an organization, but rather an amalgam of diverse radical women's
groups, including "Politique et psychanalyse" and "Feministes revolutionaires". For a fuller
discussion of the troubled history of the M.L.E see Toril Moi, "Introduction" FrenchFeminist
Thought (1987); Claire Duchen, Feminismin France(1986).
82. This historical account draws heavily on marks and de Courtivron, The New French
Feminisms (1980), Introduction III, and Duchen supra note 81.
83. Marks, supra, note 76, at 833.
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points out, "is an ideological notion ...(because) within our ascriptions
of difficulty lie subterranean and complex evaluations",84 Difficulty is
integrally connected with unfamiliarity, lack of experience. But these
"circumstances of ignorance" are not fixed, essential or fortuitous. They
are not very much the outcome of social structures that have been chosen
and perpetuated by those with the power to construct and constrain our
cultural milieu and experiences. Thus, those who aspire to be progressive
should be suspicious about the familiar and the facile and, at least, be
open-minded about the unfamiliar and the difficult. More importantly,
difficulty is inevitable in that in attempting to achieve what the N.EE
aspires to - articulating that which has never been articulated - is, of
necessity, unfamiliar. It is a new language.
The New French Feminisms have gone beyond a programme of
critique, of unmasking sexism and stereotyping - both explicit and
implicit - of unpacking the omissions and misconceptions in traditional
literature. Although beneficial and necessary, such consciousness-raising
strategies are perceived as inadequate by many french feminists. At best,
they may push for a reformist equality, an equality that runs the risk of
simply smoothing the sharp edges of misogyny, sandpapering the
extremities and thereby permitting, indeed perhaps even reinforcing, the
continued existence of the basic structures of masculinist hegemony.
Instead, the N.EE propose and proceed immediately with their vision:
to directly undercut traditional textual conventions through the
subversive tactics of appropriating and revising women's texts, styles and
themes, and by articulating the traditional muteness of difference. The
N.EE seek to elucidate the distinctiveness of women's language "in
contrast, not relation, to the dominant conventions".85 They seek to
present a new, alternative, gender-specific vantage point (episteme)
independent and subversive of, and different from, the currently
prevailing phallocentric paradigm. "... L'1criture feminine ...reasserts
the value of the feminine and identifies the theoretical project of feminist
criticism as the analysis of difference.18 6 Central to this project of
articulating and valorizing difference has been their eulogy and
reappropriation of "la jouissance", 7 women's pleasure, the libidinal

84. Preface, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds (1987).
85. Elizabeth Abel, Introduction, "Writing and Sexual Difference" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry
173, 177.
86. Elaine Showalter, supra note 51, at 186.
87. "Jouissance" is one of the central terms of French feminist literary discourses. There does
not exist a suitable English language equivalent for this experience. Reflecting the importance
of the power of naming, this has now become a neologism in certain North American feminist
circles. Marks and de Courtivron interpret it as follows:
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economy of women. Difference and la jouissance, they suggest, have the
power to de-range and de-centre the "reigning phallus". 88
Leading names within this gynocritical dynamic include H6lne
Cixous, 89 Julia Kristeva, 90 and Luce Irigaray, 91and their texts have been
92
energizing catalysts for a host of others.

ii) Hlne Cixous
Cixous is profoundly skeptical of equalitarianism suggesting that it is a
bourgeois feminist effort to gain legitimacy within a patriarchal society.

The verb jouir ("to enjoy, to experience sexual pleasure") and the substantive la
jouissance ("sexual pleasure, bliss, rapture") occur frequently in the texts of the new
French feminisms.... This pleasure, when attributed to a woman, is considered to be
a different order from the pleasure that is represented within the male libidinal economy
often described in terms of the capitalist gain and profit motive. Women's jouissance
carries with it the notion of fluidity, diffusion, duration. It is a kind of potlatch in the
world of orgasms, a giving, expending, dispensing of pleasure without concern about
ends or closure. One can easily see how the same imagery could be used to describe
women's writing.
Supra, note 82 at 36-37.
Marilyn French has adopted this idea, but has anglicized it to render it a "pleasure
principle", a counterparadigm to the patriarchal dynamic towards power and domination, an
ethical standard which can provide guidance and encouragement in the project of "feminizing
the world". Beyond Powersupra note 7, Chs. 6 and 7.
88. Elaine Marks and I. de Courtivron, supra note 82 at 36.
89. Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1975-76), 1 Signs 875; Portraitde Dora
(1986); Angst (1977) (Trans 1985).
90. Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) (Margaret Waller trans.); About
Chinese Women (1977) (Anita Burrows trans.): Powers of Horror(1932), (Leon Roudiez
trans.); Polylogue (1977); Desire in Language(Leon Roudiez ed. 1980); The KristevaReader
(Toril Moi ed. 1986).
91. Luce Irigaray, Speculun de I'autrefemme (1974) (Gillian C. Gill trans. Speculurv Of the
Other Woman (1985); Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (1977) (Catherine Porter trans., This Sex
Which is Not One (1985)); Amante Marine:De FriedrichNeitzche (1980). In this paper I do
not discuss the contribution of Luce Irigaray. Drawing on post-Lacanian psychological theory
and deconstruction, Irigaray argues that, traditionally, women have been culturally understood
as the "other" of man, as lack, deficiency, incompleteless and, ultimately, as his inferior. Thus,
she argues that womens oppression/repression is not simply political or economic, rather it is
imbricated in our very understanding and knowledge of the world.
Her affirmative practice is to suggest, inchoately, a conception of woman as she might exist
beyond masculine representations of her. I say "inchoately" because to identify woman via a
male constructed language would be to represent her, but once again only within the discourse
of male theory. Irigaray therefore prefers the gaps, the silences, the blanks in order to indicate
but not to define. However, when Irigaray does move beyond refusal and invocation of the
blank spaces, she also draws on maternal and reproductive metaphors, as well as female
sexuality. See for example "When Our Lips Speak Together" (1980), 6 Signs 69.
92. See Elaine Marks, supra, note 76 at 838-840. It should also be pointed out that each of
these women insist that their projects are diverse from the others, that their work is not an
integrated vanguard. Indeed, there are, perhaps fundamental, political differences between
them.
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Her ambition is the transformation of patriarchal society, to reconstruct
it upon a more heterogeneous basis, a society underpinned by a feminine
multiplicity, a substantively different, matrifocal and alterior society.
The central concern of Cixous' work is the connection between
women's writing and women's body.93 By articulating and developing
this connection, Cixous attempts, through a metaphorical discourse, to
envision a less dichotomized, mutually alienating conjuncture of social
relations. Her enterprise is to imagine and evoke both the means and the
possible nature of a society liberated from phallocratic domination. In
pursuit of this end, she quests for transformed language and literature.
Cixous' work is remarkably evocative, imaginative and suggestive,
both in form and substance. 94 On occasion, she indicates that the actual
biological sex of the author is irrelevant, that difference is to be located
in the writing itself.95 However, her most significant work challenges the
masculine tradition of father as creator by locating the source of
difference in women's bodies, thereby emphasizing "the voice of milk
and blood". 96 Through euphoric "verbal rhapsody" 97 she envisons the
female body as plenitude, as capable of a plethora of procreative
capabilities: gestation, birth, lactation, writing.
She is giving birth, with the strength of a lioness. Of a plant. Of a
cosmogony. Of a woman ... A desire for text! Confusion! What possesses
her? A child! Paper! Intoxications. I'm overflowing! My breasts overflow!
Milk. Ink. The moment of suckling. And I? I too am hungry. The taste of
milk, of ink!98
The richness of these maternal metaphors, while themselves pregnant,
are also a source of dilemma. Despite her apparent rejection of
reductionist biologism and essentialism on a theoretical level, Cixous
seemingly buys into these understandings in the course of her own,
intentionally inspirational, literary practice, thereby problematically
reducing "jouissance" to either women's reproductive opportunity or
their sexuality, a pleasure principle equally and exclusively accessible to

93. See for example La venue h l'criture(1977).
94. Form is just as important as substance, and the work of activists like Cixous is pervaded
by openness, non-linearity, fluidity, polysemicism, disconnection.
95. See Moi, supra note 2 at 108. For example, at one point she indicates that Jean Genet's
work indicates traits of "feminite". See "Laugh" supra note 89 at 855.
96. Sandra Gilbert, "A Tarantella of Theory" Introduction, The Newly Born Woman; (1986)
(Betsy Wing trans.).
97. Domna N. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" in The Poetics of Gender, supra note 34 at 169.
98. In La venue 6 l'dcriture 37 (1977). For similar invocations of the "white ink of mothers
milk" see "Laugh" supra note 89. At times, Adrienne Rich also appears to accept that women's
difference is related to their biological capabilities. See for example Of Woman Born 11, 62
(1977).
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all women. Her political strategy for the empowerment of women leads
her onto the treacherous ledge of the transcendental, metaphysical
"universal woman subject", 99 the mythical earth-mother, and perhaps
back to the masculinist and/or conservative identification of woman with
nature, only now it is "anatomy is textuality". 1 °
Moreover, despite, or perhaps because of, her metaphorical l01 and
"utopian"' 0 2 predelictions and her over-emphasis on the maternal
location, Cixous never provides her audience with an account of the
substance of difference. Indeed, on the contrary, in her celebrated
(wo)manifesto "Laugh of the Medusa", she goes so far as to deny the
possibility of defining the feminist practice of writing:
For this practice can never be theorized, enclosed, encoded - which
doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. But it will always surpass the discourse
that regulates the phallocentric system; it does and will take place in areas
other than those subordinated to philosophico-theoretical domination. 0 3
Thus, although Cixous goes beyond critique, her affirmative program
remains disconcertingly indeterminate, disturbingly essentialist and
tantalizingly suggestive, but ultimately underdeveloped to serve as an
empowering, transformative strategy. Something more specific, although
necessarily corrigible, is required.
iii) JuliaKristeva
Julia Kristeva's work, although in certain ways significantly different
from that of Cixous, also manifests some problems. She is explicit in her
anti-biologism and anti-essentialism in so far as she argues that femininity
is not necessarily related to sex, but is better understood in relation to
marginality. Thus, femininity is understood in a relational rather than in
an essentialist sense "as that which is marginalized by the patriarchal
symbolic order". 1°4 Developing her ideas through a fusion of pre-oedipal

99. "Laugh" supra note 89 at 878.
100. Showalter, "Wilderness" supra note 51, at 187. For a French Canadian example see
Jovette Marchessault, Lesbian Triptych (1985). The idea of the "Celtic Triptych" in Part A of
this article was inspired, in part, by this book.
101. The point about metaphor is important In "Laugh of the Medusa" supra note 89 at 881
she suggests that the invocation of "mother" is metaphorical and symbolic-inspirational, not
biologically determined However, when reading her texts I get the impression of a greater faith
in the idea than merely the instrumental utilization of a concept for strategic purposes. For an
alternative critique of the maternal metaphor which argues that revalorization through
mimeticism remains within sameness, see Domna N. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" in Poetics
of Gendersupranote 34 at 170-173.
102. Moi, supranote 2 at 121-124.
103. Marks and de Courtivron, supra note 82 at 253.
104. Moi, supranote 2 at 166.
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interpretations of mother-child interaction and semiotic theory,105 she
develops an interpretation that allows her to posit that men can also be
"different" in so far as the patriarchal symbolic order considers them as
marginal. Thus, she discusses the subversive difference of avant garde
artists such as Joyce, Artaud, and Mallarm6. However, she is still very
much a proponent of difference:
Woman is here to shake up, to disturb, to deflate masculine values, and
not to espouse them. Her role is to maintain differences by pointing to
16
them, by giving them life, by putting them into play against one another. 0
Although Kristeva is keen to "remind us that any hope for a radically
new ethics may be up to women",10 7 she refuses to conjecture about the
"female subject's potential liberation from patriarchy",108 claiming only
that the feminist project is one of critique and negation, subversion and
dissidence. This becomes most apparent in her On Chinese Women when
she opines:
On a deeper level [than advertisements or slogans for women's demands],
however, a woman cannot "be"; it is something which does not even
belong in the order of being. It follows that a feminist practice can only be
negative, at odds with what already exists.... In "woman" I see
something that cannot be represented, something above and beyond
nomenclatures and ideologies. 109
Kristeva also directly confronts the question of ethics. In Revolution in
Poetic Language she develops her negative vision of political praxis even
more explicitly. She claims that radical practice must take the stance that:
wherever a code (mores, social contract) [emerges it] must be shattered in
order to give way to the free play of negativity, need, desire, pleasure and
jouissance, before being put together again, although temporarily and with
full knowledge of what is involved. 0
And again she argues that women's strategy should be to assume:
a negative function: reject everything finite, definite, structured, loaded
with meaning, in the existing state of society. Such an attitude puts women
on the side of the explosion of social codes: with revolutionary
movements."'

105.
106.
107.
108.

Revolution, supra note 90.
Polylogue,supra note 90 at 498.
Alice Jardine, Introduction to "Womans Time" (1981), 7 Signs 5, 12.
Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent Contexts" in Poetics of Gender,supra note 34,

at 110.

109. On Chinese Women, supra note 90 at 137.
110. Cited in Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent Contexts" in Poetics of Gender,supra
note 34, 96 at 109.
111. Marks and de Courtivron, supra note 82, at 166.
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Thus, by continually insisting "that a feminist praxis can only be negative,
an opposition to what exists, in order to say that's not it ... that's still not
it"112, Kristeva's is an ethics of subversion, a negative ethics, one that
seeks to critique, but one that provides little guidance for reconstruction.
Although it would be inappropriate to accuse her of nihilism, as an
empowering political strategy, her preference for "eternal dissiden(ce)" is
only of limited utility.
iv)

The Significanceof the N.EE

There is much to be said for the N.EE examination, reappropriation and
affirmation of the specificity and difference of female experiences and
body. Their inquiry highlights, in a crucial way, both the existence and
importance of heterogeneity, and the potential not only for different ways
of writing but also different social relations premised upon different value
structures. Seen in this light, it must be admitted that their efforts have
been successful in so far as they have gone a long way towards speaking
"(m)otherwise", while being imprisoned within a discursive structure not
only alien, but actively hostile, to the articulation of that which they want
to say.
However, unfortunately, in their attempts to unbury the repressed
maternal, some N.EE's come dangerously close to the simultaneously
authoritarian and crippling impulses of essentialism,' the universal and
exclusive, anatomically-based identity and experience of women as
women. They suggest, both explicitly and metaphorically, that women's
writing "springs from a secret well of immanent femininity"., 4 In so
doing, they deny the qualitatively different experiences of different
women in favour of some putative metaphysical woman's essence. Such
essentialism is uncomfortably silent about differences of class, race, sexual
orientation," 5 and physical or psychological ability. Although the same
criticism cannot apply to Kristeva, she fails to capitalize on her own
critical insights and unfortunately retreats into negation with its
potentially paralysing political consequences.
Despite these rather serious difficulties, the N.EE's contribution is
important. As Spivak points out, within their inquiry there is "an implicit
double program for women ... against sexism, where women unite as a
biologically oppressed caste; andfor feminism, where human beings train

112.
113.
114.
115.

TNd at 137.
Spivak, "Feminism and Critical Theory", supra, note 84; Unger, Politics,(1987).
Jane Gallop, "Writing a letter with Vermeer" in Poetics of Gender,supra,note 34 at 150.
Annie Leclerc, "La lettre d'amour" in La venue h i'dcriture(1977).
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to prepare for a transformation of consciousness"' 6 and, I would add, the
practice of our social relations. This double vision is potentially
empowering for it attempts to shift the focus of attention from negation
to affirmation, while simultaneously remaining acutely conscious of the
masculinist powers and structures that be, with their potential for both
repressive imperialism and more subtle forms of delegitimation such as
ridiculing feminist utopianism. The double vision is an encouraging
attempt to develop the ground between self-defeating reformism and
mythical revolution by exploring the transformative potential of
language. It encourages the articulation and espousal of difference, but
now it is an awareness of difference in all its social, political, historical
and cultural contexts; difference as heterogeneity rather than
determinative polarities.
Thus, despite serious and politically important differences, the N.F.F.
are unambiguous in their belief that difference and otherness are of
fundamental significance. At the same time, there has been an
unwillingness and inability to provide an explicit content for that
otherness. The reason for this is not difficult to locate. Men have
monopolized the discourse and the words do not, as yet, exist. To say and
write what needs to be said and written can, as yet, only be done through
discourses and texts which are an anathema to that otherness. The
contradiction is stark. Moreover, even if women could articulate a
substance for otherness, they do not control the discursive means of
production and reception and therefore to even speak or write runs the
risk of co-option and appropriation. The French feminist response has
been one of using the silences, the gaps, the margins, the spaces, in the
hope that they can, even indirectly, communicate something of the
significance of otherness. Although cautiously radical, I think that, on the
continuum between negation and reconstruction, such tactics are situated
a little too closely to the position of negation.
ii) FeministPsychoanalytic Theory anda Different Jurisprudence
a) Making it "Otherwise"
".... women's development delineates a path not only to a less violent life
but also to a maturity realized through interdependence of taking care."
7
Carol Gilligan'

The transdisciplinary interpretive turn and French detour indicate that
there is merit in looking beyond the imprisoning confines of traditional

116. Spivak, "French Feminism in an International Frame" supra, note 84 at 145 and 150.
117. In a Different Voice, 172 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Voice].
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North American legal discourse. The inquiry demonstrates that our
formative contexts - intellectual, disciplinary, national and cultural while constitutive may also be constraining. As lawyers we tend to
understand social relations through a particularistic grid, but others may
understand those same social relations through an alternative grid. The
expansion of our cognitive juridical horizons so as to encompass how
others experience and interpret social interaction can provide us with an
opportunity to reflect upon our own deep structural assumptions, to ask
new and different questions about the nature of law, and to contemplate
alternative visions of law, and perhaps society more generally. To simply
dismiss other viewpoints as utopian or naive is to uncritically buy into
phallocracy, perhaps even reinforcing that which one hopes to transform.
For feminism, knowledge itself is a crucial arena for critique and
reconstruction.
We can continue feminism's context dislocating and repositioning
approach by returning to North America, but by now focusing on some
recent psychological theory as developed by feminist scholar, Carol
Gilligan. The virtue of Gilligan's approach is that while it advocates both
the existence and desirability of difference, it also attempts, in a tentative
way, to articulate what difference might mean, what is substantively
different about difference. In other words, it cautiously attempts to
identify some of the central components of the notoriously ambiguous
and multivalented concept of difference.
Gilligan's reflections on difference grow out of her ability to listen.
When many of us listen we interpret what the other is saying in
accordance with a plethora of assumptions, apparent truths, preconceptions. Consequently, when the other speaks, their discourse is not
understood to have any essential meaning, but rather is encoded so as to
"fit" with the interpretive matrix which pre-exists their discourse. If a
discourse does not fit this pre-existing structure, it is understood as
anomalous or, perhaps more accurately, as deviant, inferior, even
senseless. Thus, the determining structure of discourse is simultaneously
communication-enhancing and communication-exclusive, it is both
facilitative and intolerant.
The starting point for Gilligan's work has been her ability to
temporarily and partially suspend her socially constructed commitment
to the conventional matrix of communicative assumptions and thereby to
pick up on the "moral language which spontaneously appeared in
women's narratives". 18 Her suggestion is that the moral discourse of
118. I. Marcus and P. Spielgelman, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law Conversation" (1985), 34 Buffalo L.Rev. 11 at 37 [hereinafter cited as Discourse].
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women is "bilingual". More ambitiously, she has begun to develop a
countervailing interpretive matrix which allows for the recognition of
alternative discourses, those which were formerly understood to be
anomalous, deviant and inferior. Every decoding is itself an encoding,
and Gilligan identifies the different voice as the feminine voice. 119 This
alternative matrix not only allows for recognition of that which had been
traditionally excluded, but also validates, legitimates and affirms the
integrity of that which it identifies.1 20 It valorizes that which has been
devalued, and reconstructs our understanding of "difference" to accept it
as positive not negative, and perhaps even to encourage us to embrace it.
Gilligan's insights stem from her studies of the discourse of women
who are confronted with moral choices which necessitate an evaluation
of the relationship between self and other. Her basic claim is that the
hierarchicalized stages of moral development created by Kohlberg et
al.121 are unjustifiably partisan in that they value certain types of moral
decision-making over others, without seriously considering the merits of
the alternatives. What is particularly problematic for Gilligan is that the
other mode of moral decision-making, primafacie, appears to correlate
more closely with the way women make moral choices. Rephrased,
according to Kohlbergian assumptions and criteria of evaluation,
women's moral decision-making patterns are less advanced - read
inferior - than those of men. 122 Moreover, the disconnection between
that which is publicly valued and that which better encapsulates the
different moral worldview of some women, causes those women a
significant degree of personal anguish and pain. 12 One important
politico-cognitive consequence of Gilligan's work is that what had
seemed to be scientifically neutral and objective, a structure of moral
development, can now be understood to be premised upon, determined
by and permeated through and through, with an androcentric bias.
Gilligan's enterprise is an important feminist challenge to the fathers of
119. Voice., 105. More recently, Gilligan has pointed out that "I deliberately called it a
different voice, I did not call it a woman's voice." A few lines later she says that her project
was not to compare women with men, but to "compare women with theory". "Discourse" at
38. This is important in that the analysis is not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of the
evaluative and cognitive structures that underpin and channel our interaction.
120. Voice, at 3.
121. Kohlberg et al., Essays in Moral Development VoL 1: The Philosophy of Moral
Development Moral Stages and the Ideal of Justice (1981); Vol 2: The Psychology of Moral
Development The Nature of Validity ofMoralStages (1986).
122. Similar processes of marginalization and devaluation of women permeate Freud's work.
See for example his claim that women are "a dark continent for psychology". "The Question
of Lay Analysis", Vol. XX Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud216 (Stratchey
ed. 1961).
123. Voice, at 71.
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psychological, scientific orthodoxy, from Freud to Piaget, from Erikson
to Kohlberg.
Gilligan's work, however, is more than simply a psychological version
of the equalitarian critique of masculinist hegemony and sexism. She
aspires to do more than simply demand that women be allowed to reach
the same levels of moral development than men, because, once again,
that would leave too much of the methodological and substantive
structure of androcentricity in place. Her affirmative vision is that a
consciousness of the different structure of moral decision-making should
transform the very structures themselves. The different voice seeks to
participate equally in defining and evaluating the process of moral
development analysis itself. To do this she attempts to capture the
substantive dissimilarities of these divergent - although not necessarily
incompatible - structures of moral decision-making through the
24
metaphors of "ladder" and "web".
Gilligan posits that the dominant moral ideology and discourse is
primarily hierarchical, ladder-like. It is premised upon a conception of
the self as individuated, separate, autonomous, independent and
essentially the same as other "selfs". As a correlative of this conception of
the self, community relationships, though real and essential, are
considered primarily contractual, competitive and adversarial. These
assumptions, in turn, privilege certain forms of decision-making - both
personal and structural - rather than others. They favour abstraction,
depersonalization and categorization, logic and rationality. They inscribe
a legal system with the attribute of determining rules in order to facilitate
equality, reciprocity, impartiality, fairness and rights. Finally, the ladder
reflects and concentrates within itself an assumption of mutual aggression
and a potential for violence.
Although dominant, the ladder is not all encompassing, it is modified,
and circumscribed by the web. The web is premised upon a conception
of the self as attached, interdependent, connected to other persons, and
primarily relational. Consequently, community is experienced as a
network or narrative of constitutive, co-operative and mutually
vulnerable relationships. These assumptions also privilege certain forms
of decision-making, rather than others. They favour contextual judgment,
empathy, intimacy and sensitivity to the needs of both self and others.
They imbricate the legal system with flexible principles in order to

124. To be slightly more accurate, although Gilligan does explicitly use the metaphor of "the
web", I cannot locate "ladder" in her writings. However she frequently counterposes
"hierarchy" with "web" but I find this less balanced and coherent than "ladder". Ladder is also
the gloss which many commentators have superimposed upon her propositions.
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facilitate responsiveness, generosity, nurturance and concern. Finally, the
web encompasses a sense of intimacy, a resistance to hurting others, and
sponsors an ethic of care.
It is crucially important to remember that Gilligan distances herself
from biological determinism. At the very beginning of her book she
categorically asserts,
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but by theme.
Its association with women is an empirical observation and it is primarily
through women's voices that I trace its development. But this association
is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are
presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought
and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a
generalization about either sex.'2
Thus, despite the occasional identification of difference with
"feminine", 12 difference is thematic and moral, not sociobiological,
gender reductionist nor sex exclusive. Gilligan's project, in part, is to
"yield a more encompassing view of the lives of both sexes",127 and to
challenge the "distortions" 1 28 perpetrated by our current atomistic
worldview.'2 9
Moreover, late in her book, Gilligan indicates that there already exists
the experience of, and thereby the potential for, the expansion of
difference in men's lives. She suggests that the intimacy which men
sometimes experience in their post-adolescent years is the
critical ... transformative experience for men through which adolescent
identity turns into the generativity of adult love and work ... the adult
ethic of taking care.' 30
And, a few pages later, she posits that both women and men tend to
incorporate elements from each of the different moral approaches in their
decision-making processes, although she suggests that this is not
necessarily in equivalent proportions. 3 1 Thus, difference is a question of
degree, not of kind. Gilligan cannot be accused of the biological
132
reductionism of "sex is destiny".
125.
126.
127.
128.

Voice, at 2; see also Discourse at 38.
See e.g., Voice at 105.
Voice, at 4.
Discourse, at 39.

129. Moreover, she also points out the methodological and empirical limitations of her
research and that,
"such constraints preclude the possibility of generalization and leave to further research
the task of sorting out the different variables of culture, time, occasion and gender,"
Voice at 126.
130. Voice at 163-164.
131. Voice at 166-167.
132. See also Discourse, at 47-49.
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These are vitally important points. Her advocacy for difference is not
based on an essentialist, reductionist vision of male/female nature,
absolute, incorrigible, transcendental, reified. Rather, difference needs to
be understood within a broader social context, as culturally 133 and
psychologically' 34 constructed rather than natural, as a deeply entrenched
ideology, but an ideology nonetheless. 135 The recognition of difference as
ideology - as a pervasive ideology - is itself therapeutic in that it
36
indicates not only difference's constructedness but also its contingency,
mutability, plasticity and vulnerability to assessment and valorization.
Moreover, it opens up the potential to ask: valued by whom and for what
reasons? Difference, then, is artifactual, and relational. It does not inhere
in essence of the person, it is not dependent upon maleness or femaleness.
Rather, it is dependent upon the structure of social relations, it is a
process. As such, since it has been made, it can also be re-made.
Difference, when modernized, allows us to ask fundamental questions of
human agency, questions of responsibility, questions of possibility.
The consequences of choosing one moral position over the other can
be of fundamental importance. If one adopts a different version of moral
development from that which currently prevails,
the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from
competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is
contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception
of morality as concerned with the activity of care centres moral
development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships,
just as the conception of morality 1as
fairness ties moral development to the
37
understanding of rights and rules.
Thus, for Gilligan, there do in fact exist, at least, two moralities, the
"morality of rights" and the "morality of responsibility", because the
133. C. Gould, "The Woman Question: The Philosophy of Literature and the Literature of
Philosophy" in Women and Philosophy (C. Gould and M. Wartofsky eds. 1976); L. Finley,
"Choice and Freedom: Illusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice" (1987), 96 Yale L.J.
914,932-933; R.W. Connell, Gender andPower,(1987).
134. See also Discourse, at 58. At times Gilligan indicates that she has some sympathy for
Chodorow's proposition that identifies the socio-cultural conditions of early childcare as being
important for personal gendered development.
135. N. Chodorow, "Gender Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective" in
Futureof Difference, supra note 36, at 16. See also Alice Jardine, Prelude to The Future of
Difference at xxv (1980), Monique Wittig, "Paradigm" in Homosexualities and French
Literature 115 (G. Stambolian & E. Marks eds. 1974); Collette Guillaumin, "The Practice and
Power of Belief in Nature: Part I The Appropriation of Women" (1981), 1 Feminist Issues
3-28; "Part II The Naturalist Discourse" lbid 87-109; Minow, "Justice Engendered" (1987),
101 Harvard L.B. 10 at 31.
136. M. Mead, Male andFemale (1950); Talcott Parsons, Family SocializationandInteraction
Process(1956); Simone de Beauvior, The Second Sex (1972), all agree on this point despite
their significant differences. See also R.W. Connell, Gender andPower,(1987).
137. Voice at 19.
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former differs from the latter in its "emphasis on separation rather than
connection, in its consideration of the individual rather than the
relationship as primary... 1138 On a normative level, one can be
understood as an "ethic of care", 39 and the other as an ethic of
"indifference", 40 "the logic of justice".1 41 Indeed, these different moral

visions of rights and responsibilities condense within themselves implicit
understanding of our nature as social beings, as "a self defined through
separation" and "a self delineated through connection"'142 and where our
priorities lie. Moreover, priorization of one rather than the other has an
impact not only on the results achieved, but also on the very "formulation
of the problem"1 43 and on the means chosen for its resolution.
Preconceptions, comprehension, methodology, results and long term
consequences are interconnected in fundamental ways which reflect and
structure the social order in which we co-exist.
b)

Transcendingbipolarism
"... this problem of dealing with difference without constituting an
opposition may just be what feminism is all about."
Jane Gallop' 44

Although much of Gilligan's analysis is structured by the counterposing
of the web and the ladder, the distinctive moralities of "rights" and
"responsibilities", her ambition is not to replace one exclusionary
paradigm with another. Rather her aim is at once more modest and more
ambitious, it is integrative rather than supremacist. She calls for a radical
expansion,1 45 and hence transformation1 46 of conventional moral
138. Voice at 19.
139. Later she identifies "the ideal of care as an activity of relationship, of seeing and
responding to need, taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection, so that noone isleft alone" Voice at 62.
140. Voiceat 22.
141. Voice at 30.
142. Voiceat 35.
143. Voice at 32.
144. Jane Gallop, The DaughtersSeduction 93 (1982).
145. Voice at 105 and 173.
146. Voice at 25. Similar distinctions between transformation and revolution can be located
in the work of Adrienne Rich. For example in Lies, Secrets and Silences (1979) in discussing
poetry, Rich opines,
"... As long as our language is inadequate, our vision remains formless, our thinking
and feeling are still running in old cycles, our process may be "revolutionary" but not
transformative ... When we speak of transformation [instead of revolution] we speak
more accurately out of the vision of a process which will leave neither surfaces nor
depths unchanged, which enters society at the most essential level of the subjugation of
women and nature by men. We begin to conceive a planet on which both women and
nature might coexist as the She Who we encounter in Judy Grahn's poems. Poetry is,
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development theory with its predeliction for equating maturity with
separation, not its junking. Her strategy is deviationist 147 and
heterogeneous, not revolutionary. Her vision is holistic rather than
148
partial, seeking a fusion of "identity and intimacy".
As an example of her suggestion for the transformative potential of
fusion, she provides the example of two children, a girl and a boy,
wanting to play different games. The girl wanted to play next-doorneighbours, the boy wanted to play pirates. The resolution of the
disagreement was not the mere addition of the two games, or the fair
solution of taking turns, but an inclusive or "synergistic" solution, 149 "the
pirate who lives next door". In this scenario, Gilligan argues, a new game
develops; different from what either of the children imagined
separately. 5 0 She proposes that the articulation of the different voice
allows us to identify elements of our moral characters that had been
previously understood as inferior. Nor, at this point, does she distinguish
between gender, both are encouraged to recognize the "other" in
themselves. 5 ' What Gilligan is taking us towards is an emphasis on the
substantive difference of difference, without exaggerating the differences
152
between us as people.

among other things, a criticism of language ...Poetry is above all a concentration of
the power of language, which is the power of our ultimate relationship to everything in
the universe. It is as if forces we can lay claim to in no other way, become present to
us in sensuous form."

Catharine MacKinnon, at least on occasion, prefers revolution. "Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" (1987), 7 Signs 515 at 564 [hereinafter cited
as Agenda].
147. For a discussion of deviationist strategy in the service of legal doctrinal praxis, see
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement (1986).
148. Voice at 159.
149. Discourse, Carrie Menkel Meadow at 54.
150. Discourse at 45. There are strong parallels here with Miles' "integrative" proposals; see
supra note 21, and infra at 56-57.
151. Gilligan emphasizes that the transformation that she aspires to is not androgyny.
(Discourse at 45 and 84.) The problem with androgyny, it seems, is that it does not challenge
patriarchy adequately; it aspires to conjunction, not transformation. S.L. Ben, "The
Measurement of Psychological Androgyny" (1976), 42 J. Consult. Clin, Psych. 155; Herbert
Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism" (1974), 2 Women's Studies 279 at 287, and Olsen, supra
note 8 advocate androgyny.
152. See also Joan Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference To a Theory of Care" (1987), 12
Signs 644. The following capture Gilligan's sense of the nature of post-conventional morality:
The reinterpretation of women's experience in terms of their own imagery of
relationships thus clarifies that experience and also provides a nonhierarchical vision of
human connection. Since relationships, when cast in the image of hierarchy, appear
inherently unstable and morally problematic, their transposition into the image of web
changes an order of inequality into the structure of interconnection. But the power of
the images of hierarchy and web, their evocation of feelings and their recurrence in
thought, signifies the embeddedness of both of these images in the cycle of human life.
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iii)

The Ethic of Care
Can the decision "to experiment with love ... be reconciled with the
decision to fight for equal power?"
V.Held 153

Even more significant than her espousal of difference are Gilligan's
suggestions as to what she understands to be the correlative of the
consciousness of difference: the ethic of care. "Yet in the different voice
of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship
and responsibility and the origins of aggression in the failure of
connection." 154
Gilligan's discussion of the ethic of care is not developed in any
autonomous or comprehensive sense. Rather, it surfaces in her work as a
corrective or complement to "the logic of justice", "the premise of
equality", as a resisting countermorality to the morality of rights.
However, I think it is possible to distill from her reflections some of its
interlocking components. Its central insight is an awareness of the
constitutive interconnection and interdependence of the self and other.
This consciousness of mutuality militates against isolation and
separatism, the "pact of withdrawn selfs"' 55 with its correlative potential
for selfishness, aggression and violence. The ethic of care encourages a
recognition of, and enthusiasm for, the needs of others and a willingness
The experiences of inequality and interconnection, inherent in the relation of parent and
child, then give rise to the ethics ofjustice and care, the ideals of human relationship the vision that self and other will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences
in power, things will be fair, the vision that everyone will be responded to and included,
that no one will be left alone or hurt. These disparate visions in their tension reflect the
paradoxical truths of human experience - that we know ourselves as separate only
insofar as we live in connection with others, and that we experience relationship only
insofar as we differentiate other from self,
Voice at 62-63.
Development for both sexes would therefore seem to entail an integration of rights and
responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity of these disparate views.
For women, the integration of rights and responsibilities takes place through an
understanding of the psychological logic of relationships. This understanding tempers
the self-distructive potential of a self-critical morality by asserting the need of all persons
for care. For men, recognition through experience of the need for more active
responsibility in taking care corrects the potential indifference of a morality of
noninterference and turns attention from the logic to the consequences of choice ... In
the development of a postconventional ethical understanding, women come to see the
violence inherent in inequality, while men come to see the limitations of a conception
ofjustice blinded to the differences in human life,
Voice at 100.
153. In "Marx, Sex and the Transformation of Society" in C. Gould, M. Wartofsky Women
andPhilosophy(1976), 168, 180.
154. Voice, 173.
155. I take this phrase from Peter Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and
the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves" (1984), 62 Texas L.Rev. 1563.
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to respond compassionately and responsibly to those needs, 5 6 to
participate in the lived experiences and reality of others. 57 It identifies "a
world of mutuality" that "creates and sustains the human community".' 58
It reconceptualizes and reconstructs moral dilemmas to be issues of

competing responsibilities of the self because of its connection with and
responsibility for others, rather than a conflict between self and other in

which the only options are assertion of the self's trumping rights, or
martyred self-sacrifice on the pyre of altruism. 5 9 Moreover, it proposes
that moral decisions be made on the basis of specific, contextual and
particular' 6° problems and not a prior, hypothetical abstractions. Finally,
and of particular importance for this essay, not only does it encourage a
discourse and praxis that rejects domination, it strives to resolve moral
dilemmas without recourse to violence as that would counteract "the
injunction not to hurt others".' 6' In so far as the ethic of care is premised
upon "nonviolence"'' 62 it aspires to "a more generative view of human
life", 63 and even more ambitiously, an affirmative transformation of the
polity.
It is important to point out, though, that the ethic of care is distinct
from the traditional masculinist stereotype of "female self-abnegation and
moral self-sacrifice",164 that Virginia Woolf has described as "The Angel
156. Voice at 62 at 74-98.
157. Voice at 79. A similar theme can also be located in Minow, "Justice Engendered" supra
note 135 at 14, "... the perspective to seek out and appreciate a perspective other than ones
owni.
..".
158. Voice at 156.
159. Voice at 114.
160. Voice at 101.
161. Voice at 73, 102, 134, 149, 174.
162. Voice at 174.
163. Voice at 174.
164. Voice at 90, Discourseat 46. Deborah Kearns suggests that even the most sophisticated
and progressive liberal of the late twentieth century incorporates a vision of women as selfsacrificing into his work, "A Theory of Justice - and Love; Rawls on the Family" (1983), 18
Politics 2, 36. For a powerful critique of this "denial" interpretation of women's identity see
Robin West's groundbreaking article, "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Liberal and Radical Feminist Legal Theory" (manuscript;
forthcoming 1 Wisconsin Women's Law Journal hereinafter cited as "Hedonic Lives"). West
argues that if women are accurately understood as "giving selves" this has come about because
of the "pervasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality" which has resulted in
women, driven by fear, "re-constructing themselves in a way that controls the danger and
suppresses the fear .... This does not make her an altruistic person, it makes her a negative".
bid at 15 and 22. In other words, women's identity as "giving selves" isa "coherent,
understandable" defence mechanism to survive patriarchal oppression, not authentic feminism.
As the text makes clear, the ethic of care approach does not reduce to an interpretation of
women as "giving selves", it is not a servile interpretation of women's moral character and
promise. Indeed, later in her paper West also considers the possibility of an ethic of care absent
the dangers of patriarchy. bid at 38; See also her reflections on the importance of trust in
human relations. ]bid at 61-62.
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in the House". 65 It should not be confused with passivity or delicacy,
submissiveness or obedience, dependence or domesticity; it is not what
Irigaray has posited to be a 'phallic feminine",166 nor "a romantic
prescription for chaining women to the classical definition of
femininity"., 67 Indeed, Gilligan's own example refutes such self-negation,
for at least some of the women to whom she listened decided to have
abortions, thereby demonstrating that care does not necessarily priorize
the other over the self. Rather, care attempts to consider the interests of
the other in a responsive and responsible manner. The ethic of care
includes care for oneself. 168 It denies the absolutist, 169 formalistic recourse
170
to individual autonomy by favouring an "injunction against hurting"'
so that we have to seriously and contextually make moral decisions and,
at the same time, bear responsibility for that choice, and its consequences
for others as well as ourselves. The ethic of care necessitates a keen
7
consciousness of the "social consequences of action".' '
If we relate the ethic of care to the arena of legal relations, to inquire
into the possibility and direction of a "feminist contribution to justice,"' 72
a fundamental question becomes,
whether or not (law) is hurting society and whether or not it puts a barrier
73
in the way of compassion and respect.
When you are inside the barrel with the lid sealed, it is difficult to know
that it is a barrel you are imprisoned in. What the ethic of care may do
is to provide a corrigibleandprovisionalbenchmark or vantage point by
which to understand law, to interpret law, to question law, to evaluate
law in the politico-historical conjuncture in which we now find
ourselves. 74 As Kathy Ferguson notes, "Any thorough-going critique
165. Women and Writing 59 (1979).
166. Cited in Duchen, supra note 81, at 87.
167. K. Karst, "Women's Constitution" (1984), Duke L.J. 447, 480. Emphatically, although
there is some verbal intersection, the ethic of care is not what MacKinnon has described as
"contemporary industrial society's version of women ... docile, soft, passive, nurturant,
vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetant, masochistic and domestic, made for child
care, home care and husband care". "Agenda" supra note 146 at 530. Moreover, lest there be
any confusion, I want to stress that nothing in my suggestions is premised upon the idea that
the ethic of care grows out of the rosy private family life of women. For many women the
family is anything but a haven in a heartless world; it is,in many instances, the locus of extreme
domination, subordination, inequality and violence.
168. Voice at 139.
169. Discourse, at 46.
170. See supra note 161.
171. Voice at 167.
172. Dunlap, Discourse at 13.
173. Voice at 123.
174. For a useful discussion of why it is important to provide normative authority for legal
praxis, see D. Cornell, "Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in the

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

rests, ultimately, on a vision of an alternative possibility".1 751 The
76
discourse of care helps provide such a "critical ethical perspective". If
my earlier suggestions as to the relationship of contemporary law and
violence are accurate then law, when measured against the ethic of care,
is clearly found wanting. If difference, feminism and the ethic of care are
connected, then the feminist recourse to law, as currently constituted, is
problematic. The critique may not be sufficiently extensive, and the
reconstruction may not go far enough.
But law itself should not be abandoned or abdicated because, in my
opinion, feminists simply cannot afford to vacate the field. Rather it
should be transformed, reconstructed, remade so as to come closer to the
ethic of care, to be the socio-political concretization of the ethic of care,
"to become more of a healer, less of a slayer".' 77 Indeed, as Gilligan
herself suggests, law is not monolithic, for inscribed within contemporary
law there exist traces of a different voice in "the concept of equity, the
178
recognition of differences in need".
c)

Equality Revisited

i) MacKinnon'sResponse to Difference
It is true that in our history, stereotypical differences, both real and
imagined have served primarily as convenient, "natural" justifications for
impositions of burdens. It does not follow, however, that we cannot use
differences progressively. Injustice does not flow directly from recognizing
differences; injustice results when those differences are transformed into
social and economic deprivation.
Ann Scales1 79
Gilligan's work has received a mixed response from the feminist legal
academic community. Some commentators have accepted the idea but
not necessarily the substance of a different voice. 80 Others have been
enthusiastic about the substance of the different voice and have attempted
to apply it to their legal practice.' 8' Others have been skeptical.
Law" (1987), 54 Tenn. L.Rev. 327; "Toward a Modem/Post Modem Reconstruction of
Ethics" (1985), 133 U. Pa. L.Rev. 291. See also K. O'Donovan, "Women's perspectives on the
Rule of Law" (unpublished manuscript).
175. The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy(1984).
176. Gilligan, "Reply to the Critics" (1986), 11 Signs 324, 327.
177. Dunlap in Discourse at 20.
178. Voice at 164.
179. "Feminist Jurisprudence" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 1373, 1396.
180. See e.g., Suzannah Sherry, "Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication" (1986), 72 Va. L.Rev. 543; but see also her, "The Gender of Judges" (1986),
4 Law and Inequality 159.
181. Minow, "Justice Engendered" supra; note 135; Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation" (1984), 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754, 763 fn. 28; "Portia in a Different
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It has become commonplace within the legal academy to identify the
work of Catharine MacKinnon as the most trenchant critique of
difference, and particularly difference as articulated by Gilligan. The
reasons for this widely held belief are not difficult to identify: MacKinnon
has publicly challenged Gilligan's work 82 and specifies that the critique
of difference is one of the organizing themes for her book, Feminism
Unmodified
In this section I want to suggest that the first blush impression of
Gilligan and MacKinnon as being locked in incorrigible conflict is
oversimplistic. Although MacKinnon certainly does speak out against the
espousal of difference, there remains within her work traces of an
affection for difference, desirable if only the circumstances could be made
appropriate. I want to suggest that the Gilligan-MacKinnon controversy,
though very real, is not as irremediably polarized as it has been
understood and that there is scope for compatibility between these two
extremely important feminist theorists and practitioners.
In the introduction to Feminism Unmodified MacKinnon makes clear
her critical concerns about the tendency to connect gender with
difference on any level:
The second theme is a critique of the notion that gender is basically a
difference rather than a hierarchy. To treat gender as a difference (with or
without a French accent) means to treat it as a bipolar distinction, each
pole of which is defined in contrast to the other by opposed intrinsic
attributes. Beloved of left and right alike, construing gender as a difference,
termed simply the gender difference, obscures and legitimizes the way
gender is imposed by force.183
Lest there be any doubt, she emphasises that her criticism is not aimed
solely at biologically reductionist versions of gender as difference, but at
all efforts to connect gender and difference:
It hides that force behind a static description of gender as a biological or
social or mythic or semantic partition, engraved or inscribed or inculcated
by god, nature, society (agents unspecified), the unconscious or the
cosmos. The idea of difference helps keep the reality of male dominance
in place.' s4
Voice" (1985), 1 Berkley W.L.J.; Linda Krieger, "Through a Glass Darkly: Paradigms of
Equality and the Search for a Woman's Jurisprudence" (1987), 2 Hypatia 45; Karst,
"Women's Constitution" (1984), Duke L.J.447; Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and the Law"
in Justice Beyond Orwell 77 (Abella ed. 1985); Spiegelman, "Court Ordered Hiring Quotas
After Stotts" (1985), 20 Harvard C.L.C.R.L.Rev.; E. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics" (1986), 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 589; F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983), 96 Harvard L.Rev. 1497; J.Rifkin, "Mediation from a
Feminist Perspective; Promise and Problems" (1984), 2 Law and Inequality 21.
182. Discourse.
183. Feminism Unmodified at 3.
184. Feminism Unmodified at 3.
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It is difficult to imagine a more total rejection of difference, or any of
its potential justifications or foundations. Difference, for MacKinnon, is
not about gender, but about power, force and the continued supremacy
of men over women. Difference is a rationalization and legitimation of an
illegitimate hierarchy which disadvantages women thereby reinforcing,
rather than challenging, their status as "second class citizens". 185
Difference, for MacKinnon, is a second order concept and experience.
Power, or more precisely, the inequality of power, is the primary building
block for a feminist analysis of social and legal relations. The meaning of
gender and difference are predetermined by power relations between
men and women, which are relationships of fundamental inequality.
Consequently,
a discourse of gender difference serves as ideology to neutralize,
rationalize, and cover disparities of power, even as it appears to criticize
them. Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. This is
as true when differences are affirmed as when they are denied, when their
substance is applauded or when it is disparaged, when women are
punished or when they are protected in their name.186
Thus, for MacKinnon, difference is a repressive dead end, "one strategy
in keeping women down".18 7 Because it is a "conceptual tool of gender
inequality, it cannot deconstruct the master's house. Especially when it
has built it."188 Difference cannot be salvaged for the feminist critique of
patriarchy, and its espousal is "one of the most deceptive antifeminisms
in society, scholarship, politics and law...,"18 9 An unmodified feminism
rejects difference.
MacKinnon expands her critique of difference in "On Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination", 19° and discusses Gilligan's work
explicitly. Her basic disagreement with Gilligan is that the latter accepts
and valorizes those values which men have either permitted women to
have or have valued women for. Thus, she accuses Gilligan of failing to
challenge at its core the male construction of gender relations - which
are hierarchical and unequal - and worse, of legitimizing those relations
through an affirmation of the "qualities and characteristics of

powerlessness":' 9 1

185. Feminism Unmodified at 4.
186. Feminism Unmodified at 8. Similar criticisms have been levelled against the N.EE's. See
for example Emmanu Ue de Lesseps, "Le Fait F~minin: et moi?" in (1979), 5 Questions
fministes 4, cited in Duchen supra note 81 at 21.
187. Feminism Unmodified at 22.
188. Feminism Unmodified at 9.
189. Feminism Unmodified at 8.
190. Feminism Unmodifiedch. 2.
191. Feminism Unmodifiedat 39.
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I am getting hard on this and am about to get harder on it. I do not think
that the way women reason morally is morality "in a different voice". I
think it is morality in a higher register, in the feminine voice. Women
value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
them, and we could probably use some. Women think in relational terms
because their existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when you
are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak.
Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is silenced. Eliminated,
gone. You aren't just deprived of a language with which to articulate your
distinctiveness, although you are; you are deprived of a life out of which
articulation might come. Not being heard is not just a function of lack of
recognition, not just that no one knows how to listen to you, although it
is that; it is also silence of the deep kind, the silence of being prevented
from having anything to say. Sometimes it is permanent. All I am saying
is that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into differences is an
insult to our possibilities. 192
The discourse of difference, for MacKinnon, is insufficiently cognizant
of power relations to be a fruitful strategy for feminism. The better
approach is to view feminism through the prism of power, and to
indentify the conditions of inequality perpetrated by male supremacy. If
difference is real it is because dominance pre-exists and determines the
nature that difference, structuring it to men's advantage and women's
disadvantage. The "dominance approach", as MacKinnon calls it,193
provides an alternative, power-conscious, perspective from which to
identify and challenge women's continued oppression and subordination.
From this perspective difference is understood as problematic rather than
emancipatory, mapping inequality rather than challenging it.
From the point of view of the dominance approach, it becomes clear that
the difference approach adopts the point of view of male supremacy on the
status of the sexes. Simply by treating the status quo or "the standard", it
invisibly and uncritically accepts the arrangements under male supremacy.
In this sense, the difference approach is masculinist, although it can be
expressed in a female voice. The dominance approach, in that it sees the
inequalities of the social world from the standpoint of the subordination of
women to men, is feminist. 194
The gist of MacKinnon's critique, then, is that the espousal of
difference sounds uncomfortably reminiscent of the old stereotypes 95 and
clichs that have been traditionally used by men to confirm the inferiority

192. Feminism Unmodifiedat 39 (footnotes omitted).
193. Feminism Unmodified at 40.
194. Feminism Unmodified at 42-43.
195. For a particularly useful analysis and critique of the dangers of stereotyping which has
reinforced the inequality of women, blacks, Jews and the lower classes, see Sander L. Gilman,
Difference andPathology:Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness (1985).
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of women, to legitimize inequality and to maintain the relations of
domination and subordination. MacKinnon argues that the affirmation of
difference does nothing to empower women, and indeed, because the foot
is on the neck 196 it is more like masculinist ventriloquism. The authentic,
unmodified voice of feminism is the dominance approach, because only
it "strives towards equal power in the social life".1 97 For MacKinnon,
difference may be feminism's double-cross. 98
ii) Reflections on MacKinnon
Far too often, however, feminists appear too confident that we have
successfully freed ourselves from the constraining categories and norms of
the male-stream thought within which all of us in this generation were
It is hard to know what to save and what to discard from male
trained ...
stream thought as we proceed forward on our journey. Some of us have
clearly saved too much and are overburdened with antique baggage which
slows our progress. Others have, perhaps, discarded rather too much too
early.

Jill McCalla Vickers' 99

MacKinnon's comments are both timely and important. They are timely
in that they provide an important counterbalance to some of the more
euphoric elements within feminism whose faith in difference was perhaps
leading them towards romanticism and idealism, °° and was insufficiently
cognizant of the structures and actors of resistance. Her insights are
important in that they remind us, once again, that there is "no such thing
as 'keeping out of politics'- 201 and that gender, like morality, has as a
constitutive element questions of power and powerlessness. For example,
if we return to Gilligan's suggested transformation of the girl/boy,
neighbour/pirate game the problem is even more serious than the boy
opting out. The very real danger may be bringing the pirate home ... for
if pirates rape and pillage, then the new game may be the pirate raping
20 2
the girl next door!
MacKinnon reminds us that, historically, difference has been perceived
as deviant, inferior, invalid; that it has inscribed within it an ideological
weight that disadvantages women. Her concerns about the danger of
196. Feminism Unmodified at 30.
197. Feminism Unmodified at 45.
198. Elizabeth Meese, supra note 57 at 75-76.
199. In Feminism in Canada,supra note 14, at 44-45.
200. See for example, Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" and "Preservative Love and
Military Destruction" in Mothering supra note 18 at 213, 231; Barbara Love and Elizabeth
Shinklin, "The Answer is Matriarchy", ibid at 275.
201. George Orwell, cited in W Mitchell, The PoliticsofInterpretation3 (1983).
202. I wish to thank Colleen MacKay for suggesting this response to Gilligan's proposal.
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difference, with it tendency to reconfirm the traditional stereotypes,
thereby entrenching rather than dislocating hierarchy and inequality, are
made the more real when we realize that both anti-feminist women and
contemporary Christian fundamentalists also espouse difference, claiming

that men are "aggressive, dominant, logical, independent, active and taskoriented", while women are "submissive, intuitive, dependent, nurturant,
supportive, patient and person-oriented".Y No doubt such correspondences are a serious cause for concern for any progressive movement, and
justify a critical skepticism towards invocation of difference. However,

skepticism is not rejection, and MacKinnon appears to favour rejecting in
toto the discourse of difference. But can feminism afford to surrender the
ideology of difference to masculinist hegemony? In the past, antifeminists
have used, and will continue to use, difference in support of their political
agenda. Even if MacKinnon is correct that, historically, difference has
contributed to the inferiorization of women, does that mean that
difference is inherently incapable of being salvaged for feminism,
reconstructed and revalued so as to be a positive, even emancipatory,
ideology? As I understand her writings, MacKinnon disagrees. Her
preference, I think, is for a "degendering" 205 of society, for gender is a
construct of hierarchy, a product of the inequality of power between men
and women. The validity of such a position depends upon the validity of
MacKinnon's "dominance thesis" and its central concept, power. It is to
a discussion of these issues that we can now turn.
a) MacKinnon on Power
... the pitfall of being reduced into joining the oppressor under the
pretense of sharing power
Audre Lorde2°6
203. See for example Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
Between the Sexes" in On Sexuality Vol. 7, 342 (A. Richard ed. 1977); T Reik, Of Love and
Lust On the Psychoanalysisof Emotionaland Sexual Emotions (1967).
204. See for example, W Peter Blitchington, "God had A Purpose in Creating Two Sexes"
Sex Roles andthe ChristianFamily Ch. 3 (1985); Marabel Morgan, The Total Woman (1975).
205. I take this term from Nancy Chodorow, "Gender, Relation and Difference in
Psychoanalytic Theory" in Future of Difference (1980) at 3. This claim is based upon my
understanding of MacKinnon's argument. Her premise is that power, in the nature of hierarchy
and inequality, domination and subordination, pre-exists. Gender is encoded with these preexisting power relations, "the eroticization of dominance and submission creates gender,
creates woman and man in the social form in which we know them". Feminism Unmodified
at 50. To challenge the conditions of inequality necessitates a challenge to the formative
structures of powerlessness, including gender. Society has to be de-gendered, for gender is
premised upon inequality. As the overall theme of this article might suggest, my preference is
for a reconstitution of gender not its eradication. See also R.W Connell, Gender and Power,
286-293 (1987).
206. Sister Outsider 118, (1984).
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Si les femmes veulent prendre le pouvoir a la mani6re des hommes, ce
n'est pas la peine, c'est ce que nous voudrions changer justement, toutes
ces notions et ces valeurs.
Simone de BeauvoirW
An overview of MacKinnon's discussion of power leaves one dissatisfied,
for her analysis is more assertion than analysis. Although, on occasion,
she posits that feminism will transform power208 she says very little on
what that transformation might mean. Rather, as we have seen,
MacKinnon filters her analysis of power through the prism of gender and
its connection with hierarchy, authority and inequality; domination and
subordination; force and violence.
Her argument is that male power is pervasive and systemic, not only
in the public and private realms but also epistemologically, methodologically and philosophically. As she says elsewhere, male dominance is
"metaphysically nearly perfect." 2°9 In short, women are both personally
and structurally disempowered: men have power, women do not.
Consequently, the goal of feminism must, first and foremost, be to enable
women to have the same power as men, and then women can begin to
articulate more authentically their aspirations.
Is this an adequate understanding and conceptionalization of the
economy of power?
Although it is an instructive, readily accessible and critical approach to
power, its totalistic viewpoint is a cause for concern.21 0 MacKinnon
appears to accept without question what elsewhere 21 she identifies as a
male conception of power: domination. Her claim that male domination
is all pervasive is a quantative conception of power, but not a qualitative
one. It does not address the issue of the nature of power. Moreover, it
seems to me that her demand that women are entitled to equal power as
men assumes a zero-sum conception of power: that more power for
women will mean less power for men.
207. Les ecrits de Simone De Beauvoir(1979), C. Francis, E. Gontier (eds.) at 589.
208. See for example, Feminism Unmodified at 23 and 53.
209. "Marxism, Feminism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983),
8 Signs 613 [hereinafter cited as "Feminist Jurisprudence"]. See also V.Held, "Feminism and
Epistemology: Recent Work on the Connection between Gender and Knowledge" (1985), 14
Philosophy and Public Affairs 296; Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile",
in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14 at 27.
210. For similar concerns about the prevalance of "generic" statements about power/
powerlessness, shared by both sociologists and feminists see Ann Duffy, "Reformulating Power
for Women" (1986), 23 Can. R. Soc. and Anth. 22.
211. "To us it is a male notion that power means someone must dominate" Feminism
Unmodified at 23. Kathy Lahey appears to accept an essentialist conception of power. "the
very concept of power is a male vision" and "the ultimate sources of power are violence and
tyranny", "Equality and Women's Specificity in Feminist Thought" at 7 (unpublished

manuscript).
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I think such an approach manifests a unilateral conception of power.
It understands power in the Weberian sense of "power over", 212 a
negative and repressive approach, what Foucault identifies as a juridical
conception of power. 213 But power is more than simply pervasive and
21 4
systemic; it is also heterogeneous, polymorphous and multifaceted.
Power can also be understood in the sense of "power to" as well as
"power over". "Power to" is power as a cognate of freedom, a
progressive, emancipatory and potentially transformative conception of
power, a conception which emphasizes the creative, capacity-enhancing,
ability-encouraging variations of power. 215 This is a qualitatively different
conception of power. Men may understand and use power in its
imperialistic guise in order to crush women (other men, and nature) but
that does not mean that "power over" is the immutable essence of power.
212. Weber defines power as "... the chance of a man or a number of men (sic) to realize their
will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the
action", in From Max Weber Essays in Sociology 180 (H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds.
1958).
213. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1972).
214. The following reflections on power are influenced, in part, by the work of Foucault
although they aspire to a very different, that is optimistic, agenda than his. He suggests that
traditional conceptions of power are based upon three assumptions: 1) power is possessed; 2)
power is primarily coercive, it is a repressive prohibition backed by sanctions, and 3) power
is centralized and tends to be hierarchical, it flows from the top down.
Foucault argues that these assumptions unduly constrain our understanding of power, that
power has many variations beyond the juridical conception. Thus he argues that power is
exercised rather than possessed, thereby emphasizing a more relational understanding of
power. Second, we can understand power as productive as well as repressive. This claim
becomes most apparent through his discussion of the connection between knowledge and
power. Knowledge as power constructs, creates and moulds our understanding of ourselves,
our relations and our world. Power, therefore, can be proactive and creative, rather than just
sanction-determined. Third, and as a correlative of his first and second theses, if power is
exercisable, relational and creative, then it can be located elsewhere than in centralized
authorities. Put differently, power is a micro-phenomenon as well as a macro-phenomenon
(although the two are inter-related), it can be exercised through our everyday relations, from
the bottom up, as well as from the top down, as localized centres of resistance, reconstruction
and empowerment, as well as domination, either on the micro or macro levels. See Foucault,
Power/Knowledge (1972); Disciplineand Punish (1979); The History of Sexuality (1980);
Jana Sawicki, "Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference" (1986), 2 Hypatia
23; Irene Diamond, Lee Quinby, Feminism and Foucault Reflections on Strategies of
Resistance (1988).
Though I do not propose some meta-normative project, I am also more optimistic than
Foucault who resists envisioning transformation, mostly because of his anti-humanism, his
post-modem skepticism.
215. Yolande Cohen, in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14, at 236 and Geraldine Finn ibiaL
at 302. For example, certain of the privileges of citizenship can be understood as "power to",
rather than "power over". The Oxford English Dictionary also suggests these various
conceptions, beginning with "power to" but ending with "power over": "The ability to do
something ...
possession of control or command over others; domination; govemment; sway;
authority... ability to compel obedience... wage war ....See also Moi, Supra note 2 at 124125 for a discussion of Cixous' conception of "power to".

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

Feminism may pose the opportunity to conceptualize and nourish
another, emancipatory side of power, a side that expands our horizons
rather than curtails them, a side that nurtures our personhood rather than
stultifies it, a side that fosters care for our inherent human dignity rather
than inflaming the festering sores of "anxious privitism ' '216 and possessive
individualism. 2 7 Feminism, rather than working within and thereby
reproducing the androcentric interpretation/imposition of power, may be
able to challenge the very meaning of power itself. Difference, with its
substantive emphasis on the ethic of care, may fit with this alternative
conception of power.
However, because of her unidimensional conception of power,
MacKinnon understands "difference" as "powerlessness" rather than
"power to". 218 Although MacKinnon is correct to point out that,
historically, the awareness of difference has operated to women's
disadvantage, and that women's caring role has been part of their strategy
for survival, we must be careful not to make this into an essentialist thesis
that difference = domination/subordination. Such an approach ignores
the factor of human - particularly male - agency in making this
correlation. But, again, what has been socially constructed by males is
capable of being (de)reconstructed by females and profeminist males.
Difference can be interpreted, codified and understood as being
affirmative; the important question is how? MacKinnon, therefore, may
have failed to challenge male supremacism at its core. Rather than
attempting to reconstruct power, she takes the male interpretation to be
the sole interpretation, thereby working within the paradigm, rather than
transforming it.
This may also lead her into the dangers of ahistoricism in that her
conception of the totalizing dualistic hierarchy of male/female prohibits
her from accounting for those women, herself included, 21 9 who have
managed to resist the pervasiveness of patriarchal ideology and who have
voiced their opposition. Moreover, historically, some women have had
access to power in both its androcentric and expansionist manifestations.
Examples can be found not only in law, but also in politics and
literature. 220 There is a herstory that cannot be reduced to subordina216. Gabel, Book Review, R. Dworkin, "Taking Rights Seriously" (1978), 91 Harvard
L.Rev. 302.
217. C.B. MacPherson, The PoliticalTheory ofPossessive Individualism(1962).
218. The closest she comes to discussing "power to" is her assertions that "female power" is
a "contradiction in terms", a "misnomer". Feminism Unmodified at 53.
219. Thus, for example, at one point she posits that she is "existentially amazed" to be
speaking at all. Feminism Unmodified at 163.
220. Toril Moi, supra note 2 at 64; Duchen, supra note 81 at 92. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo,
"Women, Culture and Society: A Theoretical Overview" supra note 4 at 17-42. In politics, see
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tion.2' MacKinnon's conception of power is too all encompassing, it is
an understanding which is underdeveloped for the explanatory burden it
is required to carry.
Ultimately, I fear that MacKinnon comes perilously close to
reductionism by developing a unidimensional explanation that is
monolithic, thereby denying differences, important differences, not only
Dorothy Smith, "The Problem of the Main Business", discussing the power of Chilean women,
in the face of circumstances significantly harsher than those which face many North American
women; Elizabeth Janeway, Powers of the Weak (1980). Ann Duffy, "Power" supra note 210
discussing the powerful influence of a variety of middle and upper class Canadian Women in
the Canadian culture and polity. See also Susan Ostrander in the American context, "Upperclass Women: Class Consciousness as Conduct and Meaning" in Power StructureResearch 7396 (G.W. Domhoffed. 1980).
See also N.C. Dye, As Sisers andAs Equals (1980); J. White, Women and Unions (1980);
R. Cavendish, Women on the Line (1982); J. Wajeman, Women in Control-Dilemmas of a
Workers Co-operative(1983) M. Ryan, "The Power of Women's Networks: A Case Study of
Female Moral Reform in Antebellum America" (1979), 5 Feminist Studies 66. Veronica
Strong-Boag, The Parliamentof Women: The National Council of Women of Canada 18931929 (1976); M. Stacey and M. Price, Women, Power and Politics(1981); M. Young and P.
Willmolt, Family and Kinship in East London (1962); B. Campbell, Wigam Pier Revisited
(1984); C. Smith Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between
Women in Nineteenth Century America" (1975), 1 Signs 1; E. Dubois et al., "Politics and
Culture in Women's History: A Symposium" (1980), 6 Feminist Studies 26.
Again, if we look beyond our own cultures there is some evidence to indicate that women
do exercise power. For overviews see Joyce Neilsen, "From Corrective to Creative Progress in
Sex Stratification: Sociological and Anthropoligical Contributions" (1979), 2 International
Journal of Women's Studies 324; Sharon Tiffany, "Women, Power and the Anthropology of
Politics: A Review" (1979), 2 International Journal of Women's Studies 430. V. Mahler,
"Work, Consumption and Authority within the Household: A Morrocan Case" in Of Marriage
and the Market 69 (K. Young ed. 1981); A. Hamilton, "A Complex Strategical Situation:
Gender and Power in Aboriginal Australia", in Australian Women: FeministPerspectives(N.
Grieve and P. Grimshaw eds. 1981). Black herstory has been particularly important in
illuminating the narrowness of "women as only victim" analysis. See Audre Lorde, "An Open
Letter to Mary Daly" in This Bridge CalledMe Back supra note 69, at 94; Alice Walker, In
Search of OurMothers Gardenr Womanit Prose (1983); Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies
for Survival in Black Communities (1975); Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class (1981). In
the area of legal relations, Shelley Gavigan suggests that there exists an as yet unrecounted
history of women's powerful resistance to masculinist law, "Bringing on the Menses: The
Criminal Liability of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Canadian Abortion Law"
(1986), 1 Can. J.W.L. 279.
221. MacKinnon would possibly portray this discussion as an example of the male response
in which "the success of our (women's) survival is used to delegitimize what we have survived
to say, our critique", Feminism Unmodified at 131. Such a criticism would miss the point of
my suggestion for I am not claiming that things aren't bad for women, rather it is that the
oppression is not total. Moreover, MacKinnon's reliance on survival is an inadequate
foundation upon which to priorize her interpretation and critique ... other women who
disagree with MacKinnon are also survivors. To disagree is not necessarily to delegitimize.
I think that elements of a better approach are contained, in an earlier claim by MacKinnon
that, "... feminism relies on the ultimate possibility of resistence, even though the feminist
analysis of the crushing totality of subordination has difficulty accounting for it." "Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence" (1982), 34 Stanford L.Rev. 703, 720. Although she tends to still
overplay the domination element, there is an awareness that women have a power to resist.
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inter-gender but also intra-gender. It renders "her impervious to the

nuances, inconsistencies and ambiguities

222 of social

interaction. If we

accept MacKinnon's "metaphysically nearly perfect" approach, how do
we explain what Adrienne Rich has described as "the extraordinary will-

to-survive in millions of obscure women", 223 that the gynocide has not
already taken place, that the Atwoodian dystopia 224 is not where we are
today. If women have been the victims of such universal and unrelenting
domination and misogyny (which is a different claim from pervasive and
systemic inequality) then how has womankind survived and, more
importantly, how is feminism now able to articulate its critique of male
hegemony. How does feminism know? I suggest that, at least in part, this
is due to a nascent counterparadigm of power, a resilient, supportive,
encouraging, expansive and deviationist subpower that has allowed the
community of women to continue despite an extremely adverse political
ecology. 225
Finally, not only does her approach run the risk of falsifying the past,
more depressing still, it may also foreclose a feminist future. Her
approach is pervaded by a politically paralysing negativity, that denies
the emancipatory potential of difference, by claiming that we cannot
know what women would say or write or do because the foot is on the
throat.2 6 Though metaphorically powerful, and marvellously capturing,
222. Toril Moi, supranote 2 at 30.
223. On Lies, Secrets and Silence 255 (1979). See also Kalpana Ram, "Sexual Violence in
India" (1982), Refractory Girl 2.
224. Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid'sTale (1985).
225. A cautious parallel may be drawn here between the position of women in patriarchal
society and black slaves in antebellum America. For a long time many scholars emphasized the
repression and damage caused to black people by slavery. However, without underplaying or
denying the horrendous nature of the system of slavery, black and radical scholars in the 1970's
also highlighted not only the incredible resistence of black people but also the richness and
beauty of their culture even in these times. See, for example, Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordan
Roll-The World the Slaves Made (1974); Herbert Gutman, The In visible Fact Afo-A mericans
andtheirFamilies1750-1925 (1972).
226. Feminism Unmodified at 30. MacKinnon is aware of this to some extent. In concluding
an address in honour of two women judges she opines,
If it seems that this (discussion of feminist loyalties) is not very concrete, I think it is
because we have no idea what women as women would have to say. I'm evoking for
women a role that we have yet to make, in the name of a voice that, unsilenced, might
say something that has never been heard.
Unwilling to leave her audience with such an ungraspable thought she concludes,
I will hazard a little bit about its content. In the legal world of win and lose, where
success is measured by other people's failures, in this world of kicking and getting
kicked, I want to say: there is another way. Women who refuse to forget the way
women everywhere are treated everyday, who refuse to forget that that is the meaning
of being a woman, no matter how secure they might feel in having temporarily escaped
it, women as women will find that way, (Feminism Unmodifiedat 77).
MacKinnon wants to speak of how things could be otherwise and yet appears unable to find
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in one pithy phrase, the patriarchal nature of contemporary social
relations, I think that this may go too far in its relentless rhetorical
reductionism. 227 Rather than being empowering, MacKinnon's may be a
228
jurisprudence of despondence.
Put differently, how are we to ever know when the foot is off the
throat? How are we to know that MacKinnon's articles, speeches,
legislation have any more credibility as the authentic, unmodified

feminist voice than that of Cixous or Gilligan? By what criteria are
feminists to evaluate their praxis if everything they do is a distorted
229
gurgling caused by the rugged heel of masculinist supremacy?
Difference provides the possibility of establishing an affirmative - but
fundamentally corrigible, and possibly only transitory - vision which
can provide both a concrete alternative standpoint from which to critique
masculinist hegemony as well as suggesting a positive direction for
feminist practice and theory. Difference provides both a centre of
resistance and a potential panorama - severely limited no doubt - to
begin the process of transformation. It provides a gap in which to
articulate an alternative normative order. Simple critique and negation
of everything masculine is not enough ... it is trashing but not
reconstructing. Nor is it adequate to say that feminists must wait until
they have destroyed masculinist supremacy and gained access to power
and then, and only then, will they begin to imagine what otherwise might
mean ... feminism, I believe, must build as it goes. In my opinion,
feminism must articulate, create and develop alternative - but corrigible
- visions and practice that will concretize and tangibly inspire those
who seek social transformation. The discourse of difference provides the
the words. The "content" is frustrating rather than helpful because MacKinnon has already
debarred herself from access to the discourse of difference, where at least the words "empathy",
"care" or "solidarity" might help.
227. Toril Moi, supra note 2 at 29.
228. Indeed, when asked, "how do you maintain hope for future gains [for women]"
MacKinnon replied, "I'm more into determination. I am agnostic on the subject of hope."
Cited in Karst, "Women's Constitution" supranote 167 at 476, n. 113.
229. Even more problematic still are McKinnon's suggestions that her feminism is the true
feminism, that all others are complicit in collaborative with, male supremacy or, more
benevolently, falsely conscious. See pp. 5, 49, 13, 198-205, 216-218. For example, in
commenting on the female sexuality debate, she posits,
I think that sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially constructed as that
by which we come to want our own self annihilation. That is, our subordination is
eroticized in and as female, in fact, we get off on it to a degree, if nowhere near as much
as men do. This is our stake in this system that is not in our interest, our stake in this
system that is killing us. I'm saying femininity as we know it is how we come to want
male dominance, which most emphatically is not in our interest. Such a critique of
complicity ... does not come from an individualistic theory. Feminism Unmodified
at 54.
See also "Standards of Sisterhood" Broadside 6 (Dec. 1985/86 vol. 7, no. 3).
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opportunity for a politics with substance,230 a politics that refuses to
succumb to the moral nihilism of our post-modem condition.
If the preceding discussion of resistance and resilience has any validity,
it helps to unearth the historically significant ways in which power, in its
affirmative manifestations, has proved invaluable for women in general,
and for feminism, as a movement, in particular. Moreover, the most
recent wave of feminisms has developed a praxis that incorporates at least
some values associated with the ethic of care, and is itself a specific
materialization of "power to": consciousness-raising.
There appears to be consensus among feminists that, whatever its
weaknesses, consciousness-raising has been of pivotal significance in the
emergence of contemporary feminism. 231 In so far as it provided nonhierarchical, open, supportive fora for women to articulate their
experiences of male domination, it allowed women to recognize their
communality in isolation, the pervasiveness of patriarchy, and the
potential for solidarity among women. It provided the participants with
a new and critical understanding of their lives and roles, thereby
reinforcing their self-worth, self-esteem and self-respect. As well as being
a "therapeutic experience", consciousness-raising was also a "politicizing
agent"3 2 and, as such, it laid the foundation for the transformation from
powerlessness to partial empowerment, in large part, through its
valorization of their perspective as women. Moreover, building on this
foundation of mutuality, it provided support for the newly emergent
feminist practices: individual and/or collective, private and/or public. As
MacKinnon once opined in her earlier work, "consciousness-raising is
(feminism's) quintessential expression",2 3 and, I suggest, the praxis it
inspires is what makes it a cognate of "power to".234
230. Indeed feminism can certainly learn something from marxism's failures on this point
because at least one reason for the emergence of the totalitarian eastern bloc was the failure of

Marx and his successors to develop a conception of post bourgeois society beyond vague
predictions of nonalienated human interaction. See "On The Jewish Question: Early Writings
of Karl Marx" (1964), T.B. Bottomore (ed.); The Economic andPhilosophicalManuscripts of
1844.

231. For discussions, see e-g., P. White, S. Goode, "The Small Group in Women's Liberation"
in (1969), 1 Women: A Journal of Liberation 56; Pamela Allen, Free Space: A Perspective on
the Small Group in Women's Liberation (1980); Barky, "Towards a Phenomenology of

Feminist Consciousness" in Feminism and Philosophy, supra note 8; Nancy McWilliams,
"Contemporary Feminism, Consciousness-Raising, and Changing Views of the Political" in
Women in Politics 157 (Jane Jacquette, ed. 1974); C. MacKinnon, "Agenda" supra note 5; S.
Law, "Equality, Power and the Limits of Law" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 1769, 1784-1786; K.

Lahey, "Until Women Themselves Have Told All They Have To Tell..." (1985), 23 Osgoode
Hall L.J.519.

232. McWilliams, ibid note 5 at 164.
233. "Agenda", supra note 146 at 535.

234. It might be argued by some that consciousness-raising is appropriate for womens groups
to communicate independent of the silencing presence of males, but that it is unsuited to a
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If we expand our horizons beyond law, and shift our focus from power
and politics as they have been traditionally - and narrowly understood, we can, once again, learn from literature. For example, there
has been an influential, radical heritage in literary criticism - traces of
which can be detected in Barthes, Kristeva, Benjamin 235 and Stein 236 that
suggests an alternative conception of power based upon laughter. A
particularly poignant example of this is to be found in Russian literary
critic Mikhail Bakhtin's reinterpretation of Rabelais. Bakhtin argues that
anger, even when justified, is only one of several possible transformative
strategies available to us. He posits that the power of laughter can be just
as subversive as anger, and points to the power of the carnival to
delegitimize and topple the hierarchy of both church and state, and to
obliterate what had appeared to be inevitable differences and to highlight
23 7
new, mutable ones.
In the same de-ranging vein, some of those who have been the victims
of domination and oppression have dis-played their resistance by
reclaiming, affirming and revalorizing that which has been used to
oppress them. For example, feminists, invoking the power of naming,
have claimed and reinterpreted "chauvinism", disconnecting it from its
patriotic context, and canonizing it as one of feminism's pejorative
superlatives. Similarly, much of the work of Mary Daly is an attempt to
support the traditionally devalued recipients of labels such as "hag",
"spinster", "witch" and "shrew". 238 And again, at least in certain, and not
necessarily feminist, circles, the use of the generic "he" and "man" are
considered inappropriate while "chairperson" and "spokesperson" are
accepted as both desirable and normal. Other oppressed communities

larger transformative programme. Such an argument assumes that males are incapable of the
intersubjective awareness required for such an experience. If, however, one subscribes to
modernism, as I do, then there is hope that males can develop such abilities. There is, of course,
the logistical problem of making consciousness raising effective on a larger level but it is not
clear to me that this has any necessary connection with gender.
235. Seefor example,
The class struggle, which is always present to a historian influenced by Marx, is a fight
for the crude and the material things without which no refined and spiritual things
could exist. Nevertheless, it is not in the form of the spoils which fall to the victor that
the latter make their presence felt in the class struggle. They manifest themselves in this
struggle as courage, humour, cunning, and fortitude,
Walter Benjamin, llluminations254-55 (Hannah Arendt, ed. 1964).
236. See eg., Jo Anna Isaak, "Gertrude Stein: The Revolutionary Power of a Woman's
Laughter" in The Ruin of RepresentationandModernistArt and Texts 93-123 (1986).
237. M. Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World (1968). For further discussions see generally, R.M.
Berrong, Rabelais and Bakhtin (1986); D.N. Losse, Rhetoric at Play: Rabelais and Social

Eulogy (1980); D.M. Frame, Franqois Rabelais (1977); A.F. Chappell, The Enigma of
Rabelais(1978).
238. See for example, Gyn/Ecology (1979); Wickedery (1987).
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have reappropriated and revalorized terms that have been overlaid with
oppression. Some blacks now use "sweet nigger" and gays, "faggot", and
lesbians, "dyke", affirmatively, supportively.
In short, because there are no immutable essences, difference does not
necessarily have to be identified with inferior, but rather the relative value
will depend upon the circumstances of power - a concept that must be
understood expansively, in order to account for important examples of
resistance and partial reconstructions.
b)

MacKinnon'sPositive Vision: Equality

MacKinnon is fully aware that the critique of male supremacism cannot,
on its own, cause the decline of the masculinist empire, nor can it capture
the potential of feminism for social transformation. Having rejected the
discourse of difference she must articulate her own suggestions for postpatriarchy. Feminism Unmodified suggests that feminist agenda must be
located in the discourse and praxis of "equality",239
Feminism, "as a political movement for civil equality", 240 seeks to
"eradicate ...gender hierarchy" 24' and end "enforced subordination,
limited options and social powerlessness - on the basis of sex, among
other things". 242 "Equality as anti-domination", 243 is not the "abstract
equality of liberalism", 244 is more than a demand for access to the "male
world" and "male pursuits", although this is included.
Feminism seeks to empower women in our own terms. To value what
women have always done as well as to allow us to do everything else. We
seek not only to be valued as who we are, but to have access to the
definition of value itself. In this way our demand for access becomes also
a demand for change. 24
Thus, for MacKinnon, equality is something much more significant
than liberalism's espousal of equal opportunity, which is itself a structural
limitation. Feminism demands to participate in the valorization process
itself, to transform rather than merely reform. Equality as antidomination is not merely the opportunity to be the same as men, thereby
maintaining maleness as the essential referent, 246 or even to reverse the
hierarchy. Rather equality, by enabling women to participate in the
valorization process, provides the opportunity to reconstruct the very
239. Feminism Unmodifiedat 15.
240. Feminism Unmodified at 206.
241. Feminism Unmodified at 22.
242. Feminism Unmodified at 22.
243. Littleton, Reconstructing, supra note 79.
244. Feminism Unmodified at 16.
245. Feminism Unmodified at 22.
246. Feminism Unmodified at 34; see also Minow, "Justice Engendered", supranote 135.
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conditions of human interaction, male-determined conditions of
domination and subordination, so that power is no longer identified with
2 47
dominance.
The claims that feminism aspires to the transformation of both equality
and power are central to MacKinnon's work, but are unfortunately
underdeveloped, mostly because they remain abstractly aspirational and
experientially unsituated. Rephrased, how does she propose to transform
equality and power relations? No answer is forthcoming. One is tempted
to suggest the difference approach, 248 but we are prohibited from such a
strategy because difference is a male determined ideology, falseconsciousness. But why is equality any less male determined than
difference? Surely, it too has been one of the master's tools premised as
it is on maleness being the benchmark. 249 As I understand MacKinnon,
her response is that equality as anti-domination reconstructs equality to
be different from its male conception of "sameness", it is a transformative
vision of equality. But the question remains, how does this reconstruction
come about? If "equality", itself traditionally male, 250 can be remade by
feminism, then why cannot "difference" also be a component in the
transformational process, disconnected from being complicit in women's
subordination, reconstructed to be pivotal in their emancipation. Indeed,
it has the advantage over equality of providing some concrete, specific

247. Feminism Unmodified at 23.
248. This integrative approach is suggested by both Angela Miles supra note 21 and Colleen
Sheppard supra note 14. As Sheppard pithily posits, "Equality thus requires the embracing of
social diversity" supra note 14 at 200. See also Christine Littleton, who attempts to develop
a conception of "equality as acceptance" where difference would be "costless", so that,
difference between human beings, whether perceived or real, and whether biologically
or socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in the lived out equality
of those persons, (Reconstructing supra, note 79 at 1284).
She also points out, however, that she is not celebrating difference (at fn. 79).
249. Moreover, equality itself may not push the challenge far enough. It comes dangerously
close to petitioning androcentrism for fairness and justice and as such may ultimately be tied
to paternalistic benevolence. Particularly poignant in this light is Canadian feminists' emphasis
upon equality claims. In the course of the patriation process feminists successfully campaigned
to have their equal rights entrenched in the Charter. However, the Meech Lake brotherly
compact threatens to undercut the feminist successes achieved less than a decade ago. What the
male state has granted, equal rights for women, it can also take away. See A.Z. Dobrowolsky,
"Meech Lake" (unpublished manuscript); R.A. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental Rights"
(1982), 27 McGill L.J. 755.
250. MacKinnon acknowledges as much, at least in so far as equality means sameness. See
Feminism Unmodified at 34. As Ann Scales points out, "In this country, the engine of the
struggle for equality has been aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike
persons unlike" in "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1986), 95 Yale L.J.
1373, 1374 (footnote omitted). See also Littleton, "Reconstructing", Introduction and Part II,
supra note 79, for an outline of the concerns about the feminist espousal of equality, given its
"phallocentricity".
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elements which can provide guidance - always corrigible - for the
direction in which the transformation might go.
Although MacKinnon's discussion of equality is disconcertingly underdeveloped, we can develop a more specific understanding of her
reconstructive vision if we leave the spheres of jurisprudence and law,
" ' Indeed, the shift
and briefly discuss her reflections on sport.25
of focus
may be more apparent than real for the parallels between male-stream
law and sport may be very strong.
MacKinnon argues that traditional approaches to women in the
athletic community, have been based upon the gender-hierarchy
paradigm, thereby inferiorizing, excluding, and disadvantaging women.
She argues that liberal feminism's demand for equal opportunity and the
termination of sex-role stereotyping is inadequate.
An alternative, "radical feminist analysis" 2 2 challenges the gender
hierarchy system and, "moves to transform the meaning of athletics, of
sport itself'. 253 MacKinnon's view of the radical feminist perspective is
that there is a need for much more than an opportunity "to play with the
boys"' 254 for that would still allow the boys to determine the nature,
norms and values of the sport.255 The radical feminist approach strives
towards the "creation of a new standard, of a new vision of sport", 256 one
that encourages physical self-respect, autonomy, integrity and selfpossession. As a transformative vision it strives to break with the
repressive stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, to open up new
horizons.
The discussion of the "revaluation of sport" from a feminist
perspective is important, not just for its own sake but also because it is
one of the few occasions when MacKinnon indicates more specifically
what her positive vision may be. It is a rejection of objectification and
subordination in order to allow women to experience their bodies "as if
they are our own". 257 It is a vision of autonomy, integrity, self-worth, and
self-determination. Significantly, as MacKinnon is keen to point out, this
is not the same as femininity, for that serves "the interests of men",
whereas her vision serves the interests of women.
Again the question arises, how are women able to experience and
bring about this revaluation and reconstruction of sport? MacKinnon
writes in the present tense and shares her experience and that of other
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Feminism Unmodified Ch. X, "Women, Self-Possession and Sport".
Feminism Unmodified at 118.
Feminism Unmodified at 119.
Feminism Unmodified at 120.
Feminism Unmodified at 121.
Feminism Unmodified at 123.
Feminism Unmodified at 121.
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women, thereby indicating that the radical feminist transformation is
already happening, at least in certain limited spheres. However, if the
power-hierarchy thesis is to hold, then such feminist "deviations" would
be impossible. As an explanatory theory, although providing important
insights, the power-hierarchy thesis goes too far. Perhaps it would be
better to understand the feminist revaluation of sport as an aspect of
"power to", power to affirm women's integrity, power to co-operate,
power to have fun. Moreover, if women can remake sport, despite their
"learned disability", 258 then why can they not also remake difference, to
disconnect it from its negative and subordinating manifestations to be a
component in a radically transformative counterparadigm for social
interaction. Furthermore, there is nothing in MacKinnon's desiderata of
autonomy, integrity, self-worth or self-determination that is necessarily
anti-thetical to the ethic of care, for, as I have emphasized, the ethic of
care is not self-sacrifice. 2 9 On the contrary, as Jean Grimshaw points out,
it is exactly these sorts of qualities that make "care and an understanding
of others" effective, powerful. 260
c)

ReconcilingMacKinnon and Gilligan
Within the interdependence of mutual (non-dominant) differences lies that
security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and
return with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant power
to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference
is that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is
forged.
261
Audre Lorde

A careful reading of MacKinnon provides an opportunity to question just
how wide the gap is between her viewpoint and that of Gilligan.
Although she clearly favours the equalitarian position on the continuum
of equality and difference,2 62 at other moments, more interstitially and
less developed, she does suggest that women's value structures would be,
and are even now, somewhat different from those of men. The discussion
of sport is the clearest example.
258. Feminism Unmodified at 120.
259. It may also be worth noting that "self-determination, autonomy, integrity and self-worth"
are notoriously nebulous terms, and may not take us far beyond "equality" in the quest for
specificity. Moreover, MacKinnon does not tell us in what way these virtues have necessarily
avoided the power-hierarchy thesis that determines her work. For example, surely all women
politicans would claim that their careers, achievements and agendas are premised upon selfdetermination, autonomy, dignity and self-worth, but one wonders if MacKinnon would agree
that they have avoided patriarchal hegemony?
260. Jean Grimshaw, FeministPhilosophers183 (1986).
261. Sister Outsiderat 111-112.
262. See infta
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MacKinnon's point of disagreement with Gilligan is that the latter

identifies difference with gender. But this, perhaps, is a misunderstanding
of Gilligan's thesis, which, as I have indicated, is explicit in its rejection

not only of biological determinism, but also of the identification of gender
with difference. Indeed, recognizing that the debate may be somewhat

misplaced, and by shifting focus from the source or form of difference to
its substance, we can see that there may be more common ground

between MacKinnon and Gilligan than has hitherto been recognized.
Indeed, at one point MacKinnon refers to the values articulated by

Gilligan that contribute in the ethic of care:
That does not mean that I throw out those values. Those are nice values;
everyone should have them. I am not saying that taking these values
seriously would not transform discourse, which would be a good thing
under any circumstance of gender.32

MacKinnon not only accepts the desirability of such values, but also their
potentially transformative potential. Her criticism is that such values are
identified with women. 2" Gilligan rejects such a reductionism, and says
more modestly that some women and some men share both value
structures, although not necessarily in equal amounts. My suggestion is
that both men and women can contribute to the ethic of care, that we

should deprivitize it, and that we ought to consider it a legitimate concern
for legal practice and theory.
Having taken the detour through difference, we can begin to work
towards an alternative political-moral discourse and practice based upon

an ethic of care. Difference may provide a conceptual vantage point that
can help us move towards an alternative social structure.2 5
263. Discourse at 74-75.
264. Discourse at 74-75.
265. Moreover, difference if taken seriously, can allow for a dramatic expansion of autonomy,
dignity and empowerment As Audre Lorde suggests,
Difference must not be merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic,
Sister Outsider, 111 (1986).
As I have suggested, MacKinnon's proposition that the dominant ideology of masculinism
is a consistent and unified whole is unidimensional. It inhibits her from identifying the nuances,
gaps and exceptions to the dominant ideology. Difference is one such nuance or exception in
the matrix of patriarchy. However if difference is understood in the biologistic or essentialist
manner, as sex determined, then difference itself accepts patriarchal dualisms. Difference can
be developed as a counterprinciple to the formalistic reductionism of equalitarianism that
assumes the white, middle-class male to be "the measure of all things", (Feminism Unmodified
at 34).
If difference is understood in its existential, multi-faceted heterogeneity then the nuances and
exceptions become the normal, the expected and the accepted. Difference is then recognized
to relate not only to gender, but also to race, class, sexual orientation, physical or mental
abilities, age, etc.
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d)

Alternative locationsfor the ethic of care
What is at stake in this transcendence is the negation of the exploiting and
repressive values of patriarchal civilization. What is at stake is the negation
of the values engendered and reproduced in a society of male domination.
And such radical subversion of values can never be the mere by product
of new social institutions. It must have its roots in the men and women
who built the new institutions.
Herbert Marcuse 266

As we have seen, the real problem for MacKinnon is not the ideal of the
ethic of care, but rather her concern that difference is reduced to women.
Gilligan's work has been heavily criticized for its dangerous propensity to
reproduce and legitimize traditional masculinist stereotypes of femininity
with its correlative passification and disempowerment of women.
However, now that we have a stronger conception of what difference
might mean, a substantive vision rather than the insubstantial invocation
of othemess, an ideological transvaluation, it may be possible to trace
elements of the ethic of care elsewhere than in women's biology or
socially constructed roles. This article does not collapse a political-moral
discourse into the biological, for that would be to reproduce patriarchy's
propensity for stereotypical and repressive rolification.
In recent years, an increasing number of male scholars in a variety of
disciplines have also been tentatively moving towards the orbit of an
ethic of care. For example, in the field of psychology, Joseph Pleck has
The espousal of difference confronts, head on, the oppression of a value-structure that
espouses an equality which demands that those who are different become different from that
which they are if they wish to be successful. In order that they be socially recognized and
valued, it demands the very negation of that which makes them who and what they are. It
assumes the legitimacy of structure which is systematically weighted in favour of a particular
community by portraying it is "neutral", "necessary" or "natural" and insisting that people
change - deny themselves - to fit, reinforce and ultimately perpetuate the structure. Thus,
the community is constructed to fit the elite benefitting structure, rather than the social
structure being transformed to facilitate, encourage and empower the plurality of diverse
communities that characterize our societies.
In this light, Canada may have a potentially significant advantage over the United States in
that Canadians recognize cultural plurality as both desirable and worthy of state support. With
regards to ethnicity, Canada encourages the vision of a society as a cultural mosaic, whereas
the United States prefers the melting pot. Of course, Canada is still governed by w.a.s.p.
oriented persons but the potential is there for alternative developments. Of particular interest
here are both the entrenchment of the multicultural provisions in s. 27 Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms, (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11) and Canada's history of red toryism.
See also Minow, "Justice Engendered", supra note 135; Scales, "Feminist Jurisprudence"
supra note 179 at 1376, 1387-1388, I.M. Young, "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist
Politics" (1985), 8 Women's Studies Int. Forum 173, 180-181, and "Difference and Polity:
Some Reflections in the Context of the New Social Movements" (1987), 56 Cincinnati L.Rev.
535.
266. Marxism and Feminism (1974), 2 Women's Studies 274-288.
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been unpacking The Myth of Masculinity(1981). In philosophy, Michael
Ignatieff has urged us to respond to the Needs of Strangerswhile Larry
Blum encouraged us to pursue Friendship,Altruism and Morality (1980).
Michael Kaufmann has recently edited a collection of essays entitled
Beyond Patriarchy (1986) which, despite some serious problems, also
takes important steps towards an ethic of care. 267 Or, looking back a
century we may remember botanist, biologist, anarchist and social
theorist, Kropotkin, who challenged Darwin's vision of "survival of the
fittest" with an impressive account of evolution premised upon a vision
of Mutual Aid2 "
Perhaps the most important jurisprudential effort to move towards an
ethic of care, yet developed by a male, is that of Roberto Mangabeira
Unger in his essay on human personality, Passion (1984). Although
Unger fails to discuss the issue of gender or difference explicitly in his
essay, in my opinion, there is much in Passion that correlates with
Gilligan's work.269 Moreover, his theory of human personality provides
access to another pervasive and, I would suggest, inspirational aspect of
his work, "Solidarity", which he characterizes as "love struggling to move
beyond the circle of intimacy". 270 When he expands upon solidarity the
parallels with Gilligan are palpable, energizing, and encouraging:
The kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives
touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to
share in their fate. Solidarity is the social face of love: it is concern with
another as a person rather than just respect for him (sic) as a bearer of
formally equal27 rights and duties or admiration for his (sic) gifts and
achievements. '
Solidarity, I suggest, is a cognate of the ethic of care.
If we turn our attention to alternative cultures, we realize that
anthropologists have consistently identified elements of the ethic of care
267. See also Milner S. Ball, Lying Down Together (1985) who pursues a non-violent,
"peaceable kingdom" premised upon theology; G. Frug, Book Review, The Language of
Power (1984), 84 Columbia L.Rev. 1881. Moreover, even important historical figures such as
Thomas Paine envisioned a potential America, premised upon themes that are connected with
a polity motivated by love and friendship rather than greed, commerce and interest group
factionalism. See Norman Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education" (1963), 57
Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 561.
268. Gloria Steinem reminds us that, "some male primates carry and gefterally 'mother' their
infants, male lions care for their young ... and male penguins literally do everything except
give birth, from hatching the eggs to sacrificing their own membranes to feed the new arrivals"
in "Erotica v. Pornography" in OutrageousActs and Everyday Rebellions 219,226 (1983).
269. See, Devlin, Book Review (1986), 11 Queen's L.J. 219.
270. Law in Modern Society 207 (1975).
271. Ibid, 206. For a homologous feminist jurisprudential effort to reclaim love for feminist
transformation see Ruth Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards a Feminist Theological
Dialogue" (unpublished manuscript, 1988).
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in pre-industrial societies. Social anthropologist Colin Turnball, for
example, opines that if we value a "conscious dedication to human
relationships affective and effective, the primative is ahead of us all the
way." 272 Margaret Mead claimed that the Arapesh Tribe of the South
Seas is a society in which both the males and females pursue lives that are
peaceful and co-operative, and where males play an important role in
273
child care.
Even within our own Euro-yanqui societies, there may be traces of the
ethic of care, at least intracommunally, especially among those who have
been marginalized and subordinated by mainstream society.2 74 For
example, the extremely poor of Appalachia are characterized by "a
275
person oriented behaviour accompanied by an ideology of levelling".
There are indications that "Eskimo", Chicano and Indian children are
critical of the dominant culture's lack of care for others and for the
earth. 276 Indeed, North American native people in general appear to
manifest similar viewpoints. 277 Moreover, scholars who have concentrated their research on black culture have highlighted traits that also
dovetail in important ways with the ethic of care. 278 Even game theorists
have tentatively identified a connection between an "exploitative"
masculinine strategy and feminine "accommodative" strategy and the
279
cultural background of the male players.
272. The Human Cycle 21-22 (1983). Primitive is Turnbal's word, our language once again
demonstrating its value laden nature.
273. Male andFemale, 76 et seq (1968). She also discusses the Murdagumor in which women
are aggressive, belligerent and resistant to pregnancy and nursing. ]bid, Huntington Cairns also
draws our attention to other communities which have a high level of social integration and yet
lack a coercive state of the kind demanded by Locke's imperative to escape from the state of
nature. Legal Philosophyfrom Plato to Hegel 348 (1967).
274. It is possible to argue that in the light of these suggestions care should be understood as
a correlative of conditions of subordination and inequality, and therefore it is undesirable to
encourage it. I am reluctant to accept such a proposition for that would be to buy into the
dominant culture which too quickly prioritizes the self over the other. I think it is more
beneficial to see care in a positive light, as an alternative vision, in spite of oppression, rather
than because of it
275. Robert Denhardt, cited in Ferguson, supra note 43, at 23.
276. Robert Coles, Eskimos, Chicanos, Indians (1977) cited in Tronto, "Beyond Gender
Difference To a Theory of Care" (1987), 12 Signs 644, 649-51. "Eskimo" is Coles' term, not
mine.
277. See for example, Menno Boldt, The Questfor Justice (1986) and Patricia Monture, "KaNin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Ya-Gah" (1986), 2 C.J.WL. 159.
278. See for example Carol Stack, All Our Kin (1976); Betty Lou Valentine, Hustling and
Other Hand Work- Lifestyles in the Ghetto (1978); J.L. Gwaltney, Drylongso: A Self Portrait
of Black America (1980); G.G. Jackson, Black Psychology: An Avenue to the Study of AfroAmericans" (1982), 12 Journal of Black Studies 241; W.W. Nobles, "Extended Self:
Rethinking the so-called Negro self-concept" (1976), 2 Journal of Black Psychology 15.
279. TK. Uesugi and WE. Vinaki, "Strategy in a Feminine Game" (1963), 26 Sociometry 75.
See further, K. Ferguson, supra note 43 at 164.
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So, perhaps the ethic of care may not be as rare as we have come to
believe. Not only are there indications that people of both sexes
experience care in their own lives, there are indications that it is already
a constitutive, though not necessarily dominant, element in contemporary
and alterior social relations, both public and private. Can we expand it?
What I am suggesting is that the dominant ideology of separation and
otherness, domination and subordination, sameness and difference,
normal and deviant, male and female is only a partially accurate
comprehension of the complexity of life and social interaction. It is a
deeply structured paradigm that moulds our understandings, criticisms,
and visions, but it is a paradigm nonetheless, and therefore, simplistic and
repressive. It only functions in so far as it can achieve coherence, but the
price of such coherence is the repression of deviations, exclusions,
exceptions. However, as Kuhn points out, paradigms change, and they
change because the repression of the deviations can no longer be
effective. 280 The ethic of care, I suggest, is one such deviation, it exists, it
is real and it may even be in the ascendency as an "insurrection(al)
subjugated knowledge",2 l creating a "crisis" for the dominant ideology.
Feminism is at the forefront of this crisis-inducing dynamic. Feminism's
transformative vision highlights the descriptive and normative
inadequacies of the dominant ideology and provides us with a very real
political opportunity to bring about a paradigm-shift, to de-centre and derange patriarchy and violence, and to move us closer to a solidarity
inspired society, to a society that can resist what for patriarchy has been
a thanatical, and increasingly eschatological, imperative. This discussion
of the ethic of care allows us to begin to soften the boundaries between
masculine and feminine, to access the "other" in each one of Us28 2 and to
allow us to remake both our interpersonal and politico-juridical lives.
280. The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (2nd ed. 1970).
281. Foucault, Power/Knowledge 81 (1972).
282. D. Cornell and A. Thurschwell, "Feminism, Negativity and Intersubjectivity" (1986), 5
Praxis International 486, 447. I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough. My support for
the ethic of care is not premised upon a universalistic premise that all women, regardless of
historical, class or ethic differences have this talent because of their nurturant or maternal
opportunities/abilities. See for example Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" (1980), 6
Feminist Studies 342. The connection between care and female is contingent, historical and
cultural. Care cannot be reduced to maternalism. Both sexes have this capacity, it is part of our
human potential. As Jane Flax suggests, "our similarities are even more striking if we compare
humans to (say) toads or trees" in "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory"
(1987), 12 Signs 621, 636. Feminism is important not only for its concern for women's needs
but also for its radical rejection of mankind's dangerous and damaging propensities and
espousal of a more caring social ethos, a perspective that is shared by at least some men.
To conjecture further, perhaps one of the reasons why we have such difficulties in
recognizing this attribute is because of our training as lawyers, a vocation that is, at once,
underpinned and overdetermined by visions of individualism, and an excessive orientation
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e) Beyond Either/Or
As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' power
to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they
had lost in the exercise of oppression.
28 3
Paulo Friere
I hope that it is clear from the foregoing analysis of the two traditions equalitarianism and gynocentrism - that alone each is inadequate,
incapable of providing grounding, support and direction which a
progressive feminism requires. Equalitarianism may either overemphasize
autonomy and individualism thereby foregoing the importance of human
interdependence and the necessity for empathy, or it may challenge
masculinist hegemony on only a superficial level, thereby leaving too
much of the patriarchal substructure in place. On the other hand,
gynocentrism, unless reinforced by equality, may run the risk of either
reproducing and capitulating to the traditional repressive stereotypes or
of denying the important needs of an individual self. But, as Jean
Grimshaw asks, "Why should autonomy not be compatible with a
rejection of domination and aggression, with a recognition of human
284
interdependence, and for the need for care of others?"
There is no a priori reason why these two perspectives have to be
considered disjunctively or as contradictory. Methodologically, feminists
have begun to argue that either/or conceptions reflect a masculinist
propensity to conceptualize in authoritarian, separatist and absolutist
terms, 285 thereby ignoring more holistic, complex and web-like patterns
of interdependence. Malist epistomology espouses grand, purist principles
resulting in "alienating dichotomies' ' 6 while a feminist epistemology
emphasises contextualism, and the plurality of techniques. For feminism,
conjunction rather than disjunction, a transcendence of the apparent
contradiction, is the better way to go.

towards individual rights consciousness. Perhaps if we looked beyond our own discipline, and
listened to what others have suggested we might begin to see otherwise, and pay attention to
the ethic of care. We must be extremely careful not to falsely universalize our own experiences
so as to ignore alternative experiences, understandings and possibilities.
283. Pedagogyof the Oppressed(1970), cited in Miles & Finn, supra note 14 at p. 304.
284. FeministPhilosophers47 (1986).
285. Charlotte Bunch, "Beyond Either/Or: Feminist Options" (1976), 3 Quest 3. Marilyn
French, BeyondPower,500-504 (1985).
286. A. Miles, LEE, supra note 21 passim. For a sustained critical feminist critique of
dichotomous thinking, see Fran Olsen "Family and Market", surpa note 8 and "Sex of Laws",
(unpublished manuscript 1984). For feminist criticism of dichotomous thinking that has
negatively impacted upon the legal and cultural status of women, see Katherine O'Donovan,
Sexual Divisions in Law (1985); A. Bottomley, S. Gibson, B. Meteyard, "Dworkin, Which
Dworkin? Taking Feminism Seriously" (1987), 14 J. of Law and Soc. 47.
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Therefore, although equalitarianism and gynocentrism tend to stretch
the feminist cloth in different directions, that does not mean that there
must be two mutually exclusive "cuttings" ... the feminist texture is
malleable. In the same way as the woof and the warp run in competing
directions, when the two are interconnected through weaving we are left
with a fabric that is significantly more substantial than the sum of its
parts. Moreover, when further different multicoloured threads are added
the result may be "a tapestry of rich and royal hue". 28 7 Equality, I suggest,
is essential but not adequate, and may be complemented by a politicomoral vision premised on the ethic of care. The weave may produce a
288
cloth with the texture of a "rainbow coalition".
There are, I think, several different ways in which feminists can begin
to weave equalitarianism and difference together in support of the
aspiration to develop a radical transgressive practice. The first two
suggestions are a little more abstract while the third is somewhat more
pragmatic and already underway.
The first proposition comes from the work of Adrienne Rich in her
essay, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence". 289 In an
effort to challenge the taken for granted nature of heterosexuality, with its
correlative marginalization and suppression of lesbianism, Rich seeks to
highlight and expand the significance of lesbianism, both historically and
experientially. In support of this project, she develops the concept of a
"lesbian continuum" to explain a wide range of:
woman-identified experience; not simply the fact that a woman has had or
consciously desired genital sexual experience with another woman.
[Instead we should] expand it to embrace many more forms of primary
intensity between and among women, including the sharing of a rich inner
life, the bonding against male tyranny, the giving and receiving of practical
and political support; if we can also hear in it such associations as
marriageresistance ... we begin to grasp breadths of female history and
psychology which have lain out of reach as a consequence of limited,
mostly clinical definitions of 'lesbianism'. 29°
Such an expansive conception of lesbianism is important for two reasons.
First, as the reference to "clinical definitions" makes clear, lesbianism is
not innate, it is socially constructed categorization, usually pejorative.
287. Carole King, Tapestry,
288. Iris Marion Young describes the "rainbow coalition" as "an idea of political public which
goes beyond the ideal of civic friendship in which persons unite for a common purpose and
mutual respect. While it includes commitment to equality and mutual respect among
participants, the idea of the rainbow coalition preserves and institutionalizes in its form of
organizational discussion the heterogeneous groups that make it up". See also Fran Olsen's
discussion of "rainbows", supra note 8 at 1578.
289. (1980), 5 signs 631.
290. kid, at 648-49.
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More important, however, is the subversive aspect of the continuum: its
ability to undermine the traditional, exclusive dichotomy of heterosexual
or lesbian. The idea of a lesbian continuum opens up the larger possibility
and that is all it is - of escaping polarizing dualities that necessitate
either/or choices, to move towards a desired goal by holding on to both
ends of the chain at the same time. Interpreted in this light,
equalitarianism and difference can be understood as alternative locations
on a continuum, potentially reinforcing and mutually interdependent
perspectives, in pursuit of the same goal, the transcendence of women's
subordination.
Of course, the idea of a continuum does not resolve the tension
between those who prefer equalitarianism and those who advocate
difference, but it does indicate that these are alternative emphases in the
pursuit of the same dynamic, and it helps to keep the conversation going
in times of stress. As a methodological contribution the continuum can be
of strategic importance in maintaining feminist solidarity.
The second proposition is inspired by the legal and social theorist,
Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Unger posits that every radical social
movement must, in its attempt to move from "here" to "there", develop
the fertile terrain between reform and revolution. In his manifesto for
socio-legal reconstruction he proposes that such movements must
develop a dynamic fusion of internal development and visionary
imagination. 29' Put differently, there must be a capacity to work from
within, to deviate, expand and remake the familiar and normal into the
novel and transcendent, while being simultaneously informed, guided
and inspired by a transformative vision. This symbiosis allows a
progressive movement to eclipse the false dichotomy of fruitless reform
and utopian aspirationalism.
These two movements currently co-exist in the feminist movement.
On the one side there exists the potential to internally develop and
expand liberalism's "commitment" to equality, to remake equality into a
substantive reality. On the other side, there is the transformative vision of
difference, a potential value structure that challenges the hegemony of
masculinist liberalism both in the realm of socio-political institutions and
also in the dynamic of social interaction, and even human identity.
Unger's proposal enables feminism to maintain both perspectives,
practices and visions. It encourages us to understand feminism as
maintaining both equality and difference in a simultaneous, transgressive
dynamic, mutually reinforcing rather than exclusively dichotomous or
antithetical.

291. The CriticalLegal Studies Movement (1986).
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The third inspirational source that can enable feminism to transcend a
debilitating struggle is the work of Canadian feminist, activist and
scholar, Angela Miles, who has already attempted the weaving process.
Through her "integrative feminine principle" she has attempted to knit
together both equality and difference into a mutually enriching, complex,
politically sensitive and sophisticated feminist strategy that will minimize
the dangers of exclusive reliance on either one or the other.2 92 Proactively,
Miles claims that such a "synthesizing vision of politics" allows feminism
to challenge the hegemony of androcentric conceptions of humanity and
social interaction.
The integrative feminine principle ... reject(s) ... all the dichotomies of
industrial society that shape and limit people's existence. It asserts that
men and women are of the same nature but, unlike reformist feminism and
early feminist radicalism, it does not do this by insisting that women are
just like (as good as) men. Instead it recognizes that although men and
women ultimately share the same human existence, in the process of
civilization certain human characteristics, capabilities and activities have
been labelled feminine and their practice has largely been restricted
to
women and the female sphere of reproduction and personal relations.2 93
Fully aware that this social construction of gender has resulted in the
inferiorization and oppression of women294 she continues:
The integrative feminine principle provides a value famework and an
alternative rationality for feminist radicals' political struggle in that it
consciously posits an alternative definition of human nature which is
broad enough to include, and value equally, characteristics now seen as,
and generally in fact distributed between, male and female. 295
Thus, within Miles' formulation, the conjunction of equality and
difference provides the vital starting point for the reconstruction of social
interaction, by espousing the reinvigoration of values that correlate with
the ethic of care.
III.

Pornography

1) Introduction
The issue of pornography both energises and paralyses feminism. It
energises in that it provides a concrete angle through which feminists can
highlight the pervasiveness and the patterns of inequality, subordination
292. K. Lahey attempts to develop aspects of Miles project to facilitate a feminist approach to
reconstruct tax law with respect to women. "Equality and Specificity" supra note 9.
293. Miles, I.F.P. supra note 21 at 485-486. See also Fran Olsen on a rejection of socially
constructed dichotomies, supra note 8.
294. Miles, I.EP. supranote 21 at 486.

295. bid, Feminists are also accutely conscious of the dangers that could be superimposed on
their "difference claim" by conservatives such as Phyllis Schafly.
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and misogyny in contemporary society. The feminist analysis of the
pornographic flood provides a unique opportunity to connect experience,
structure and critique. However, this moment of strength is also a possible
moment of weakness in that the question of legal regulation has split
feminism resulting in debates that have, on occasion, been acrimonious
and visceral. 296 The question that I wish to raise is a little more wide
ranging than most of the discussions to date. My concern is whether the
recent impulse by many feminists to seek a solution, in whole or in part,
297
to the very real problem of pornography by recourse to legal remedies
undermines feminism's transformative vision of an egalitarian, nonhierarchical, non-alienating society. Rephrased, does the legal regulation
of pornography fit with the ethic of care, and the injunction not to hurt
others?
The decision to discuss feminism and pornography is deliberate and
immediate. All too often scholarship functions in the realm of the
abstract, toying with conceptual models and utopian visions that lack any
solid grounding in the reality of most peoples' existence. 298 By
introducing the pornography question, we are forced to face up to
questions such as: what is the impact of such material on women's lives;
is there a possibility of women's objections even being heard, never mind
being acted upon; how should pressure groups, and society as a whole,
deal with such issues; can legal remedies be developed to deal with such
a problem; what are the internal legal barriers to such strategies; are legal
remedies, in themselves, appropriate? These are highly political and
urgent issues which need to be dealt with. Scholarship which discusses
feminism, feminist jurisprudence, law and pornography is committed
scholarship, engaged scholarship, political scholarship. 299 It rejects the
pseudo-scientific objectivity which most legal scholarship claims for itself
by making it clear that legal discourse is political discourse; that what we
are involved in is in no way distinct from politics, but integral to it.300
Normative questions are the very life blood of law, particularly when law
301
is understood through the prism/speculum of gender.
296. See for example, Catharine MacKinnon, "Standards of Sisterhood" (1985), 7(3)
Broadside; Letters to the Editor, (1986) 7(4) Broadside 297.
297. For a useful, brief review of some of the various viewpoints of women on pornography
and the question of legal regulation, see K. Lahey "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Pornography: Toward a Theory of Actual Gender Equality" (1984-85), 20 New Eng. L.Rev.
649, 649-51. See also E. Spahn, "Sex and Violence" "ibid, at 629, 630.
298. For a discussion of why it is important for feminism to reject abstraction and concentrate
upon contextualism, see Carol Gould, "The Woman Question Philosophy of Liberation and
the Liberation of Philosophy" (C. Gould and M. Wartofsky eds. 1976) Women and
Philosophy.

299. See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 1.
300. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986); Politics
(1987).
301. This paper is not concerned with what I consider to be a second level issue of the
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2) A Feminist CritiqueofPornography
Traditionally, the story of pornography has been overdetermined by the
constitutionality of anti-pornography legislation, or recent common law developments such as
R v. Wagner (1985), 43 C.R. (3d) 319, 37 Alta. L.Rev. (2d) 301 (Q.B.). The politically and
logically prior question for feminists - but not for legal fetishists - is whether legal remedies
are the most fruitful path to follow. I believe that the constitutional argument can be
persuasively argued both ways. It ispolitical predispositions that tilt the balance.
Those who view anti-pornography legislation as constitutionally valid include:
K. Lahey, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of
Actual Gender Equality" (1984-85), 20 New England L.Rev. 649.
Lahey, "The Charter and Pornography: Toward a Restricted Theory of Constitutionally
Protected Expression", in Litigatingthe Values ofa Nation 265 (J. Weiler and R. Elliot
eds. 1986).
Michael Gershell, "Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography:
Legal Analysis as if Women Really Mattered" (1985), 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 41.
Cass Sunstein, "Pornography and the First Amendment" (1986), Duke L.J. 589.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue" (1984), 2 Yale Law and Policy Rev.
321 [hereinafter cited as "Not Moral"]; "Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech"
(1985), 20 Har. C.R.C.L.Rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as "Speech"].
Some of those who would disagree include:
Randall D.B. Tigue, "Civil Rights and Censorship - Incompatible Bedfellows"
(1985), 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 81.
Louise Arbour, "The Politics of Pornography: Towards an Expansive Theory of
Constitutionally Protected Expression", Litigatingthe Values of a Nation, ibid at 294.
James R. Branit, "Reconciling Free Speech and Equality: What Justifies Censorship?"
(1986), 9 Harvard Journal Law & Public Policy, 429.
Geoffrey R. Stone, "Anti-Pornograghy Legislation or Viewpoint Discrimination"
(1986), 9 Harvard Journal Law & Public Policy 461.
T. Emerson, "'Pornography and the First Amendment' A Reply to Professor
MacKinnon" (1984), 3 Yale Law and Policy Review 130.
A. Alan Borovoy, "Freedom of Expression: Some Recurring Impediments", in Justice
Beyond Orwell 125 (R. Abella & M. Rothman eds. 1985).
Robin Elliott, "Freedom of Expression and Pornography: The Need for a Structured
Approach to Charter Analysis", in Litigating the Values of a Nation, ibid at 308 - sits
on the surface, non-committal, but overall tone suggests he favours expression.
Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights' Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission:
New Developments in Pornography Regulation" (1986), 21 Harv. C.R.C.L.L.Rev. 27.
Alan Dershhowtiz, "Women's War on Porn", Time, August 27th, 1979 at 64.
There are a couple of comments that I would like to make on the strategic significance of
constitutionalization of the pornography issue. First, feminist advocates of legal controls on
pornography or remedies against pornography must have comtemplated the very high
likelihood that this would become a constitutional issue. As feminists have pointed out time
and again, law is a male-constructed and dominated episteme, discourse and practice, therefore
it was predictable that the constitutional twist would occur.
The second issue raised by recourse to law, is the danger of distraction. What started off for
feminism as an issue of powerlessness has, through the hegemonic dynamic of legal discourse,
been recorded as an issue of constitutionally protected speech, and the correlative miasmic
morass of doctrinal arguments that accompany such an encoding. What we find iswhat Robert
Samek has described as metaphenomenalism, a perennial shifting of the locus of the problem,
a continual slide to the peripheral. Robert Samek, The Metaphenomenon (1981). Not only is
this encoding process a distraction, it is also insidious that it is liberal legalism, not feminism,
which has a powerful hold over the popular psyche and the appeal to constitutional rights
allows the liberals to portray progressive feminism in a negative light ... casting them as
totalitarian despots. The consitutional twist, therefore, automatically puts the feminist challenge
to pornography in a position of politico-ideological disadvantage.
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concept of "obscenity" 30 2 resulting in a conceptualization and discourse
in terms of conservatism versus liberalism,30 3 "Victorian priggishness"
versus sexual liberation, intolerance versus prurience. °4 Thus, until
recently, pornography has been understood as morality play30 5 rather
than an act of political power, phallic power. 3°6

302. See for example, Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality (1975); Oybikowski, "Law,
Liberty and Obscenity" (1972), 7 U.B.C.L.Rev. 38; Hunter, "Obscenity, Pornography and
Law Reform" (1975-76), 2 Dal. L.J. 482; Pornographyand Censorship (D. Copp and S.
Wendell eds. 1983); Joel Feinberg, "Pornography and the Criminal Law" (1979), 40 U. Pitt.
L.Rev. 567; F Schauer, The Law of Obscenity (1976); D.A.J. Richards, "Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment" (1974-75), 123 U. Pa.
L.Rev. 45 and The Moral Criticism of Law, 56-77 (1977); Alan Young, "News From the Front
- The War on Obscenity and the Death of Doctrinal Purity (forthcoming, Osgoode Hall
L.J.).
303. United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1971); E. Hoffman,
"Feminism, Pornography and Law" (1985-86), 133 U. Pa. L.Rev. 497, 504-510; Amitai
Etzioni, "Porn is here to stay", New York Times, May 17, 1977 at 35; Paul Goodman, Utopian
Essays & PracticalProposals57 (1962); Kathleen E. Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and The
Law: Challenging Basic Assumptions" in Justice Beyond Orwell supra note 301, at 77. Some
observers suggest that anti-pornography feminists, although adopting a different approach,
have entered into an alliance with conservatives. See for example, Donald Downs, "The
Attorney General's Commission and the New Politics of Pornography" (1987), 4 A.B.ER.J.
641; Robin West, "The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report" (1987), 4 A.B.ER.J. 681; Varda
Burstyn, Women Against Censorship(1985).
304. Schipper, "Filthy Lucre, A Tour of America's Most Profitable Frontier", Mother Jones
31, April 1980; Margaret Baldwin, "The Sexuality of Inequality" (1984), 2 Law and
Inequality 629.
305. See, Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California413 U.S. 15 (1973); see C.
Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence" (1984), 7 Harvard Women's L.Rev. 5, 29-36. Canada for a long
time has followed the English decision of P v. Hicklin (1868), 3 Q.B. 359, 18 L.T. 395; and
Brodie v. The Queen, [1902] S.C.R. 681, 32 D.L.Rev. (2d) 507. See also Joel Bakan,
"Pornography, Law and Moral Theory" (1985), 17 Ottawa L.Rev. 1.
Nor should we be confident that this dominant interpretation has now passed. For example,
although the U.S. Attorney-General's Commission on PornographyFinalReport July 1986,
does refer to more recent interpretations of pornography, including that expoused by feminists,
its overall tone is still staunchly moralistic. Moreover, moralism pervades a recent Canadian
proposal to criminalize pornography which it defines as:
any visual showing vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, ejaculation, sexually violent
behaviour, bestiality, incest, necrophilia, masturbation or other sexual activity.
(emphasis added)
Bill C-1 14, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Customs Act, 1st Session, 33rd Parl.,
1984-85-86, cl.7. After extensive criticism, this proposal has been withdrawn to be replaced
with a somewhat more specific definition. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code,
2nd Session, 33rd ParI., 1986-87, s. 1. But this too seems to have lapsed.
Again moralism appears to be on the ascendency in the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) which upheld the constitutional validity of state sodomy
prohibitions, and the rhetoric of Judaeo-Christian morality. Similarly there is a subtle mixture
of moralistic discourse and feminism in the S.C.C. decision in Towne Cinema Theatres v. I,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 494, [1985] 4 W.R.R. 1, 37 Alta. L.Rev. (2d) 289, 45 C.R. (3d) 1; 18
D.L.Rev. (4th) 1.
306. Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 321; Beverly Brown, "A
Feminist Interest in Pornography - Some Modest Proposals" (1981), 5/6 M/F 5.
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In recent years, feminists have retold the story and but now we see
pornography as vicious, chilling, horrifying. Pornography has been
disconnected from obscenity, and the restraining conceptual hegemony of
the moralistic see-saw has been overturned. By articulating the integral
connection between gender and power, feminism has gone a long way in
providing a deeper understanding of the nature and effects of the
pornographic phenomenon. 30 7 It has named 308 pornography for what it is:
a vital constitutive component in the continued existence of the ideology
and practice of male supremacism. The sexual revolution of the 'sixties
and 'seventies was not a woman's revolution, 3°9 and therapeutic derepression has become domination. In short pornography is an exemplary
3 10
moment of patriarchy.
As I have already indicated there are many different feminist perspectives, and these varying
viewpoints have concretized themselves in relation to the pornography debate. What follows
is an outline of the most critical feminist approach to pornography, one that sees pornography
as having no redeeming qualities from a feminist perspective. Frequently, this is perceived as
"the radical feminist" critique of pornography.
However, pornography is part of a broader debate within feminism, what has been called
"The feminist sexuality debate". See e.g., (1984-85), 10 Signs 102-135; C. Cohen, "The
Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics" (1986), 2 Hypatia 71. Other feminists who
claim to be just as radical as the anti-pornography feminists, argue that pornography is not
monolithically oppressive, that some women find some pornography to be liberating, and
transformative. See in particular,PleasureandDanger: ExploringFemaleSexuality (C. Vance
ed. 1984); Powers of Desire, (Ann Snitow et al. eds. 1983); Robin West, "'he Feminist
Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance" (1987), 4 A.B.F.R.J. 681; Paula Webster,
"Pornography and Pleasure" (1981), 3 Heresies 48. See also Alan Soble, Pornography:
Marxism, Feminism and the Future of Sexuality (1986) for a Marxist defence of pornography,
that envisions a positive role for pornography in a non-alienated society, pornography as a
contribution "to the rich, sensual, sexual fives of communist people" at 108.
307. See for example, Irene Diamond, "Pornography and Repression: A Reconsideration"
(1980), 5 Signs 686; A. Dworkin, "Against the Male Flood" (1985), 8 Harvard Women's Law
Journal 1, Women Hating 78 (1976); Pornography:Men Pressing Women (1981); S. Griffin,
Pornographyand Silence (1981); Take Back the Night Women and Pornography(L. Lederer
ed. 1980); Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301,
Obscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals from the male point of
view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance. The feminist critique of pornography
is a politics, specifically politics from women's point of view, meaning the standpoint
of the subordination of women to men. Morality here means good and evil; politics
means power and powerlessness. Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political
practice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete (at 322-323).
See also Feminism Unmodified Part III, "Pornography".
Susan Cole, "Gagged, Bound and Silenced: Confronting Pornography" (1981), 10
Broadside 11; Anne Cameron, "Hardcore Horror", Broadside (Feb. 1983); Geraldine Finn,
"Against Sexual Imagery: Alternative or Otherwise" (1986), 12 Parallelogramme.
308. For a discussion of the power of "naming" see Mary O'Brien, "Feminism and
Revolution" in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14 at 251, 259; Scales supra note 179 at 1383,
footnote 59; Dworkin, "Male Flood" supra note 307 at 9.
309. Diamond supra note 307 at 701; MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 144, Snitow et
al. supra note 306 at 12. See contra B. Ehrenreich, E. Hess, G. Jacobs, Remaking Love: The
Feminizationof Sex (1986).
310. MacKinnon goes so far as to posit that, "In a feminist perspective, pornography is the
essence of a sexual order, its cuintessential social act". "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 335;
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A radical feminist interpretation of pornography operates on several
levels of analysis. The first step in a feminist understanding of
pornography is to contextualize it, to relate pornography to the formative
conditions of domination and subordination which characterize
contemporary male/female relations. "The major theme of pornography
'31
as a genre is male power, its nature, its magnitude, its use, its meaning. '
As institution, empire31 2 and practice, 31 3 by eulogizing male power and
eroto-legitimizing female powerlessness, pornography generates, reflects
and reinforces the relations of gender inequality, exploitation,

humiliation, degradation, objectification, dehumanization and subjugation that characterize contemporary society. In and of itself, pornography
demonstrates men's power in that it captures their controlling ability to
make women's bodies say what men want them to say. Feminism
understands pornography from the bottom up, from the perspective of its
victims, women, "the sexual disappeared" 31 4 of modern society, not its
male entrepreneurs nor its consumers.
By locating pornography in the experiential circumstances of women's
lives, by shifting attention from amorphous and indeterminate abstract
ideas such as "morality" and "free speech", feminism reconstructs the
question of pornography as an issue of equality. Feminism argues that
pornography violates women's human and civil rights, it is therefore a
315
form of sex discrimination.
Similarly, Dworkin claims that "At the heart of the female condition is pornography; it is the
ideology that is the source of all the rest". Right Wing Women (1983) at 222-223, but see
contra, Carol Vance and Ann Barr Snitow, "Toward a Conversation about Sex in Feminism"
(1984), 10 Signs 126, 132.
311. Dworkin, Male Flood, supra note 307 at 24; C. MacKinnon, "Francis Biddle's Sister",
in Feminism Unmodified 163 (1987); Myrna Kostash, "Whose Body, Whose Self?."; M.
Fitzgerald, C. Guberman, M. Wolfe, Still Ain't Satisfied 43 (1982).
312. "There are more hardcore bookstores than there are McDonalds" in "Pornography:
Liberalism or Oppression", Off Our Backs 14, March 1983. See generally, Jacobs, supra note
305; Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution in Canada VoL 1
(1985),passin.
M. Langelan, "The Political Economy of Pornography" (1981), 5 Aegis; Cook, "The XRated Economy", Forbes,Sept. 18, 1978, at 81. In 1981, Americans spent $2.75 billion at
motion picture theatres, INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC 28A (R.
Gertner ed. 1984), and consumed $4.246 billion worth of phonograph records and tapes,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
237 (1984). In 1980, pornographic video cassettes outsold other video cassettes by three to
one. Langelan, ibid, at 8.
Galloway and Thornton "Crackdown on Pornography - A No-Win Battle" U.S. News
and World Report June 4th 1986, at 84.
313. Pornography is more than abstract speech; it is a horrifying, perhaps deadly, reality and
process for many women. See also MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supranote 301 at 337.
314. A. Dworkin, quoted in C. McKinnon, "Pornography as Sex Discrimination" (1986), 4
Law & Inequality 38, at 40 [hereinafter cited as "Discrimination"].
315. Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Discrimination"; ".... pornography, not alone but crucially,
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Second, concretizing their understanding of power(lessness), feminists
argue that pornography is primarily about physical and psychological
violence against women, not sex. 31 6 Violence is pervasive in pornography,
both hard and soft core; if one simply looks at it one can see that women
are the victims of routinized violence. Often, if the violence is not explicit,

it is implied or waiting in the background. Pornography both sanctions
and promotes violence against women. It terrorizes. 317 Moreover,
quantitatively and qualitatively, it is on the increase.31 8
Third, pornography as violence, through its production and
proliferation, directly harms women, individually and as an identifiable
group. The harm operates on several different levels.
a) "Models 3 19 who are directly involved in the porngraphy industry are
harmed. Many are hurt in the course of the "recruitment" and making
institutionalizes a subhuman victimized second class status for women in particular" at 44. See
also, "Speech", supra note 301; Feminism Unmodified at 200-201.

316. Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (1970); Robert StoUer, Perversion, The Erotic Form of
Hatred (1976); Colloquium, "Violent Pornography: Degradation of Women versus Right of
Free Speech" (1978-79), 8 N.Y.U. Rev. Law and Soc. Change, 181-308; Elizabeth Spahn "On
Sex and Violence" (1984-85), 20 New England L.Rev. 629; Edward Donnerstein, "Sex and
Censorship" (1984), 20(b) Film Comment 34-35; "Pornography: Its Effect on Violence
Against Women" in Pornographyand Sexual Aggression 53-81 (Malamuth and Donnerstein
eds. 1984); D. Linz, Steven Penrod, Ed. Donnerstein, The Question of Pornography:Research
Findings and Policy Implications (1987); "The Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography: The Gaps between the Findings and the Facts" (1987), 4 A.B.FR.J. 713; West,
"Hedonic Lives" supra note 164 at 66.
It must be made clear, however, that feminism distances itself from moralist objections. It
does not seek to repress sexuality nor object to the portrayal of sexual conduct, but seeks to
discriminate between pornography (violence) and erotica. It seeks to alter, not eradicate,
sexuality! See Gloria Steinem, "Erotica v. Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference", in
Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions 219 (1983). A. Dworkin Pornography 199-200
(1981). See also Ann Garry, "Pornography and Respect for Women" (1976-78), 4 Social
Theory and Practice 395; and Irene Diamond supra note 307 at 686.
MacKinnon appears not to agree with this analysis. She claims that this is a liberal position
which "trivialize(s) and evade(s) the essence of (the feminist) critique, while seeming to express
it". "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 343. See also "Linda's Life and Andrea's Work" in
Feminism Unmodified at 130. As I understand her, she appears to believe that so pervasive is
the inequality, hierarchy and domination of contemporary society that it is difficult to
distinguish violence from heterosexual sex. See also Dworkin, Intercourse(1987). She suggests
that the "violence not sex" critique fails to ask deeper questions of what are women's identities,
independent of that which are created for them by men.
317. A. Dworkin, "Pornography: The New Terrorism" (1978), The Body Politic, August,
1978; MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 426 at 301; Feminism Unmodified at 140.
318. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence", supra note 305; Mahoney, supra note 428 at 95;
Malamuth and Spinner, "A Longitidunal Context Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Best
Selling Erotic Magazines" (1980), 16 J. of Sex Research 226; But see D. Linz, Steven Penrod,
E. Donnerstein, The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The Gaps between the
Findings and the Facts" (1987), 4 A.B.ER.J. 713, 716-718.
319. The use of the word "model" is both accurate and intentional for in pornography these
women are treated as reified objects, not as persons.
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such movies,3 20 some have been killed. 32' The material doesn't lie ... the
women are hurting when they are "cut, beaten, tied and hung ...- 322

323
Often, pornography is a "recording, not a simulation of real violence".
The more "fortunate" women who are not physically hurt are reduced to
accessible orifices, objects of masculinist gratification, non-persons. There
324
is some evidence of self-hatred among pornographic models.
b) Harm is caused to women on whom men attempt to realize their
pornographic desires. The pithyist encapsulation of this claim is Robin
Morgan's proposition that "pornography is the theory, and rape is the
326
practice". 32 This can be understood as "pornography as text-book";
men force pornography on women and demand that they do what they
see. Pornography educates, instructs and inspires men in the art of "sexual
callousness". 327 It is claimed that there is a direct causal connection
between pornography and violence against women, a causality which "is
essentially collective and totalistic and contextual". 328 Viewed in this
320. K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (1979); L. Lovelace & M. McGrady, Ordeal (1980);
U.N. Economic and Social Council; Activities for the Advancement of Women: Equality
Development and Peace, Report of Jean Fernand-Laurent (March 17, 1983); Lederer, "Then
and Now: Interviews with a Former Pornography Model" Take Back the Night 57 (1980); A
Dworkin, "Pornography's 'Exquisite Volunteers"' Ms Magazine March 1981, at 65.
321. Snuff movies exist. See MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 33 fn. 61.
322. See Baldwin supra note 304 at 637.
323. West, "Hedonic Lives" supra note 164 at 68.
324. N. Van den Ven and D. Russell eds. Crimes Against Women: Proceedings of the
InternationalTribunal182-183 (1976).
325. Morgan, "Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape" in Going Too Far 163, 169
(1977); see also S. Griffin, Pornography and Silence (1981); Leah Fritz, "Pornography as
Gynocidal Propaganda" (1978-79), 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. Soc. Change 219.
326. Margaret Baldwin, "The Sexuality of Inequality" supra note 304 at 639.
327. Baldwin ibid at 640-641. For example, Brownmiller argues that pornography "promotes
a climate in which acts of sexual hostility directed against women are not only tolerated but
ideologically encouraged" Against Our Will 395 (1975).
328. C. MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 338. See also 323-324. "Speech", supra
note at 43-60; Feminism Unmodified at 202. Joel Bakan, supra note 305.
This claim stands in stark opposition to the conclusion reached by the 1970 Commission ...
"empirical research ... has found no reliable evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual
materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal sexual behaviour
among youth or adults". Report, supra note 304 at 139. For a critique, see Diamond, supra
note 307 at 693-697.
More recently, the Report on Pornographyand Prostitution in Canada, Vol. 1 (1985) was
reluctant but overt in admitting that it,
is not prepared to state, solely on the evidence and research it has seen, that
pornography is a significant causal factor in the commission of some forms of violent
crime, in the sexual abuse of children, or the disintegration of communities and
societies, at 99.
But the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography,FinalReport (1986) did find such
a causal connection at 324.
This has become the most controversal claim and a collosal amount of laboratoryresearch
has been put into (dis)proving that pornography increases misogyny and sexual callousness. A
catalogue of some of the studies includes: Baron, "The Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of
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light, pornography encourages and legitimizes practices such as sexual

harrassment, child abuse, assault and rape.
Worse still, women who are exposed to pornography internalize
pornography's misogynistic construction of their identity/nature, thus
Heightened Sexual Arousal" (1974), 30 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 318; Baron, "The
Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of Sexual Humor" (1978), 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych.
189; Baron, "Sexual Arousal and Physical Aggression: The Inhibiting Influence of 'Cheesecake
and Nudes"' (1974), 3 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 337; Baron and Strauss, "Sexual Stratification,
Pornography and Rape in the United States" and Court, "Sex and Violence: A Ripple Effect"
both in Pornographyand Sexual Aggression (Malamuth and Donnerstein eds. 1984); Mosher
& Katz, "Pornographic Films, Male Verbal Aggression Against Women, and Guilt" (1971), 8
Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 357; Siegman & Dintur,
"The Catharsis of Aggression and Hostility" (1977), 41 Psych'l Rep. 399; Zillmann, Johnson
& Hanrahan, "Pacifying Effect of Happy Ending of Communications Involving Aggression"
(1973), 32 Psych'l Rep. 967; Ziliman & Sapolsky, "What Mediates the Effect of Mild Erotica
on annoyance and Hostile Behaviour in Males? (1977), 35 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 587;
Donnerstein & Barrett, "Effects of Erotic Stimuli on Male Aggression Toward Females"
(1978), 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 180; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Barrett, "Where Is
the Facilitation of Media Violence: The Effects of Non-Exposure and Placement of Anger
Arousal" (1976), 10 J. Research Personality 386; Donnerstein, Donnerstein & Evans, "Erotic
Stimuli and Aggression: Facilitation or Inhibition" (1975) 32 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 237;
Jaffe & Berger, "Cultural Generality of the Relationship Between Sex and Aggression" (1977),
41 Psych'l Rep. 335; Jaffe, Malamuth, Feingold & Feshback, "Sexual Arousal and Behavioral
Aggression" (1974), 30 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 759; Lenes & Hart, "The Influence of
Pornography and Violence on Attitudes and Guilt" (1975), 45 J. Sch. Health 447; Loye,
"T.V.'s Impact on Adults: It's Not All Bad News" (1978), Psych. Today 87; Mueller, Nelson
& Donnerstein, "Facilitation Effects of Media Violence on Helping" (1977), 40 Psych'l Rep.
775; Tannenbaum, "Emotional Arousal As a Mediator of Erotic Communication Effects"
(1971), 8 Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 326;
Berkowitz, "Sex and Violence: We Can't Have It Both Ways" (1971), 5 Psychology Today 14;
Wills, "Measuring the Impact of Erotica" (1977), 11 Psychology Today 30; H. Eysenck & D.
Nias, Sex, Violence andthe Media 257 (1979); Donnerstein, "Aggressive Erotica and Violence
Against Women" (1980), 39 J. Personality and Social Psychology 269; Feschbach &
Malamuth, "Sex and Aggression: Proving the Link" (1978), 12 Psychology Today 110;
Malamuth and Donnerstein, PornographyandSexual Aggression (1984). See also Chervenak,
"Selected Bibliography on Pornography and Violence" (1979), 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 652, 65860;
My own viewpoint is that if we believe that "literature" can have a beneficial impact in
structuring our society, why can it not also have a negative impact? Although we must be very
careful about "inferring causality from correlational evidence", the nexus between
pornography and violence is certainly plausible. This is an intuitive and perhaps "unprovable
assumption ... "(Paris Adult Theatre v. Slton 413 U.S. 49, 60-61) (1972) but it can hardly
be denied that advertising doesn't work. Second, what we have here is a classic example of
sliding to the peripheral. Scientism and empiricism, the realm of experts, has become the
dominant and exclusive discourse in the thrust and parry of debate. Normative engagement is
displaced by a psuedo-objective debate which may obscure preconceptions and bias rather
than articulating them. For a critique of the androcentric tilt of scientism see Margaret Benston,
"Feminism and the Critique of Scientific Method" in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14 at
47. See also Evelyn Fox Keller, "Feminist Critique of Science" (1980), 1 Fundamenta
Scientiae.
Indeed the issue of pornography and violence is a classic example of the indeterminacy,
malleability and bias of scientific research, dependent upon the unquestioned assumptions.
Compare, for example, President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
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undercutting their autonomy, lowering their self image, crushing their
329
potential and permitting the continuance of male domination.
c) Women, in general, are harmed because they suffer from a hate
propaganda 330 which annihilates their dignity and self-respect as human

beings, by portraying them as no more than fuckable objects or degrading
them as virginal nymphomanics who need men to tame them, or beat
them. In this perspective, women are whores by nature, nothing more
than the sum of their sexual parts. Pornography, contributes in a vitally
important way to the continued exploitation and subordination of
women as a class, by constructing them as less than human. By
desensitizing men to the personhood of women, it helps construct and
33
reinforce women's lived reality of inequality. '
These themes are all brought together in the following lengthy
quotation by Andrea Dworkin:
In the United States, pornography is an $8-billion trade in sexual
exploitation.
(1969) with Report of Commission on Obscenity and Pornography(Washington, D.C., Govt.
Printing Office, 1970) which reach diametrically competing conclusions with respect to the
impact of the media on violence-inducing behaviour. See Diamond supra note 307 at 691.
Beyond this there is the fundamental issue of what qualifies as competent material. Should we
accept claims by people who work in women's shelters and police officers that in their
experience pornography and violence are related?
At least one U.S. case has already acknowledged the causal role of pornography in
promoting violence: State v. Herberg324 N.W. 2d 346 (Minn. 1982). Moreover, Judge Sarah
Evans Baker and Judge Frank Easterbrook both accepted that pornography does cause harm
... thereby going further than they may have intended to. They calculated, however, that the
harm was not so great as to merit an exception being made to the First Amendment. See
American Booksellers v. Hudnut 598 E Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984) all 771 F 2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985). For a useful discussion of this case see R. Benson, "Pornography and the First
Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut" (1986), 9 Harv. Women's Law Journal 153.
329. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of
Pornography" (1984), 7 Harvard Womens L.J. 5, 18; M. Vivar, "The New Anti-Female
Violent Pornography: Is Moral Condemnation the Only Justifiable Response?" (1981-82), 7
Law and Psych. Rev. 53,63.
330. Labelle, "The Propaganda of Misogyny" in Take Back the Night supra note 307, at 174;
Susan Brownmillar claims that "pornography is the undiluted essence of female propaganda"
in Against Our Will 394 (1975).
331. There is a fourth harm caused by pornography ... the harm to men. As Ms. Anthony
posits:
Violent pornography is also harmful to men and lessens the quality of community life
... It is dangerous for men to have the dehumanized view of sex which results from
viewing pornography. It distorts their image of women and debases them as well.
She continues:
"This type of propaganda portrayed in pornography is equally harmful to men and
women."
Dialogue, in "Colloquium on Violent Pornography" supranote 316, at 191-192.
Although the last sentence clearly goes too far, it must be recognized that pornography is not
necessarily good for men just because they like it, or use it voluntarily. If structures are
important, then it is not open to us to blithely identify voluntariness with "the good".

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

It is women turned into subhumans, beaver, pussy, body parts, genitals
exposed, buttocks, breasts, mouths opened and throats penetrated, covered
in semen, pissed on, shitted on, hung from light fixtures, tortured, maimed,
bleeding, disemboweled, killed.
It is some creature called female, used.
It is scissors poised in the vagina and objects stuck in it, a smile on the
woman's face, her tongue hanging out.
It is a woman being fucked by dogs, horses, snakes.
It is every torture in every prison cell in the world, done to women and
sold as sexual entertainment.
It is rape and gang rape and anal rape and throat rape: and it is the
woman raped, asking for more.
It is the woman in the picture to whom it is really happening and the
woman against whom the picture is used, to make them do what the
woman in the picture is doing.
It is the power men have over women turned into sexual acts men do
to women, because pornography is the power and the act.
It is the conditioning of erection and orgasm in men to the
powerlessness of women; our inferiority, humiliation, pain, torment; to us
as objects, things or commodities for use in sex as servants.
It sexualizes inequality and in doing so creates discrimination as a sexbased practice.
It permeates the political condition of women in society by being the
substance of our inequality however located - in jobs, in education, in
marriage, in life.
It is women, kept a sexual underclass, kept available for rape and
battery and incest and prostitution.
It is what we are under male domination; it is what we are for under
male domination.
It is the heretofore hidden (from us) system of subordination that
women have been told isjust life.
Under male supremacy, it is the synonym for what being a woman is.
It is access to our bodies as a birthright to men: the grant, the gift, the
permission, the license, the proof, the promise, the method, how-to; it is us
accessible, no matter what the law pretends to say, no matter what we
pretend to say.
It is physical injury and physical humiliation and physical pain: to the
women against who it is used after it is made; to the women used to make
it.
As words alone, or words and pictures, moving or still, it creates
systematic harm to women in the form of discrimination and physical
hurt. It creates harm inevitably by its nature because of what it is and what
it does. The harm will occur as long as it is made and used. The name of
the next victim is unknown, but everything else is known.
Because of it - because it is the subordination of women perfectly
achieved - the abuse done to us by any human standard is perceived as
using us for what we are by nature: women are whores; women want to
be raped; she provoked it; women like to be hurt; she says no but means
yes because she wants to be taken against her will which is not really her
will because what she wants underneath is to have anything done to her
that violates or humiliates or hurts her; she wants it, because she is a
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woman, no matter what it is, because she is a woman; that is how women
are, what women are, what women are for. This view is institutionally
expressed in law. So much for equal protection.
If it were being done to human beings, it would be reckoned an atrocity.
It is being done to women. It is reckoned fun, pleasure,
entertainment, sex,
332
somebody's (not something's) civil liberty no less.

3) FeministResponses to Pornography
Feminists have not limited themselves to merely describing and critiquing
the misogynistic nature of pornography. Reflecting their own horror and
fear of pornography, and motivated by the lived experience of other
women who have been its victims, feminists have developed various
strategies of political resistence, extra-legal, illegal, and legal.
Extra-legally, feminists have developed consumer boycott techniques
and economic sanctions such as picketing, letter-writing campaigns,
petitions and leafletting. On an educational level, they have developed
speak-outs, teach-ins, and published information on the producers,
distributors, exhibitors and users of pornography. There have been
consciousness-raising slide shows and documentaries on the harm caused
by pornography.33 3 Others have suggested the development of a

subversive, "alternative literature of arousal";33 4 or the creation of new
types of videos which would break the connection between sex and harm
33 5
and demonstrate the realizability of egalitarian sexual relationships.
Many feminists help the victims of pornography through abuse shelters.

Still others have participated in illegal "vigilante squads" which have, on

332. Andrea Dworkin, "Against the Male Flood" (1985), 8 Harvard Women's Law Journal
1, 10-11. For the legal correlative of such an understanding see the Anti-Pornography
Ordinance, Minneapolis Minn., Ordinance amending tit. 7, chs. 139 and 141, Minneapolis
Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights (Dec. 30, 1983). For a text, see Feminism
Unmodified at 262, footnote 1. I should also note that I do not think Dworkin's analysis can
qualify as a pornographic vignette. See Part A of this article at footnote 24 p. 310.
333. See for example, Not a Love Story.
334. Nancy W, Waring, "Coming to Terms with Pornography" (1986), 8 Research in Law
Deviance and Social Control 85; Paula Webster, "Pornography and Pleasure" (1981), 3
Heresies 48-51; Jessica Benjamin, "Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination" in
Powers of Desire 380-99 (Ann Snitow ed. 1983); Ann Snitow, "Mass Market Romance:
Pornography for Women is Different" in Snitow ibid at 245-263; D. English, "The Politics of
Porn" Mother Jones 20, April 1980; Ann Ferguson, "Sex War..." (1984), 10 Signs 106, 111;
Audre Lorde, "Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power", [1984] Sister Outsider55.
335. Ann Garry, "Pornography and Respect for Women" (1978), 4 Social Theory and
Practice 395; Bette Gordon's film "Variety" is even more "ambitious" in that it posits that
pornography is not a monolithic bloc, that it is potentially subversive and that attempts should
be made by women to appropriate its subversive elements to expand women's sexual freedom.
See Gordon "Variety: The Pleasure of Looking", in Pleasure and Danger Exploring Female
Sexuality 189-203 (C. Vance ed. 1984); but see Geraldine Finn, "Against Sexual Imagery:
Alternative or Otherwise" (1986), 12 Parallelogramme, which critiques the whole voyeuristic
technique as masculinist.

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

occasion, harassed both distributors and exhibitors, as well as
perpetrating organized vandalism.
Legally, feminists have been creative in developing common law and
statutory policies to both protect women and to try to hit the pornocrats
where it hurts. On the criminal plane, there have been calls for more
rigorous enforcement of laws on (sexual) assault and battering against
both the makers of pornography and men who live out their
pornographic desires on women. There have been arguments favouring
an expanded conception of obscenity so as to incorporate the feminist
interpretation of pornography, with limited success. 336 It has been
suggested that there be amendments to the hate literature provisions of
the Canadian Criminal Code so as to incorporate pornography 337 and
that pornographers be prosecuted under prostitution statutes.338 There has
been support, although qualified by some strong reservations, for new
anti-pornography legislation recently introduced by the current Canadian
339
administration, i.e. Bill C-54.
In the United States there has been feminist support for zoning
regulations, 3 and the use of public nuisance statutes in an attempt to
minimize access to the impact of pornography. 341 Tort law has presented
336. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence", supra note 305; Kathleen Mahoney, "Obscenity,
Morals and Law", supra note 303; Sheila Noonan, "Pornography" (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 61.
A judicial propensity to adopt such an approach has manifested itself in several Canadian
cases: R. v. Chin (unreported, Ont. Provincial Ct. 22nd Feb. 1983); R. v. Doug Rankine Co.
Lid (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 154; 9 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R. v. Ramsingh (1984), 14
C.C.C. (3d) 230 (Man. Q.B.) Ferg. J.; R. v. Wagner(1985),43 C.R. (3d) 318,36 Alta. L.Rev.
(2d) 301 (Q.B.) Shannon J.;
R. v. Red Hot Video (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 36 (B.C.C.A.) Nemetz
C.J.B.C.; Towne Cinema Theatres v. R, supra note 430.
337. Toronto Area Caucus of Women and the Law, 1984 Recommendations for the
Amendment of the Criminal Code, i.e. s. 159. For a discussion and proposed text see K. Lahey,
"Charter and Pornography", supra note 305 at 666.
338. L.D. Hutchins, "Pornography: The Prosecution of Pornographers Under Prostitution
Statutes - A New Approach" (1986-87), 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 977.
339. See supra note 305.
340. C. Jacobs, supra note 305. See e.g., Euclid v. Amber Reality Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Young v. American Mini Theatres 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
106 S.Ct. 925 (1986). See also Note "Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Zoning
Prohibition", 12 Seton Hall 311 (1981-82). At the municipal level in Canada there has been
a proliferation of by-laws which attempt to regulate obscene material through zoning
requirements and by direct regulating the sale of obscene material. For a listing of some of the
relevant municipal by-laws, see Mahoney, "Obscenity and Public Policy" (1986), 50 Sask.
L.Rev. 75, 100 n 132. Some cases that discuss the operation of these varied by-laws are Red
Hot Ideo Ltd v. City of Vancouver (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 153 (B.C.C.A.); Re Information
Retailers Association (1985), 22 D.L.Rev. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.); Re Hamilton Independent
Variety (1983), 143 D.L.Rev. (3rd) 498 (Ont. C.A.); Re Shalmark Hotels (1981), 32 O.R.
(2d) 129 (Ont. Div. Ct.); ReNordee Investments (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. C.A.).
341. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985). See C. Jacobs, supra note 305 at
48-51. L.D. Hutchins, supra note 338 at 981-983; "Colloquium on Violent Pornography",
supra note 316 at 197; Note, "Enjoying Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint
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itself as a potentially rich source of legal remedies including actions based

upon infringement of women's privacy, 342 mental distress, 343 private
nuisance, unauthorized sexual portrayals, 344 and the controversial antipornography ordinances developed by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
A. MacKinnon.3 4 There has also been the related claim that

pornography infringes Canadian provincial human rights codes.3 " It
seems to me that such activities are a tangible manifestation of the "ethic
of care" in practice, a significant effort "to apprehend the reality of the
other", and to act upon it.

IV. Feminism and the Turn to Law: Part of the Problem, Part of the
Solution
Sometimes you become what you are fighting.

347

Catharine MacKinnon
[while it is] unpleasant to be locked out ...
it is worse, perhaps, to be
locked in
Virginia Wolf348
Pornography has backed women into a corner: through its integral
connection with violence it is a threat to the health, safety and even
existence of women. 349 Women, if they are to protect themselves from
Doctrine" (1984), 84 Col. L.Rev. 1616; "Regulation of Obscenity through Nuisance Statutes"
(1983), 19 Wake Forest L.Rev. 7; "Pornography, Padlocks and Prior Restraints" (1983), 58
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1478; Bendleman, "Civilizing Pornography, The Case for an Exclusive
Obscenity Nuisance Statute" (1977), 44 U. Chic. L.Rev. 509; O'Connor, "Nuisance
Abatement Law" (1977), 46 Fordham L.Rev. 57; Oglesby, "Porno non est pro bono publico"
(1977), 4 Hastings Constit. L.Q. 385.
342. Barbara S. Bryant, "Sexual Display of Women's Bodies - A Violation of Privacy"
(1980), 10 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 1211; Ruth Colker, "Pornography and Privacy: Towards
the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy" (1983), 1 Law
and Inequality 191.
343. J. Bakan, supra note 305.
344. Ruth Colker, "Regulation of Unauthorized Sexual Portrayals" (1986-87), 20 New
England L.Rev. 687.
345. Anti-Pornography Ordinances, supra note 332. Some Canadian Feminists also support
such measures. See "AGM Rejects New Porn Bill" (1987), 2 Feminist Action 7.
346. Sask Human Rights Comm v. Waldo (1985), 5 Can. Human Rights Rep. 17609-17783
or 2074.
347. Feminism Unmodified at 91.
348. A Room of Ones Own cited in Showalter "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness" (198182), 8 Critical Inquiry 179, 181.
349. The Amicus Curiae Brief - Linda Marchiano and Estate of Dorothy Stratten at 18-19,
Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Docket No. 84-3147 (7th Cir. 1985) cites studies
which show that between one-fifth and one-third of all women reported some sort of
childhood sexual encounter with an adult male, that forty-four percent of all women had
reported an attempted or completed rape in their lives, that twenty-one percent of women who
had ever been married reported physical violence by a husband. MacKinnon stresses that these
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these atrocities, to survive, must do something about it.3 1° There is no
alternative ... it is a matter of life and death. Feminism as the voice and
practice of womankind must respond. It cannot abandon women to the
35 2
pomographers, 35 1 the rapists, the batterers.
The question is how. 35 3 It is at this exact point that the anguishing

dilemma between theory and practice, vision and need, aspiration and
immediacy comes into sharp relief. Political necessity dictates do
whatever is possible to protect women, and the law presents itself as a
potentially important arena for self-defence. Yet, at the same time, a
consciousness of the violence that is inscribed within the very idea and
practice of contemporary law itself may make resort to law problematic,
perhaps even antithetical to a movement that considers the ethic of care
to be an important facet of its agenda.
From the earliest days of the women's movement, struggle in the legal
arena has been a central component of feminist practice. Recognizing
that law is a constitutive element of the polity, feminists have sought to
make the law more responsive to womens' needs by gaining access to
their own property, achieving suffrage, having their reproductive
autonomy at least partially recognized, sponsoring changes to rape laws,
lobbying for pay equity, and litigation through the highest courts in the
land. Furthermore, Canadian feminists have achieved what the E.R.A.
movement failed to do: they have had equality provisions enshrined to
the Constitution.
Clearly these achievements have not resulted in substantive equality or
anything like it, but what they do suggest is that the legal system is
flexible enough to respond to women's needs, that progress - in the
liberal sense of the word - is being made by women. They suggest that
women and feminists are gradually gaining access to the corridors of
traditional power, that their demands are being heard, and even acted
upon, and that law is a worthwhile arena for social and political activity
for women. In the light of such a long history of exclusion,

statistics reflect only reported abuse, and that substantial amounts of sexual and domestic
violence are generally agreed to go unreported.
She argues,
Pornography is at the centre of a cycle of abuse that cannot be reached or stopped
without reaching or stopping the pornography that is its incentive, product, stimulus
and realization,
"Pornography as Sex Discrimination" supra note 314 at 48.
350. So also, must socially conscious and politically responsible men.
351. Lahey "Charter and Pornography", supra note 301 at 671.
352. MacKinnon, "Agenda", supra note 146.
353. As Marilyn French points out, "the major problem facing feminists can be easily summed
up: there is no clear right way to move". Beyond Power at 484.
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marginalization and subordination, such victories are undoubtedly
encouraging, even exhilarating. Thus, when pornography becomes a
concern for feminists it is inevitable that the quest for legal remedies
should become one of the central components of the feminist
programme.
The history of feminist jurisprudence, although covering a much
shorter time span, broadly maps the development of the feminist legal
agenda. Some of the earliest examples of feminist jurisprudence criticised
the exclusion of women and issues which were of particular concern to
women, from both the law and jurisprudential reflections on the legal
system, while simultaneously highlighting the pervasive male biases and
assumptions. 354 This "first wave" was followed by what might be
described as a "demand for access" scholarship, a filling in of the gaps so
3 55
as to render the legal system more fair.
A third wave in feminist legal scholarship suggested that the second
approach was inadequate in that it did not adequately comprehend the
deep structural embeddedness of androcentricity in law, and therefore its
ability to resist feminist input. 356 This approach suggested that the
feminist critique and reconstruction of law would have to be even more
ambitious, and difficult, than had hitherto been realized. It highlighted the
epistemologically gendered nature of law itself, that law is a vital part of
the power/knowledge/ideology matrix that structures our lived
experiences. For example, Catharine MacKinnon's critique of traditional
rape law poignantly highlights the way in which the "neutrality" and
"objectivity" of that law is, in reality, premised upon a deeply entrenched
male viewpoint, that is, the viewpoint of the rapist or potential rapist, and
not women, the victims of rape. She argues that if we were to seriously
consider and adopt an understanding of rape that reflects women's
357
understanding of rape, then the law would be very different.
While I do not wish to cast doubt on the significance of these
achievements of feminist practice or theory, nor denigrate their
importance, I think that a critical jurisprudence must continue to push
forward and point out their potential limitations, and possible dangers. In
the spirit of the feminist dynamic already traced in this paper, there must

354. See for example J. Rilkin, "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy" (1980), 3 Harv.
WL.J. 83; D. Polan. "Towards a Theory of Law and Patriarchy"; N. Taub and E. Schneider,

"Perspectives on Womens Subordination and the Role of Law" in Kairys, The Politicsof Law
12 & 4 & 3 (1983).
355. W Chafe, Women and Equality (1977). For a review and assessment of the theory and
practice of such perspectives, see Olsen, supra note 8 at 1529-1560.
356. See e-g. Olsen, The Sex of Law, (unpublished manuscript, 1984).
357. MacKinnon, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 209.
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be a continual critical consciousness of the pervasiveness of andocentrism
at every level, with the correlative progressive imperative "to question
everything". I will concentrate my reflections first on the theoretical end
of the spectrum, and then return to a discussion of the legal remedies
proposed by anti-pornography activists.
I am concerned that the feminist emphasis on unpacking the deep
structural ideological assumptions of law - the sex of law - has,
perhaps, led to the under-emphasis on the "how of law". By the "how of
law" I mean the way in which law is made material or relevant in a
community, the operational norms of law. The feminist analysis of the
ideological significance of law is crucial, but feminism must also be
careful to remain conscious that law is more than an ideology, that it is
"operationalized" in very specific ways, that contemporary law is a vital
mechanism of social control and political domination. As I have
suggested in Part A of this essay, it is the subtle interplay of violence and
ideology, not their disjunction, that accounts for the genius of law.
Consequently, if violence is an androcentric quality, 358 or the product of
a male dominated society unable to reconcile the tension between "self"
and "other", then the bias of law may be even more deeply embedded
than even the most progressive feminist insights have already uncovered.
The feminist critique and reconstruction must, therefore, not only unravel
and rework the politically partisan nature of law, it must develop visions
of the very operation of law itself, and confront the problematic
relationship between care, control and coercion. A feminist jurisprudence
must invoke its critical ability to take a "double look" 359 at law, for the
patriarchal unconscious may be even more deeply entrenched than we
3
have yet understood. 0
To elaborate, it is not simply the instrumental problem of how to make
traditionally sexist laws, legal institutions and legal actors respond to the
needs of women, although this is important, but the more fundamental
dilemma of maintaining feminist visions and aspirations while at the
same time moving from "here" to "there". Put differently, if the purpose
358. S. Brownmiller, Against Our Wills (1975).
359. See for example, Peggy MacIntosh, "Feeling Like a Fraud" (1985) (unpublished

manuscript, Wellesley College) for a fruitful discussion of feminist's ability to critically "double
vision" concepts, ideologies and practices;

We need a double vision [double consciousness] both of what the dominant culture
stands for and what we lower caste people who are undervalued can develop in the way
of a critique of the dominant culture, bid, at 8 and 15.
360. I should point out that my aim is not to further impose burdens on those who are already

denied equality, to make their life even more oppressive and demanding. I also believe that
men should be incorporating -the ethic of care in their law-making, my point here is to ask "at
what price access" and "on whose terms?"
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of feminism is, at least in part, to challenge domination, 361 to create a
society founded upon and structured by desiderata such as the
preservation of relations, "the ability to apprehend the reality of
others", 362 a rejection of violence and the avoidance of harm 363 then
recourse to contemporary law, and all the violent baggage and
364
underpinnings that go along with it,
appears to contradict the long term
goal, perhaps "recreat(ing) the patterns of oppression that feminism arose
to combat". 365 Even if law is a powerful political tool, feminists must
confront the difficult and profoundly disturbing question of whether they
are, at bottom, merely substituting an agenda that is itself lamentably
imbricated with violence for that of a male agenda, and not a feminist
reconstruction of law. Would it be a feminist mimicry of male discourse
and practice, not a transformative alternative? Does it run the risk of
being a capitulation to, not a rejection of, patriarchal lore, lure and
law? 3 66 Contemporary law, understood simply as an instrument of social
engineering,3 67 may be an anathema to some of the basic tenets of
feminism. Legal fetishism may be more deeply entrenched in the popular
and legal psyches than we had ever imagined or feared.3 68
361. Scales, supra note 179 at 1382; Sheila Rowbotham, Woman's Estate (1973); Mary Daly,
Beyond God the Father(1973).
362. Jean Grimshaw, Ch. 7, supra note 44.
363. See, J.D. Wine, Hughes and Finn in Feminism in Canada,supra note 14 at 83, 287 and
306; Ruth Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards a Feminist-Theological Discourse" 51
(1988) (unpublished manuscript); Gilligan, Voice passim.
364. MacKinnon is aware of this in her earlier work. "The law sees and treats women in the
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the
social order in the interest of men as a gender, through its legitimizing norms, relation to
society, the substantive policies." "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 209 at 644 [emphasis
added.] However, like most critical legal scholars, she tends to emphasize the ideological
significance of law - in this case embedded maleness - at the expense of the coercive/violent
aspects. Consequently, her transformative vision is pitched at the ideological level, which is no
doubt crucial, but again partial.
365. Ferguson, supra note 43 at 203.
366. Sandra Gilbert, Introduction to Newly Born Woman at xi.
367. See for example, Ann Scales, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 179; Elizabeth
Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: (1986), 61 New York U.L.Rev. 589;
MacKinnon, "Discourse", at 72.
368. By attempting to highlight embeddedness of violence of law and the potential
connections with patriarchy, I am here attempting to continue the feminist project of
consciousness-raising, to illuminate the structures of domination as they exist both externally
and internally, consciously and unconsciously. See further MacKinnon, "Agenda" supra note
146 at 519-520.
Again, in light of the feminist emphasis of contextualism, I think it is appropriate to
remember who is speaking when we discuss legal remedies. We are lawyers. Despite our
counterhegemonic aspirations, our radicalism and our feminism, we are also lawyers who
conceive of the world through a legalistic grid and who incorporate that perspective in
everything we do, even if, as MacKinnon says, "we are feminists first". I fear that law and legal
discourse are magnetic and imperialistic, colonizing our creative imaginations and constraining
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Nor can these dilemmas be resolved by attempting to distinguish
between means and ends, 369 because, as history demonstrates, once one
begins to adopt a certain methodology that has an ineluctable impact on
the consequences. Means and ends, methods and outcomes, processes
and goals coexist in a symbiotic relationship. As Cheryl Cohen comments
in the context of "sexuality",
I think a political movement that uses any means to its end is doomed to
achieve an undesirable end. A feminist political praxis that uses any means
to tear down patriarchy may find that the practices it advocates ultimately
construct the personalities of the next generations. If feminists advocate
sexual practices which, when removed from a context of caring, can
become objectifying and dehumanizing, they may thereby be responsible
for an experimentalism with desire that sets not limits and gives no
guidelines for constructive and healthy relations between persons. They
may succeed in escaping from patriarchal constructions of sexuality, but
they may also thereby destroy the human caring and responsibility that
give us hope for a better. world. I think ethics is essential to all
politics but
370
particularly in the traumatic transition to an unknown future.
We can concretize and contextualize these reflections through a brief
review of some of the legal strategies suggested by feminists to deal with
pornography. Proposals grounded in the criminal law sanction are the
most obviously problematic in so far as there is a clear invocation of the
repressive and punitive powers of the state, in support of feminist's
preferred agenda. The feminist challenge only goes so far as to change the
object of state imposed violence, not the nature of law itself. As such, it
reflects the concerns of the "demand for access approach", the "second
wave" of feminist jurisprudence.
Do the civil law remedies, those which are tortious or human rights
based, avoid this same problem? Do they attempt something that is more
transgressive or transformative? An analysis of the anti-pornography
ordinances may prove to be particularly useful at this point.

our emancipatory potentials by the shackles of seeking solutions to politico-social problems
through law. I am frightened by the thought that the pervasiveness of legal ideology may be
so deeply engrained that nothing seems possible without the invocation of its sanctifing blessing
through violence. Equalitarianism, if prioritized, may result in "an equality of
dehumanization". (Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution andRevolt 75 (1972)).
Similar concerns about the tension-ridden relationship between feminism and legalism,
particularly as "legalist loyalties" may tend to trump the feminist methodology of
consciousness-raising, have been voiced by Robin West, "Hedonic Lives", supra note 164 at
44-45.
369. For a critique of means and ends thinking as malist alienating dichotomies, see A. Miles,
"I.F.P.", supranote 21 at 482, "IF", ibid at 59-60.
370. "The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics" (1986), 2 Hypatia 71, 84-85; see
also, Grimshaw, supra note 44 at 214-221; Steinham, "Feminist Ethic", ibid at 62.
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Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, encouraged by the
admittedly limited successes of judicial response to actions based upon
sexual harrassment, have developed the anti-pornography ordinance that
would allow women to pursue civil remedies against the pornocrats. In
so far as such an approach does not invoke the criminal law remedy it
does not call on the coercive power of the state. Indeed, MacKinnon sees
this argument as being the main reason why the ordinance is neither
prior-restraint nor censorship. She is at pains to point out that the
ordinance is different from obscenity legislation. 371 Moreover, the
ordinances attempt to rework the evaluative criteria of law in so far as
they attempt to materialize in legal terms the harmful significance which
women attach to pornography. Viewed in this light, such proposals
encompass some of the concerns of the "third wave" of feminist
jurisprudence.
However, despite the important step forward that such ordinances
achieve, they still fail to come to terms with the concern of what might
be called the "fourth wave" of feminist jurisprudence, the inquiry into the
way in which legal norms are operationalized. MacKinnon has, on many
occasions, reiterated the claim that the ordinances do not invoke the
power of the state, rather they empower women. However, such a
dichotomous view is difficult to maintain, and cannot be justified on the
basis of the formalistic distinction between civil and criminal law. The
ordinances were lobbied for and achieved or defeated through statist fora,
municipal governments and/or courts. Although the plaintiff in cases is
intended to be a private person, the channels through which the action
must go - human rights commissions, courts - are statist institutions. 372
The process of empowering women, therefore, does not take place in the
absence of the state, but rather through the state.
This attempt to highlight the continued influence of the state should
not be interpreted as being libertarian or anti-statist, for the state must be
central in any project of transformation. Rather, it is simply a reminder

371. See e.g. FeministUnmodified at 140.
372. More recently MacKinnon has withdrawn from her earlier view that the ordinances do
not empower the state to admit, "It does not empower the state in the direct way that an
obscenity law does" "Discourse", at 34. The key word here, of course, is "direct", and again,
later, she posits that "we have the audacity to think that we might be able to use the state to
help (empower women)". Ibid at 72. Thus MacKinnon's concerns about the state are very
different than my own. Her main concern is emphasizing the non-statist nature of the
legislation is to distinguish the ordinance so as not to be open to accusations of prior restraint,
censorship or the danger of the legislation backfiring. She does not deal with the concern of the
violence of law. On the contrary, on one occasion she suggests that it may be "worth
considering" the use of the United States federal criminal law power, in appropriate
circumstances. "Speech", supra note 301 at 61, footnote 44.
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that so pervasive and multifaceted is the structure of the state in postindustrial, patriarchal society that is difficult to evade its influence. My
main point is narrower, however. The reason why civil law remedies specific performance or damages - are attractive in the first place is
because they might just be enforced against the producers or consumers
of pornography. But the enforcement of civil remedies is completely
dependent upon the coercive apparatus of state, in the same way as the
criminal law power. Consequently, the ordinances, although innovative
and creative, are also overdetermined by the threat and potential
actualization of violence and, in their own way, although perhaps at a
later stage, reinforce women's dependency on the normalization of
violence. The cycle is difficult to break.
None of this is to say that feminism is internally debarred from
recourse to law in all circumstances. I am not so utopian or naive as to
believe that by avoiding or ignoring law it will simply wither away, or
that recourse to law is not a necessary step in any political movement. I
am neither advocating an abandonment of law nor "counselling
abdication of the state altogether" 3 73 Nor am I saying that women should
not use violence to defend themselves against male violence. 374 Rather, I
am suggesting that feminists be very wary of the seeming potential of law
for it is also quicksand that could silently but effectively bury the
emancipatory impulse that motivates so much of feminism. Rephrased, if
the ethic of care is a constitutive element of contemporary feminism, its
"injunction not to hurt others" would suggest that there is a prima facie
presumption against legal remedies, while the burden of proof is on those
who support legal remedies to demonstrate that the returns are worth the
risk.

37 5

373. A stance which MacKinnon ascribes to Marxism in "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra
note 209 at 643.
374. MacKinnon once asked, "Don't they want us to learn how to kill?" in "Women Who
Kill" (1983), 34 Stanford L.Rev. at 732.
Although I am no pacifist, I would certainly prefer if people did not know how to kill.
Having said that, and to be more gender specific, I think that there clearly are circumstances
in which it may be appropriate for women to do violence to men, and even kill them. The
obvious example is women who are subject to seriously abusive relationships. And I think that
it is appropriate for feminists to defend these women from the prosecutorial violence of the
state. My objection is to the uncritical reinforcement of the violence of modern law. Direct
action by women is less of a problem for me because, like abortions, such actions are hardly
taken lightly, and is unlike the violence of the law which, as Cover has pointed out, is
structured so as to minimize our resistence to violence.
375. By risk I mean several different things. First there is risk articulated in this paper, the risk
of foregoing an important aspect of the feminist vision. Second there is the political risk that
such legislation will backfire, hurting the women's movement rather than helping it. Third,
there is the risk that strategies of legal regulation may be unduly divisive of the women's
movement at the expense of a strategy the precedents for which are hardly encouraging.
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I am not saying that feminists should not pursue legal remedies to the
problem of pornography. That would be to say too much, it would be too
judgemental, too authoritarian, too despotic. I do not "know" what
feminists know; pornography does not, cannot, impact my life the way it
does womens' lives. But it seems to me that the question posed by
pornography and the appropriate feminist response creates a moment of
"crisis and transition"37 6 for feminist theory and praxis. In their attempts
to effectively deal with the pornographic assault, feminists may take the
opportunity to respond in ways that are innovative and transgressive,
motivated by an awareness of interconnectedness and inspired by an
ethic of care that continues to "apprehend the reality of the other". 377 Or,
feminists may take recourse to "the cycle of repetition that has extended
across generations a cold loneliness" 378 concretized in the impersonalized
corpus of a determinatively repressive law. That choice is one that must
be made by women and feminists, as a community, not by another.
V)

Conclusion
To be without a conclusion or destination, is not, however, to be without
purpose.
379
Elizabeth Meese

It has been widely recognized that, even taken in their best light, women's progress through
law has been a "mixed bag" and even reactionary. MacKinnon herself is acutely conscious of
the paucity of success in achieving equality through legal remedies.
The abortion right, framed as a right to privacy rather than a right to sex equality, was
recognized, only to be taken almost immediately from women who have least access to
it ... women are poor and their pay is at least as far from being sex-equal as it was
before the passage of legislation guaranteeing pay equality by law. Women are more
and more losing custody of their children, in part because of legal reforms feminists
helped put in place. The rape rate is increasing significantly, while the conviction rate
for rape is not, in spite of legal changes feminists fought for and won over the last
decade....
Feminism Unmodified at 1 (footnotes omitted).
376. Gilligan, Voice, ch. 4.
377. I would attach one important proviso to my concerns. As should be clear my primary
concern is law's disregard of our common humanity as persons. If law is used against nonhumans, "legal persons" as we rather euphemistically call "corporations", then many of my
concerns are less important. Corporations are not sentient, and within my value structure are
less important than people. But again, that should not be interpreted carte blanche, a
formalistic approach cannot be adopted. Many corporate bodies are simply real persons
acknowledged to have a particular legal status. Others are large empires distinct from the
people who stand behind them. I am more comfortable if the contextual approach is adopted,
to distinguish between those who could be subject to the violence of law, and those who should
not.
378. Voice, at 107.
379. Crossingthe Double-Cross:The PracticeofFeminist Criticism(1987) at xii.
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Imagination: ... "not merely for changing institutions but for human

relationships; not merely for equal rights, but for a new kind of being" 380
Adrienne Rich
I have covered a great deal of ground in this essay. Through a discussion
of subjugated knowledges, in the spirit of a jurisprudential archeological
dig, and motivated by the feminist preference for transdisciplinary
research and reflection, I have attempted to unearth at least one of the
foundations of our received jurisprudential tradition. The exposition of
law's antifactual nature, in turn, opened up an interrogative space in
which to investigate some hitherto unquestioned assumptions that
provide the mortar for the edifice. Through an extensive discussion of
some of the tensions of contemporary feminism, I suggested the
possibility of an alternative juridical construct, one that transcends and
displaces the thanatical impulse that has underpinned patriarchal society
and plagued the dominant jurisprudential tradition. But I do not offer a
tidy conclusion, for the invocation of closure usually obscures and
excludes more than it enlightens or resolves."' Moreover, the centrality
which feminism and modernism afford to openness sits uncomfortably
with the traditional legal quest for right answers.
However, in order to be as clear as possible, it may be useful if I
attempt to forestall some possible misinterpretations. For many women,
and perhaps some men, this paper may be problematic, accommodating,
deradicalizing, condescending, arrogant, offensive, or perhaps even
insulting. Some may understand it as setting up feminism as either
glorificationally redemptive or vindictively retributive, a jurisprudential
twist to the madonna/whore stereotype, or the double-standard, yet
again. Others may interpret my support of the ethic of care as an attempt
to modernize the "cult of pure womanhood" 382 or as hopelessly
sentimentalized, romantic or naive. Some may interpret it as the product
of the "abstract refuges of academia", turning "women into a field or an
idea or a subspeciality, an artifact of one theoretical approach or
another". 383 It may well be construed as a "magical approach to social
change ...(a) 'let's pretend' strategy (that) is idealist and elitist both". 384
Others, less benignly, may see it as the blame-the-victim strategy, thinly

380. In "Toward a Woman Centred University" Lies Secrets and Silence (1979) at 125 at
155.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Barbara Johnston, The CriticalDifference (1981).
Barbara Berg, The Remembered Gate (1979).
Feminism Unmodified at 216.
Feminism Unmodified at 219.
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disguised.385 At the bottom such responses are probably based in a belief
that the article and myself manifest "virtually no commitment to
change" 38 6 caught up in a "conception of politics as fantasy and
entertainment". 387 Others may characterize my reflections as either
oblivious to, or trivializing of, the oppression of women, an effort to deny
them recourse to one of the few remedies they may have available to
challenge patriarchy.
I want to resist such criticisms. The purpose of this paper is not
negation, rather it is an attempt to contribute to the feminist demand for
constant conversation 388 from the perspective of what might be called a
"feminist-positive" 389 male. As the celtic triptych in Part A might suggest,
my commitment to change is fundamental, and it is that which leads me
to ask the questions I have asked, posit the dilemmas I have posed, and
suggest the suggestions I have made. 390 Emphatically, to problematize is
not to stymie. Rather, it is to continue the feminist critical dynamic, to
locate and challenge patriarchy and domination in all their forms and to
raise the possibility of their transcendence. This is not masculinist
ventriloquism. I am not speaking for women. I am attempting to speak
with women about opportunities, aspirations and visions which some
have claimed to be a central component of their agenda. My question
asks whether the legal tools, unless radically refurbished, can deconstruct
the master's house?391 I suggest that law can be a vital terrain in the
process of emancipating women, but only if remade in a fundamentally
different way. Like a magnet in a force field I am drawn towards the
practical suggestions that MacKinnon and other feminists have made in
an effort to access the tools of law; yet, simultaneously, law appears to
stay the same, except that the constituency has changed. 392 Such a

385. Another variation may be, "why experiment on the most vulnerable?" See Minow, "Part
of the Solution, Part of the Problem" Review, J. Handler, The Conditionsof Discretion(1986),
34 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 981, 1000.
386. Feminism Unmodified at 216.
387. Feminism Unmodified at 221.
388. Editorial (1987), 12 Signs 619, 620.
389. Sean Mullarkey, "Can a Man Be a Feminist" (Paper for "Legal Status Based on Sex",
Dalhousie University) (Spring 1988).
390. Without slipping into the danger of believing that thinking is doing, Karl Barth posits
that, "transformation of thought is the key to the problem of ethics, for it is the place where
the turning about takes place by which [we] are directed to new behaviour". The Epistle to the
Romans 438 (1933).
391. Andre Lorde, "The Master's Tools" supranote 206.
392. As Robin West says in a different context,
We must begin to make good on our promise to change the discourse with our
presence, instead of simply changing ourselves to fit the discourse.
"Hedonic Lives" supranote 164 at 10.
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viewpoint, I think, comes dangerously close to seeing the law as neutral
and capturable, if only the right strategies could be developed. It reminds
me of legal realism's aspirations for social engineering through law. As

such, it ignores the traditions, values, and elements imbricated within the
very structure of contemporary law, a central value being violence. 393 The
critique and renovation envisioned by such a practice are partial rather
than transformative, perhaps even more of the same. Traditional power
not only corrupts, it deradicalizes alternative power structures. Feminism
does provide a unique opportunity for the actual reconstitution of law,

not just its reworking. Speculation, imagination and hope, on their own,
cannot make things otherwise, but without them it is difficult to know
where to go.
My fear is that it may be possible to detect a pincer movement
confronting feminism. If it is true that pornography's proliferation and
increasing violence is due, in part, to a reaction against feminism,394 then
feminism's attempt to take refuge in and seek remedies through the law
may be reinforcing the modus operandi of patriarchal society rather than

393. On occasion, MacKinnon does explicitly articulate concerns about the nature of law, but
once again her comments are underdeveloped, and do not fit with the more instrumentalist
approach which characterizes most of Feminism Unmodified For example,
The law - like the hunt, warfare and religion - has been a male sphere. The qualities
and values of these pursuits have defined the male role and public life. They have
defined what power means. [Feminism Unmodified at 26.]
She continues,
The feminist question for the future of women's rights is: if we acquire and use these
forms of power, including economics (the modern equivalent of the hunt), the use of
physical force (of which war is a form), and the tools of law (the secular religion) will
we use them differently. [Feminism Unmodified at 26.]
This comment is important, I think. MacKinnon draws the analogy between religion and
law rather than force and law. This suggests that MacKinnon understands law more in the
context of its educative, ideological manifestations, rather than its coercive elements. This
interpretation that MacKinnon primarily understands law as ideological is reinforced later
when she discusses the educative effect of law in relation to pornography. [Feminism
Unmodified at 131,223.]
This view is problematic. It is insufficiently cognizant of the coercive role of law, with its
built-in hierarchy, domination and subordination. It ignores the possibility that although the
ideological function of law may be dominant, its coercive function is determinative. Law
certainly does educate, but it is an education reinforced by violence, or the threat of violence,
an education based on fear, terror. Remember Plato. In turning to the law to fight hierarchy,
there is a very real danger of simply replacing one hierarchical relationship with another,
adding momentum to an already eschatological spiral.
Only once in her most recent work does she recognize the fundamentally coercive nature of
the law, when she opines, "law being a form of combat". [Feminism Unmodified at 75.]
394. See for example, Dworkin, "Why So-Called Radical Men Love and Need Pornography"
in Lederer, "Night" supra note 307, 148 at 153; Sally Wagner, "Pornography and the Sexual
Revolution: The Backlash of Sadomasochism", Against Sadomasochism: A RadicalFeminist
Analysis 23 Linden, ed., (1982).
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challenging it. Pathological pornography terrifies women, thereby
limiting the feminist agenda to a politics of fear, rather than a politics of
hope. Patriarchal society will only allow feminism a very limited defence
mechanism, one which is circumscribed by a masculinist ideology. Thus
between them, pornograpy and law, aggressor and defender, they encircle
the radical transgressive potential of feminism, terrorize it and
disempower it. By offering it as a potentially helpful defence mechanism,
law - as it is currently constituted - may lead feminism to forgo too
quickly its transformative, jurisgenerative potential, adopting a policy of
resistance at the price of partial incorporation.

